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INTRODUCTION
A. The Past
Probably the most important development in administrative
law in the 1980s came not from federal courts, nor even from
Congress, but from Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush.
In two executive orders, President Reagan asserted vigorous
centralized control over the regulatory process. The first such
order, Executive Order 12291, laid out a set of substantive princi-
ples, most notably cost-benefit analysis, and said that these prin-
ciples would be binding on executive agencies to the extent per-
mitted by law.' This Order also contained an important proce-
dural provision. It required all major regulations to be accompa-
nied by a "regulatory impact analysis," which would be submitted
for review and approval to the Office of Information and Regula-
tory Affairs ("OIRA"), an institution within the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget ("OMB").2 The order amounted to an effort to
promote centralized OMB control of the regulatory process, to be
conducted in accordance with presidential policies favoring dereg-
ulation and close attention to cost.
President Reagan's second relevant executive order, Execu-
tive Order 12498, went a step further. It required each agency to
submit an "annual regulatory plan," consisting of proposed ac-
tions for the next year, that was to be included in a publicly
available annual document, the Regulatory Program of the Unit-
ed States.3 Under this order, all agencies were required to sub-
mit their proposals to OIRA for review and approval.4 New ini-
tiatives not included in the annual plan were permitted only
under a narrow set of circumstances.5 The Order placed OIRA in
the center of regulatory planning.
The Reagan initiatives were defended with several theoreti-
cal and empirical arguments. National bureaucracies are numer-
ous, even chaotic, and regulations that are nominally indepen-
dent of one another may produce considerable inconsistency in
practice. Some degree of presidential review of the regulatory
process is probably necessary to promote political accountability
and to centralize and coordinate the regulatory process. These
1 Exec Order No 12291 § 2, 3 CFR 128 (1981), reprinted in 5 USC § 601 note (1988).
2 Id § 3 at 128-30.
' Exec Order No 12498, 3 CFR 323 (1985), reprinted in 5 USC § 601 note (1988).
4 Id at 324.
6 Id at 324-35.
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are important goals, particularly in light of the need for sensible
priority setting in a nation that devotes extraordinary resources
to some minor problems and low levels of funding to some major
problems.'
In addition, the cost of regulation-perhaps as high as $400
billion annually,7 with up to $124 billion spent on environmental
regulation alone--is too high for the benefits received.9 We
could obtain the same level of benefits far more cheaply. Perhaps
centralized presidential control could diminish some of the char-
acteristic pathologies of modern regulation-myopia, interest-
group pressure, draconian responses to sensationalist anecdotes,
poor priority setting, and simple confusion. In theory, OMB con-
trol promised to bring about not only greater political account-
ability, but also more in the way of technocratic competence, thus
returning to the original New Deal goal of combining democratic
and technocratic virtues. ° Many people thought that the new
system of OMB oversight was admirably well suited to overcom-
ing the difficulties in the regulatory process."
Despite these points, the Reagan orders were extremely
controversial. The criticisms fell into four basic categories:
1. Some people said that the orders involved an unlawful and
counterproductive transfer of authority from regulatory agencies
to OMB. This transfer of authority, it was said, disregarded the
comparative expertise of the agencies and violated the law, which
gave the President no power to bring about any such transfer.
2
The transfer was especially controversial in light of the percep-
tion that OMB would be unduly biased against regulation. 3
6 See Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation
19, 23-28 (Harvard, 1993). See also Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and
Government, Risk and the Environment: Improving Regulatory Decision Making (1993).
' Thomas D. Hopkins, The Costs of Federal Regulation, 2 J Reg & Soc Costs 5, 25
table 2 (1992).
' Michael Kellogg, After Environmentalism: Three Approaches to Managing Environ-
mental Regulation, Regulation 25 (No 1, 1994).
' See Robert W. Hahn and John A. Hird, The Costs and Benefits of Regulation:
Review and Synthesis, 8 Yale J Reg 233, 253-54 (1990).
10 See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 Harv L Rev 421,
440-45 (1987).
" See, for example, Christopher C. DeMuth and Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House
Review ofAgency Rulemaking, 99 Harv L Rev 1075, 1088 (1986).
' See generally Morton Rosenberg, Presidential Control ofAgencyRulemaking:AnAnal-
ysis of Constitutional Issues That May Be Raised by Executive Order 12,291, 23 Ariz L Rev
1199 (1981).
13 For a full discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of OMB review, see
Thomas 0. McGarity, Reinventing Rationality: The Role of Regulatory Analysis in the
Federal Bureaucracy 274-91 (Cambridge, 1991).
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2. Some people complained that the process of regulatory
oversight was too secretive. In their view, the lack of public visi-
bility disguised a new system in which well-organized private
groups-particularly regulated industries-were allowed to dic-
tate national policy.'4 Especially during the period of Vice Presi-
dent Quayle's Council on Competitiveness, some feared that
regulatory policy was being made by a "shadow government"
operating at the behest of private factions and accountable, in
practice, to no one with an adequate claim to public legitima-
cy. 1
5
3. Some people complained that the reviewing process
dwarfed OMB's limited resources and resulted in excessive delay.
The few officials at OIRA lacked the time and capacities to en-
gage in truly expert assessment of regulation and its complex
costs and benefits. Because OMB was unable effectively to assess
the wide range of regulations submitted to it, its principal func-
tion was to slow things down. The result was to deprive the pub-
lic of desirable or necessary regulations and, on occasion, to vio-
late the law. 6
4. Some people complained about the substantive principles
reflected in the Reagan orders. In their view, cost-benefit analysis
was too partisan a standard to capture the full array of consider-
ations properly invoked by regulatory agencies. In practice and
perhaps in principle, critics urged, the idea of cost-benefit analy-
sis was a device not for producing the right kind and amount of
regulation, but for diminishing the role of regulation even when
it was beneficial. This substantive agenda, it was said, violated
"' See Erik D. Olson, The Quiet Shift of Power: Office of Management & Budget Supervi.
sion of Environmental Protection Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, 4 Va
J Nat Resources L 1, 31-35 (1984).
' See Role of the Council on Competitiveness in Regulatory Review, Hearings before
the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 102d Cong, 1st Sess 2 (1991) (statement
of Sen Glenn).
1" See McGarity, Reinventing Rationality at 282-88 (cited in note 13). In 1986, a court
concluded that OMB delayed EPA regulations that were subject to statutory deadlines for
ninety-one days on average. Environmental Defense Fund v Thomas, 627 F Supp 566, 571
(D DC 1986). Although § 8(a)(2) of Executive Order 12291 explicitly exempted from OMB
review regulations "for which consideration or reconsideration under the terms of this
Order would conflict with deadlines imposed by statute or by judicial order," the court
concluded that this section of the Order was "simply ignored." Id at 570-71.
An article from the same time period asserts that the average time for all regulatory
reviews by OMB was sixteen days. DeMuth and Ginsburg, 99 Harv L Rev at 1088 (cited
in note 11). For an illuminating discussion of agency-OIRA interactions, see E. Donald
Elliott, TQM-ing OMB: Or Why Regulatory Review Under Executive Order 12,291 Works
Poorly and What President Clinton Should Do About It, 57 L & Contemp Probs 167
(1994).
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the President's duty under the Take Care Clause and also was
unjustified in light of the need for regulation in many areas of
modern life.'
B. The Present
In light of the extraordinary importance of OMB oversight to
so much of American government, many observers were extreme-
ly curious to see how President Clinton would reform the Reagan
initiatives. The process of reform was surprisingly slow. Whereas
President Reagan had issued the first of the two executive orders
within one week of assuming office, President Clinton did not
respond for many months. On September 30, 1993, however,
President Clinton issued his long-awaited repeal and replacement
of Executive Orders 12291 and 12498.18
President Clinton's Order, Executive Order 12866, is a dra-
matic and in many ways quite surprising step. First and in some
ways foremost, it maintains the basic process inaugurated by
President Reagan, including the essential procedural provision of
Executive Order 12291: the requirement that major regulations
be submitted to OMB for general review and oversight.'9 It also
includes the essential procedural provision of Executive Order
12498: the requirement that agencies submit an annual regulato-
ry plan, compiled in conjunction with OMB."
At least equally important, Executive Order 12866 also
maintains much of the substantive focus of the Reagan orders,
including the emphasis on cost-benefit analysis as the basic foun-
dation of decision.2' President Clinton thus rejected the view
that an assessment of costs and benefits is an unhelpful or undu-
ly sectarian conception of the basis of regulation.
17 See, for example, Robert V. Percival, Checks Without Balance: Executive Office Over-
sight of the Environmental Protection Agency, 54 L & Contemp Probs 127, 178-200 (1991).
'8 Exec Order No 12866 § 11, 3 CFR 638, 649 (1993), reprinted in 5 USC § 601 note
(Supp 1993). See also Office of the Vice President, Improving Regulatory Systems: Accom-
panying Report of the National Performance Review 11 (1993). An early discussion of the
new Clinton process can be found in Colloquium, The Fifth Annual Robert C. Byrd Confer-
ence on the Administrative Process: The First Year of Clinton/Gore: Reinventing Gov-
ernment or Refining Reagan/Bush Initiatives?, 8 Admin L J Am U 23 (1994).
19 Exec Order No 12866 § 2(b), 3 CFR at 640 (cited in note 18).
20 Id § 4(c) at 642.
21 Id § 1(b)(5) at 639.
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At the same time, the Clinton Order marks a number of
important substantive and procedural shifts. Executive Order
12866 includes a set of innovations specifically designed to over-
come the problems faced in the Reagan and Bush administra-
tions. In particular, it addresses unnecessary conflicts between
agencies and OMB, and the appearance (or perhaps the reality)
of factional influence over the review processY It also places the
Vice President squarely in charge of the regulatory processY It
reduces the number of rules that OMB will review, perhaps by as
much as one-half. It seeks to overcome the "ossification" of rule
making, in part by encouraging negotiated rule making.'
The Order also includes a new, complex, and somewhat un-
ruly set of substantive principles to govern agency decisions.
Some of these principles are an outgrowth of the commitment to
"reinventing government" in the service of more flexible manage-
ment.' Some of them qualify the commitment to cost-benefit
analysis, though in ambiguous ways. Some of them point in the
direction of comparative risk assessment." Apart from their
merits as policy reforms, some of these innovations are of uncer-
tain legality.
C. The Plan
This Article evaluates Executive Order 12866 as part of
President Clinton's program for "reinventing government." We do
this in an effort to help point the way toward procedural and
substantive reforms that might increase coordination and ratio-
nality in federal regulation, and in this way diminish currently
excessive costs, while at the same time promoting the democratic
character of regulatory processes through methods that will take
advantage of appropriately informed public judgments about risk.
To introduce some of our themes in advance: The modern
regulatory state delivers insufficient benefits at unnecessarily
high costs. A range of imaginable improvements could decrease
= See text accompanying notes 81-87.
' See Exec Order No 12866 § 2(c), 3 CFR at 640-41 (cited in note 18).
Id § 6(aX1) at 644-45. See also Memorandum of September 30, 1993, Negotiated
Rulemaking, 3 CFR 776 (1993).
' This is the major theme of David Osborne and Ted Gaebler, Reinventing Govern-
ment: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector (Addison-Wesley,
1991), which has obviously had an enormous influence on the Clinton administration. See
Vice President Al Gore, From Red Tape To Results: Creating a Government that Works
Better and Costs Less, Report of the National Performance Review (US GPO, 1993).
' See text accompanying notes 155-59.
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the costs of regulation and thus reduce prices, increase employ-
ment, and promote international competitiveness. Through such
steps, reduced costs could also reduce poverty and thus risks to
life and health." Through similar steps, reforms could reallocate
regulatory resources to places where they will do the most good.
In this way, regulatory programs could deliver greater protection
of safety and health and, in the process, save many lives.
The modem regulatory state should also be more democratic.
Currently, regulation is far too inaccessible to public control.
Instead, it is enshrouded in technocratic complexities not subject
to public debate, affected by misleading, sensationalist anecdotes,
or, even worse, subject to the influence of well-organized private
groups with personal stakes in the outcome. A range of improve-
ments could make the democratic process work better. The key
task for those interested in regulatory performance is to find
ways of simultaneously promoting economic and democratic
goals.'
We offer a range of proposals designed to accomplish this
task. A special goal is to incorporate public judgments about risk
so long as they are appropriately informed and reasonable, even
when those judgments diverge from expert understandings. We
spend considerable space on this complex subject, contending
that public judgments often reflect a distinctive kind of rationali-
ty, one that rejects some conventional forms of cost-benefit bal-
ancing. Executive Order 12866 might well be administered in a
way that takes advantage of this insight. In short, we offer the
following recommendations:
1. OIRA should see, as one of its principal missions, the goal
of rationalizing regulatory policy by ensuring good priority set-
ting, comparison of risks in terms of seriousness, and careful
attention to the most important problems. To this end, it should
issue guidelines and recommendations for the best use of limited
See generally Ralph Catalano, The Health Effects of Economic Insecurity, 81 Am J
Pub Health 1148 (1991); Ralph L. Keeney, Mortality Risks Induced by Economic Expendi-
tures, 10 Risk Analysis 147 (1990); Aaron Wildavsky, Searching for Safety 61-75 (Transac-
tion, 1988).
'8 It is too soon for any real conclusions about the actual implementation of Executive
Order 12866. We note, however, that the first major report on the Order was concerned
almost exclusively with procedural issues of internal governmental management; it said
nothing about whether the Order was actually making for better or worse regulation. See
Office of Management and Budget, Report on Executive Order No 12866, Regulatory
Planning and Review, 59 Fed Reg 24276 (1994). There appears to be a risk that OIRA will
be unduly concerned with procedural issues and fail to focus on what is most important,
the substance of regulation.
[62:1
Reinventing the Regulatory State
public and private resources, together with information about the
concrete, actual consequences of current efforts and about ways
of improving them.' The ultimate goal should be neither to stop
nor to spur regulation, but instead to make sure that regulation
works well.
2. There should be early coordination between OIRA and
other federal officials, based on shared goals and on a clear un-
derstanding of jurisdictional lines. OIRA should not operate as a
last-minute obstacle to agency proposals.
3. OIRA should allow a form of "national performance re-
view" in which it demonstrates in concrete terms how, and at
what cost, regulation under its supervision has promoted par-
ticular social goals. To this end, OIRA should publicize its short-
term and long-term goals for regulation in relatively concrete
terms and show whether and how the government has made
progress in meeting those goals. It should do this as part of a
general effort to encourage public trust and public understanding
of regulatory outcomes and choices. It should also attempt to
promote, to the extent feasible, citizen participation in the pro-
cess of setting regulatory priorities.
4. Regulations should be evaluated not only in terms of ag-
gregate costs and benefits, but also in terms that reflect demo-
cratic judgments about qualitative differences among
qualitatively different risks. By qualitative differences, we mean
to include an understanding of whether a risk is voluntarily
incurred, especially dreaded, equitably distributed, potentially
irreversible or catastrophic, faced by future generations, or in-
curred by discrete groups within the population. To incorporate
an understanding of these factors, OIRA and relevant agencies
might experiment with three approaches: (a) develop formulas
that assign numbers to, and thus incorporate, qualitative differ-
ences; (b) offer a two-stage analytic process, the first based on
conventional cost-benefit balancing, the second introducing quali-
tative differences in order to produce a final judgment; and (c)
use different forms of citizen participation so as to build into the
regulatory process an understanding of informed public judg-
Many proposals in Congress suggest this approach by requiring comparative risk
assessment. See the Johnston Amendment, S 171 § 123, 103d Cong, 1st Sess (May 4,
1993), in 139 Cong Rec S5362 (May 4, 1993). See also the important discussion of "risk-
risk" trade-offs in John Graham and Jonathan Wiener, Risk vs. Risk (Harvard, forthcom-
ing 1995).
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ments about how different risks should be treated. We offer com-
ments on all three proposals below.0
5. The government should shift from command-and-control
regulation to more experimentation with information disclosure
as a remedy for risk and with economic incentives. Informational
remedies should be based on a careful understanding of how
people process information and develop trust, a key ingredient of
successful risk communication. If methods of information process-
ing are not kept in view, informational remedies can be futile or
even counterproductive. Moreover, the use of incentives should be
limited to certain specific circumstances that we identify.
6. The President or the Vice President must take a serious
interest in improving health and safety regulation. Without a
firm signal from the highest levels of government, OIRA is un-
likely to be able to accomplish much of its mission, and the po-
tential advantages of centralized control will be lost.
This Article is organized into five parts. Part I describes the
history of presidential oversight of the regulatory process, show-
ing that such oversight has been a steady development in the
twentieth century and that it can now be said to be permanent,
or at least as permanent as any procedural innovation not re-
quired by the Constitution itself. Part H deals with institutional
issues, in particular with those procedures designed to bring
about greater openness and visibility. This self-conscious effort at
democratization is one of the most distinctive features of Execu-
tive Order 12866. Part II also discusses the fact that the Order
contains an apparent presidential (and vice-presidential) veto on
agency regulations-a bold step that goes well beyond anything
that Presidents Reagan or Bush endorsed, at least publicly. It
concludes with a discussion of the Order's partial and un-
precedented inclusion of the independent regulatory commissions.
Parts III, IV, and V are the heart of the Article. Part III
turns to substance and, in particular, to the question of regulato-
ry ends. It focuses on cost-benefit analysis, comparative risk
assessment, and the problem of regulatory rationality in general.
There is good reason for enthusiasm about some basic goals and
possibilities of these technologies-to increase sensible priority
setting, to limit the unnecessarily high costs of regulation, and to
make sure that government controls actually improve people's
lives. But it is important to ensure a form of these analytic tech-
See Part IV.F.
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niques that is attuned to some of the complexities of social valua-
tion of different risks in different contexts of social life.
Part IV offers a number of suggestions on this score. It tries
to make sense of the evident ambivalence in Executive Order
12866 toward cost-benefit analysis. We suggest that there are
conceptions of rationality that resist the effort to align diverse
social goods along a single metric, and that cost-benefit analysis
disregards what we call the expressive dimension of regulation.
Part IV also urges possible modifications to conventional cost-
benefit analysis, designed specifically to make a place for ade-
quately informed and rational public judgments about risks.
Part V discusses the question of regulatory means. Its princi-
pal topic is the conspicuous effort in Executive Order 12866 to go
beyond command-and-control regulation in the interest of provid-
ing less costly means for achieving regulatory goals. Here we
emphasize an unmistakable trend in federal regulation: informa-
tion disclosure as a remedy for risk. We also deal with the re-
placement of command-and-control approaches with economic
incentives. We discuss the ways in which new strategies should
take account of ordinary understandings of risk and also attempt
to build public trust. Through this discussion of means, as
through the earlier discussion of ends, we suggest reforms that
will simultaneously promote economic and democratic goals.
I. BACKGROUND: A NEW AND PROBABLY PERMANENT FEATURE
OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT
Almost since the birth of the modern administrative agency,
American presidents have struggled to assert more centralized
control over the regulatory state. Indeed, a recent study asserts
that "the history of the presidency in the twentieth century has
been the history of presidents' attempts to gain control of the
sprawling federal bureaucracy."3' Typically, these attempts have
generated sharp congressional resistance.
The first step in this direction can probably be traced to
President Theodore Roosevelt's creation, in 1903, of a commission
designed to study the scientific work done by government agen-
cies in order to recommend more efficient coordination. The re-
sults presaged those of similar reform efforts to follow. The com-
mission recommended that the thirty scientific agencies be con-
"1 Forrest McDonald, The American Presidency: An Intellectual History 329 (Kansas,
1994).
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solidated into one, in order to minimize duplication and ineffi-
ciency. Roosevelt forwarded this recommendation to Congress,
which declined to act on it.
3 2
Roosevelt then created a second commission, the Keep Com-
mission, to study a broader array of administrative reforms. In
some ways a precursor of Vice President Gore's recent National
Performance Review, the Keep Commission found that many civil
servants were underemployed and resistant to new technologies,
such as typewriters and adding machines. It also concluded that
the system of supply acquisition was hopelessly chaotic.3 The
Keep Commission forwarded eleven formal reform proposals to
Congress. When it did so, the century's first major battle between
Congress and the White House over control of administration
was joined. Congress not only declined to act on any of the pro-
posals, but also expressed outrage at the Executive's effort to
seize "an authority previously the exclusive and unchallenged
domain of Congress."' In addition, Congress prohibited the use
of government funds for such commissions in the future and even
refused to appropriate funds to publish the Keep Commission's
report.35
At Congress's invitation, President Taft attempted to central-
ize and coordinate the budgetary process. Although Congress
rejected Taft's particular proposals, by 1921 Congress granted the
President effective oversight control of agency fiscal requests by
enacting the Budget and Accounting Act.38 This was an extraor-
dinary development, in many ways a precursor of current efforts
to centralize the regulatory process. For the first time, the Presi-
dent would be given statutory authority to submit an annual
budget to Congress. Wilson's wartime presidency aggressively set
into motion the vision of a more managerial presidency.37
In the period after the war, the ideas of consolidation and
efficiency-motivated reorganization swept the business communi-
' Oscar Kraines, The President Versus Congress: The Keep Commission, 1905-1909:
First Comprehensive Presidential Inquiry Into Administration, 23 W Pol Q 5 (1970).
' For a recent influential statement on modem government procurement, see Steven
Kelman, Procurement and Public Management: The Fear of Discretion and the Quality of
Government Performance (AEI, 1990).
See McDonald, The American Presidency at 330-31 (cited in note 31).
See Kraines, 23 W Pol Q at 37-45 (cited in note 32); McDonald, The American
Presidency at 330-31 (cited in note 31); Peri E. Arnold, Making the Managerial Presidency:
Comprehensive Reorganization Planning, 1905-1980 23-26 (Princeton, 1986).
' Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, Pub L No 67-13, 42 Stat 20, codified at 31
USC §§ 1101 et seq (1988).
' Arnold, Making the Managerial Presidency at 26-54 (cited in note 35).
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ty. Congress eventually followed suit in 1932 with the Govern-
ment Reorganization Act,38 which granted the President unilat-
eral authority, subject to legislative veto,39 to reorganize the ad-
ministrative branch. Franklin Roosevelt's Brownlow Commission
revived Wilson's famous distinction between policy and adminis-
tration;' the Commission saw "policy" as the joint domain of the
President and Congress, whereas "administration," it asserted,
must be under the direct and exclusive command of the Presi-
dent. Despite an initial congressional outcry, most of the
Committee's proposals were enacted.4 A key reform, with last-
ing consequences, was the creation of the Executive Office of the
President.'
In 1949, the Hoover Commission produced yet another effort
to create a more coordinated and managerial presidency. It is-
sued 277 specific proposals for reorganizing and consolidating
agencies. More than half of these were adopted via statute or
executive order, with the purpose of creating a "clear line of com-
mand from the top to the bottom, and a return line of responsi-
bility and accountability from the bottom to the top."43
The most direct precursor to the current structure of execu-
tive oversight of regulation was the Nixon Administration's sys-
tem of "Quality of Life" reviews. Nixon's response to the expand-
ing administrative bureaucracy was to create a "counter-bureau-
cracy" in the White House. He doubled the executive office staff,
created the modern OMB, and established the Domestic Council
(chaired by a top aide, John Ehrlichman). The Council met with
representatives of different departments having jurisdiction over
a problem and tried to develop coordinated policy positions for
presidential approval.' In the "Quality of Life" review process,
agencies were required to submit significant rules to OMB in
advance of publication in the Federal Register. OMB's principal
duty was to circulate the agency draft to other agencies for re-
view and comment. Although the process was intended to apply
' Act of June 30, 1932, §§ 401-08, Pub L No 72-212, 47 Stat 382, 413-15, codified at 5
USC §§ 124-31 (Supp 1932).
'9 The constitutionality of the legislative veto was not litigated until INS v Chadha,
462 US 919, 959 (1983), when it was invalidated.
" See Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government: A Study in American Politics
(Houghton Mifflin, 1925).
41 McDonald, The American Presidency at 333 (cited in note 31).
42 Arnold, Making the Managerial Presidency at 114 (cite in note 35).
4' McDonald, The American Presidency at 335 (cited in note 31).
4 Richard P. Nathan, The Plot That Failed and the Administrative Presidency 45-49
(Wiley, 1975).
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to all agencies, only EPA and OSHA were actually subject to the
reviewing process. OMB's goal was rarely substantive; it served
instead a coordinating function.45
President Ford continued the interagency review process and
added to it a process designed to control the effects of regulation
on inflation. Most important, the Council on Wage and Price
Stability ("CWPS") reviewed regulations to assess these effects.
In addition,- OMB promulgated a circular to agencies arguing
that the inflationary impact of a proposed rule could best be
assessed through a quantitative cost-benefit comparison." The
Council's role was principally technical, consultative, and adviso-
ry. It was understood that the relevant agency might well persist
in the face of CWPS disagreement. Despite often antagonistic
relationships between the agencies and CWPS, many observers
believed that CWPS enhanced both public participation and the
agencies' analytical capabilities.' Congress ultimately enacted a
statute allowing CWPS to participate in rule making and to ex-
plore adverse effects on inflation.48
President Carter, built on the Ford precedent through a suc-
cessor to CWPS, the Regulatory Analysis Review Group
("RARG"). RARG consisted of representatives from major agen-
cies, OMB, CWPS, and the Council of Economic Advisors. The
purpose of this fifteen-agency group was to conduct interagency
review of cost-effectiveness analyses, which were required of
"significant" rules from relevant agencies. Notably, the Executive
Order establishing the RARG review process did not require cost-
benefit analysis.49 In fact RARG reviewed relatively few rules,
though the President did resolve a few highly controversial is-
sues.
All of these efforts were designed to increase interagency
dialogue, coordination, and analytical precision, as well as to
reduce regulatory costs. But a decisive step came within a week
of President Reagan's inauguration, with the formal creation of a
mechanism for OMB review of major regulations. The most im-
portant of the new innovations, contained in Executive Order
12291, were (1) a set of substantive principles for all agencies to
follow, "to the extent permitted by law," including a commitment
See Carnegie Commission, Risk and the Environment at 48-49 (cited in note 6).
4 Office of Management and Budget, Circular No A-107 (Jan 28, 1974).
47 McGarity, Reinventing Rationality at 19 (cited in note 13).
'a Act of December 23, 1969, Pub L No 91-151, 83 Stat 377, codified at 12 USC § 1904
(1976). See also Carnegie Commission, Risk and the Environment at 48 (cited in note 6).
49 Exec Order No 12044, 3 CFR 152 (1978).
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to cost-benefit analysis; (2) a requirement that a Regulatory Im-
pact Analysis, including a cost-benefit analysis, accompany all
"major" rules; and (3) a formal mechanism for OMB oversight,
with a general understanding that OMB had some (undefined)
substantive control. President Reagan considered subjecting the
independent agencies to the new Order, but ultimately declined
to do so, partly because of concerns about legal authority, but
mostly because of fears of an adverse congressional reaction.50
The independent agencies were asked voluntarily to comply with
Executive Order 12291, but not one of them formally acknowl-
edged their willingness to do so.
Executive Order 12291 proved extremely controversial. None-
theless, President Reagan expanded on the basic idea four years
later with Executive Order 12498. As noted above, that Order
established a requirement that agencies submit "annual regulato-
ry plans" to OMB for review.5 The result is an annual publica-
tion, the Regulatory Program of the United States, which con-
tains a discussion of all proposed actions that might be either
costly or controversial. Executive Order 12498 served to increase
the authority of agency heads over their staffs by exposing pro-
posals to top-level review at an early stage. But it also increased
the authority of OMB by allowing OMB supervision over basic
plans and by making it hard for agencies to proceed without
OMB preclearance.
The Bush Administration continued the Reagan procedures.
Its principal innovation was the Council on Competitiveness,
chaired by the Vice President. The Council engaged in occasional
review of agency rules, operating as a kind of supervisor of OMB
itself. It also set out a number of principles and proposals for
regulatory reform."
President Clinton's Executive Order 12866 is the latest step
in this process; we will investigate it shortly. Our current point is
more general. From the recent evidence, it seems clear that presi-
dential oversight of the regulatory process, though relatively new,
has become a permanent part of the institutional design of Amer-
ican government. This new institutional arrangement has oc-
curred for reasons parallel to the development of a centralized
'o Peter M. Shane and Harold M. Bruff The Law of Presidential Power 358-60
(Carolina Academic, 1988).
5' See text accompanying notes 3-5.
5 See Office of Management and Budget, Regulatory Program of the United States
Government, April 1, 1990-March 31, 1991 5 (US GPO, 1990).
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budget in the 1920s. Any president is likely to seek assurance
that an unwieldy federal bureaucracy conforms its actions to his
or her basic principles. Any president is likely to be concerned
about excessive public and private costs. And any president is
likely to want to be able to coordinate agency activity so as to
ensure consistency and coherence and to guard against the impo-
sition of conflicting duties on people who must comply with the
law. The result of these forces is that a centralizing and rational-
izing body, housed within OMB and devoted to regulation, has
emerged as an enduring, major, but insufficiently appreciated
part of the national government.
II. REGULATORY INSTITUTIONS
Executive Order 12866 makes three major institutional
changes from the Reagan-Bush procedures. It imposes new dis-
closure requirements. It attempts to sort out the allocation of
authority among agencies, the White House, and OIRA. Finally,
it includes the independent agencies within some aspects of pres-
idential oversight.
A. In General
As we have said, there are strong reasons for creating and
maintaining an executive office entrusted with the job of coordi-
nating modern regulation, promoting sensible priority setting,
and ensuring conformity with the President's basic mission.53 In
view of the wide array of regulatory programs administered by
modern government, the absence of such an office would probably
guarantee duplication, parochial perspectives, and inefficiency. A
number of separate agencies and programs deal with environ-
mental and other risks, and it is therefore important to share
information, to reduce inconsistency, and to devote scarce re-
sources to places where they will do the most good.
The past process of OIRA review has been imperfectly
equipped to carry out these tasks. Too often OIRA has become
involved at very late stages, operating as a kind of last-minute
barrier to action at a point when cooperation and trust are nearly
impossible." Too often relations between OIRA and the agencies
have been adversarial, with considerable distrust and even a
' See Carnegie Commission, Risk and the Environment (cited in note 6); Breyer,
Breaking the Vicious Circle at 61-68 (cited in note 6).
4 See Elliott, 57 L & Contemp Probs at 171-74 (cited in note 16).
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degree of "guerilla warfare."55 What is needed instead is a defi-
nition of shared goals and objectives, accompanied by good and
continuous working relations, clear jurisdictional authority, and
mutual investment in the basic goals of improving regulatory
performance according to agreed-upon criteria.
Executive Order 12866 is designed in part to achieve these
goals, though some of the evidence for this conclusion lies outside
the four corners of the document. The Order establishes the
agencies as the principal decision makers, and in this way it
insists, more than its predecessors, on agency autonomy." In
general, the process appears to involve a government-wide sys-
tem of priority setting, rather than one concentrated in OMB.
Thus the Order contemplates an annual agency policy meeting to
set priorities and coordinate activities. 7 The Order also requires
each agency head to designate a Regulatory Policy Officer, who is
to be involved "at each stage of the regulatory process."8
Following this provision, the Clinton Administration has
created a set of Regulatory Policy Officers within each agency.59
These officers are specifically charged with improving the regula-
tory process by ensuring conformity with Executive Order 12866.
The officers work with a new Regulatory Working Group created
by the Order, chaired by the OIRA Administrator, and attended
by specially appointed White House Regulatory Policy Advi-
sors.60 The purpose of this system is to promote early interaction
and cooperation by coordinating agency and OIRA behavior, and
also to ensure exchange of information among agencies, with a
particular eye toward sensible treatment of problems that cut
across agencies.6 In a similar attempt to limit conflicts and to
reduce unnecessary layers of bureaucratic oversight, Executive
Order 12866 also attempts to reduce the number of rules to be
reviewed by OIRA, cutting the number in half from previous
years. 2 The Order seeks to promote democratization as well by
Id at 171.
See Exec Order No 12866 § 2(a), 3 CFR at 640 (cited in note 18).
57 Id § 4(a) at 642.
Id § 6(a)(2) at 645.
See Report on Executive Order No 12866, 59 Fed Reg at 24290 (cited in note 28).
o Id. See Exec Order No 12866 § 4(d), 3 CFR at 643 (cited in note 18), for the Order's
creation of the Regulatory Working Group.
c' See the helpful discussions in Carnegie Commission, Risk and the Environment at
19-20, 71-72 (cited in note 6).
' See id.
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requiring the OIRA Administrator to meet with members of the
public and to convene conferences to this end.'
It is impossible to tell at this stage whether these institu-
tional innovations will accomplish a great deal. Much of the evi-
dence will come from the regulations that eventually emerge. If
cooperation is an end in itself, it is a limited one, and the success
of the new process will be measured principally by sub-
stance-what emerges from it. Two early reasons for concern are
the apparent absence of clear OIRA focus on regulatory conse-
quences, and the apparent failure to develop a close sense of
regulatory priorities through general publicity about the nature
of various risks and the costs of eliminating them.Y It would be
highly desirable for OIRA to attempt to place problems in broad
risk categories and to attempt to regulate risks that are of the
highest priority.' For democratic reasons, it would also be de-
sirable for OIRA to make information about risk categories
broadly available to the public and to be responsive to the weight
that the public places on various risks. The EPA undertook an
early effort to this effect and updated it in 1990.' The 1990
study identified a number of "relatively high-risk problems,"
including habitat alteration and destruction, species extinction
and loss of biological diversity, ozone depletion, and global cli-
mate change. It also found a number of "relatively medium-risk
problems," including pesticides, surface water toxins, acid deposi-
tion, and airborne toxins. And it identified a number of "relative-
ly low-risk" problems, including oil spills, radionuclides, ground-
water pollution, and thermal pollution.' A 1994 report of the
National Academy of Sciences basically approved the EPA's rank-
ing and approach.' This might serve as a model for the federal
government as a whole.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it would be desirable
for the executive branch to identify its long-term risk-reduction
goals, at least in broad terms, and to report on its progress to-
See Exec Order No 12866 § 4(e), 3 CFR at 643-44 (cited in note 18).
Thus, the early Report on Executive Order No 12866, 59 Fed Reg 24276 (cited in
note 28), devotes no attention to whether the regulations that have emerged are good
ones, even by the Order's own criteria.
See Carnegie Commission, Risk and the Environment at 20 (cited in note 6).
See Environmental Protection Agency, Report of the Science Advisory Board:
Relative Risk Reduction Strategies Commission to William K Reilly (1990), in Zygmunt
J.B. Plater, Robert H. Abrams, and William Goldfarb, Supplement for Environmental Law
and Policy: Nature, Law, and Society 19-23 (West, 1990).
67 Id at 21.
' Id at 23.
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ward reaching those goals. Executive Order 12866 contains no
mechanism of this kind.
In general, however, there is reason for optimism both in the
maintenance of the OIRA reviewing process and in the steps to
limit antagonism between the agencies and OIRA and to promote
attention to shared regulatory goals. We now turn to some insti-
tutional details.
B. Disclosure Requirements
The Reagan orders contained no provisions governing disclo-
sure or regulation of communications between private parties
and OIRA, or within the executive branch itself. The absence of
formal procedures was itself a cause of considerable controver-
sy.69 Many people alleged that private communications had oc-
curred and that OIRA was basing its decisions on pressure from
business groups with self-interested stakes in the outcome.7"
1. Policy and law.
As a matter of policy, the rules governing disclosure of com-
munications with OIRA are quite important. Informal communi-
cations between the executive branch and affected citizens may
be "the lifeblood of the administrative process,"7 in the sense
that they may well be crucial to the development of sound regula-
See text accompanying notes 14-15.
70 See Olson, 4 Va J Nat Resources L at 31-35 (cited in note 14); Percival, 54 L &
Contemp Probs at 168-72 (cited in note 17). Early in the Reagan administration, the De-
partment of Justice advised OMB to make public all substantive communications between
OMB and private parties. See Stephen G. Breyer and Richard B. Stewart, Administrative
Law and Regulatory Policy 684 (Little, Brown, 3d ed 1992), summarizing Memorandum
from Larry Simms, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, to Direc-
tor of the Office of Management and Budget (1981). An implementing memorandum from
OIRA offered a complex set of guidelines. See Memorandum, Additional Procedures
Concerning QIRA Reviews Under Executive Order Nos 12291 and 12498, from Wendy L.
Gramm, Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, published in Office
of Management and Budget, Regulatory Program of the United States Government, April
1, 1990-March 31, 1991 605 (US GPO, 1990). Congress held many hearings about the
absence of disclosure of communications between OIRA and private groups, or between
OIRA and the agency itself. See Clean Air Act Implementation (Part 2): Hearings before
the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the House Committee on Energy
and Commerce, 102d Cong, 1st & 2d Sess (1991-92). Informal agreements were reached
between the White House and Congress, without formal legislation, requiring disclosure of
most substantive communications from private parties. The understandings are published
in the Congressional Record. See 136 Cong Rec S17608-10 (Oct 27, 1990). They did not,
however, cover the Council on Competitiveness, which became the focal point of concern.
See id.
71 Home Box Office, Inc. v FCC, 567 F2d 9, 57 (DC Cir 1977).
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tory policy.72 There is much that government does not
know-about the facts, about the intensity of possible public
reactions, about the consequences, and about possibly creative
alternatives. Informal and consultative processes with outsiders
may be critical. They can help ensure the development of sensible
reforms before people become firmly committed to one or another
view. If government cannot speak informally with outsiders,
regulatory policy may be created in a vacuum and hence in igno-
rance. A flat ban on ex parte communications would therefore be
troubling. The problem with disclosure requirements is that they
may deter beneficial processes of informal information gathering.
On the other hand, selectivity is hard to avoid in government
communications with outsiders, and there is at least the appear-
ance of partisanship and factionalism whenever one group, and
not others, has access to public officials. The reality of factional-
ism may exist if a powerful executive branch entity is listening
closely to the views of one group of interests. The result may be a
form of government by private groups, the defining evil in the
great Schechter Poultry case.73 In any case, a failure to disclose
ex parte communications may breed harmful and unnecessary
suspicion.
A major difficulty in resolving the policy issue is that we
need to know the extent, if any, of deterrence of information
gathering created by a disclosure requirement in this setting. If
the deterrent effect is small, the case for disclosure of substantive
communications is compelling. As we discuss below, there is no
real evidence, moreover, that disclosure requirements do deter
desirable communications, and some evidence to the contrary.
The legal issue-whether disclosure requirements are im-
posed by statute-is complex. The Administrative Procedure Act
("APA") contains no restrictions on ex parte communications
' See E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 Duke L J 1490, 1492-93 (1992):
No administrator in Washington turns to full-scale notice-and-comment rulemaking
when she is genuinely interested in obtaining input from interested parties. Notice-
and-comment rulemaking is to public participation as Japanese Kabuki theater is to
human passions-a highly stylized process for displaying in a formal way the essence
of something which in real life takes place in other venues. To secure the genuine
reality, rather than a formal show, of public participation, a variety of techniques is
available-from informal meetings with trade associations and other constituency
groups, to roundtables, to floating "trial balloons," in speeches or leaks to the trade
press, to the more formal techniques of advisory committees and negotiated
rulemaking.
ALA. Schechter Poultry Corp. v United States, 295 US 495, 537 (1935).
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during notice-and-comment rule making, and it does not require
disclosure of such communications.74 Congress deliberately chose
to restrict such communications in formal proceedings, without
adding restrictions in notice-and-comment rule making.75 The
absence of explicit restrictions in informal proceedings, such as
notice-and-comment rule making, counts strongly against judicial
imposition of any additional procedural requirements, including
disclosure of ex parte communications. v6
Nonetheless, disclosure of some private contacts may be
required by the APA as it has come to be understood. In a series
of cases, the Supreme Court has said that courts should review
agency action on the basis of the record that was actually before
the agency.77 The idea of "record review" means that agencies
must compile some kind of record even in informal proceedings.
That idea has survived the notion that courts may not add to the
procedural requirements of the APA.78
With respect to disclosure requirements, the question then
arises: What if substantive communications that were an impor-
tant factor in the agency's deliberations are not made available to
reviewing courts? Perhaps the full record before the agency, in-
cluding undisclosed substantive communications, must be before
a court in order for it to undertake review. An early case so sug-
gested.79 On this view, there cannot be one record before the
court and another before the agency. At least those undisclosed
communications that had a real effect on the outcome must be
made part of the record for judicial review.
This argument, however, is rather adventurous. It is not
clear that a court needs to have all the informational inputs that
were before the agency in order to review the agency's decision.
Perhaps a court needs only to ensure that the agency decision is
defensible on the basis of the record actually before the court."
1 See 5 USC §§ 500 et seq (1988 & Supp 1993).
7' See Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub L No 94-409, 90 Stat 1246 (1976),
codified at 5 USC § 557(d) (1988 & Supp 1993).
" See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 435 US 519, 523-25 (1978).
' Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v Volpe, 401 US 402, 420 (1971); Motor
Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n, Inc. v State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 US
29, 43-44 (1983).
"' On the notion, see Vermont Yankee, 435 US at 524; on the survival, see State
Farm, 463 US at 43.
7 Home Box Office, 567 F2d at 54-55.
'o This may be the meaning of the suggestion in Action for Children's Television v
FCC: "[Tihe commission did explain the reason for its decision .... This explanation is
contained in the record now before us, and it furnishes a basis for effective judicial re-
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If the agency's decision is sustainable on the basis of what the
agency provides to the court, its legal obligations may well be
satisfied. This seems the most plausible understanding of the
APA, though the conclusion is not clear, and though, for reasons
to be stated shortly, we believe that the APA requires less disclo-
sure than it should as a matter of sound policy.
2. Innovations.
In Executive Order 12866 itself, President Clinton took the
surprising step of outlining specific procedures governing the
process of OIRA review. Many of these provisions involve disclo-
sure, though some of them are directed to associated fears about
the power of private groups over the process.
1. Firm deadlines-generally ninety days-are placed on the
reviewing process,8' thus cabining OIRA activity, including dis-
cussions with others, within a specified time frame. This provi-
sion is a self-conscious response to the problem of delay and rule-
making "ossification," sometimes thought to involve near elimina-
tion of regulations through ORA inaction.82
2. OIRA must provide written explanations of any rule that
it returns for further review.'
3. Only the OIRA Administrator may receive oral commu-
nications from people who are outside the executive branch.'
4. When OIRA personnel are speaking with people outside
the executive branch, an agency representative must be invited,
and written communications from outsiders must be forwarded to
the agency.85
5. OIRA must include a publicly available log with a record
6f all written communications that have been forwarded, and
with full disclosure of all substantive oral communications with
people outside the executive branch.86
6. After publication of the regulatory action, OIRA must
disclose all written communications between OIRA and the agen-
view." 564 F2d 458, 472 (DC Cir 1977).
8' Exec Order No 12866 § 6(b)(2), 3 CFR at 646-47 (cited in note 18).
See Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process,
41 Duke L J 1385, 1435-36 (1992).
' Exec Order No 12866 § 6(b)(3), 3 CFR at 647 (cited in note 18).
84 Id § 6(b)(4)(A) at 647.
"' Id § 6(b)(4)(B)(i)-(ii) at 647.
8 Id § 6(b)(4)(C) at 647-48.
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cy. In this way, internal executive branch communications are
opened up for public scrutiny.'7
On balance, these disclosure requirements are a healthy
idea. In order to safeguard the appearance and the reality of
independence from private interests, it is important for people to
know what sorts of private contacts have occurred. As we have
noted, the principal objection to disclosure requirements is that
they will impose a "chilling effect" on desirable communications.
But there is no evidence of any such effect. Indeed, the Clean Air
Act imposes relatively onerous disclosure requirements on the
Environmental Protection Agency," with apparently no adverse
consequences for EPA rule making. Moreover, there is no reason
to believe that there are high costs to keeping track of what has
been done.89
Thus far, we have discussed communications between the
agency and private citizens. Internal executive branch communi-
cations involve a separate issue. Even if some communications
with outsiders must be disclosed, no one believes that current
law requires disclosure of all intra-executive branch communica-
tions. Indeed, Article II of the Constitution may forbid Congress
to require disclosure of at least some such communications, and
in any case Congress has made no decision to do so.' Disclosure
of internal executive contacts is somewhat more troublesome. As
the cases involving executive privilege acknowledge, it is impor-
tant to ensure a degree of open give-and-take within the execu-
tive branch.9' If the President were required to disclose all of his
discussions with, for example, the Secretary of State, free inter-
nal communication would be impossible, and the President would
be far less able to perform his constitutional duties. Something of
the same may well be true of informal communications between
OIRA and the agencies (though it is not clear that executive
privilege applies to communications not involving the President
himself). 2 The case for disclosing intra-executive branch dis-
Id § 6(b)(4)(D) at 648.
42 USC § 7607(d) (1988 & Supp 1992).
The Order does not affect communications between private groups and the agen-
cies themselves, apparently on the theory that this issue lies outside the scope of the
Order, which is focused on OIRA.
Sierra Club v Costle, 657 F2d 298, 406-07 (DC Cir 1981).
" See, for example, id; United States v Nixon, 418 US 683, 708 (1974).
Nixon holds that qualified executive privilege protects the President's own commu-
nications, at least as a presumptive matter; but it does not resolve the question whether
the privilege applies to internal executive branch communications not involving the Presi-
dent. 418 US at 707-10.
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cussions is also weakened by the fact that the spectre of faction-
alism is less plainly involved.
On the other hand, the Order does not require disclosure of
purely oral remarks between OIRA and others within the execu-
tive branch. It is limited to written communications. In view of
the extreme concerns expressed about OIRA performance in the
Reagan and Bush Administrations, we think that the new ap-
proach is probably sensible as a compromise step, one that allows
disclosure while also promoting a degree of free internal com-
munication.
C. Allocation of Authority: A White House Veto?
Under the Reagan orders, there was no explicit provision for
resolving internal executive branch conflicts. The official govern-
ment position was that agency heads would be entrusted with
making ultimate decisions.93 Many people alleged, however, that
in practice OMB was permitted to displace the agency heads,
who in effect took orders from OMB officials. 4 At the very least,
a spirit of adversariness and hostility prevailed between OIRA
and the agencies.95
The legal issues are unsettled, in part because theory and
practice diverge in this area. In addition, these conflicts have yet
to be adjudicated. What we might call the conventional view
relies on the following three points: (a) neither the President nor
the agency head may violate the law, and to that extent both
must follow the substantive statutory standard, whatever their
policy views may be; (b) apart from the special case of indepen-
dent agencies (taken up below), the President is always permit-
ted to discharge people whose decisions displease him;" and (c)
' See Memorandum for the Honorable David Stockman, Director, Office of Manage-
ment and Budget, in Peter M. Shane and Harold M. Bruff, The Law of Presidential Power
357 (Carolina Academic, 1988). Executive Order 12291 did say that the Presidential Task
Force on Regulatory Relief, chaired by the Vice President, "shall resolve any issues raised
under this Order or ensure that they are presented to the President." Exec Order No
12291 § 3(e)(1), 3 CFR at 129 (cited in note 1).
See Olson, 4 Va J Nat Resources L at 42-46 (cited in note 14).
9' See Elliott, 57 L & Contemp Probs at 177 (cited in note 16). In at least one highly
visible and contentious setting, Vice President Bush resolved a conflict between OSHA
and OMB; the fact that he endorsed OSHA's regulatory approach is perhaps less reveal-
ing than the fact that he believed it to be his decision whether OSHA would prevail.
McGarity, Reinventing Rationality at 100-01 (cited in note 13). Considerable legal contro-
versy was raised by what appeared to be de facto White House intervention to dictate
policy to agencies or to resolve conflicts between agencies and OMB.
'9 On issues raised by independent regulatory commissions, see text accompanying
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the President has no authority to make the decision himself, at
least if Congress has conferred the relevant authority on an
agency head.97
On this view, an agency head who rejects the President's
policies knows that he is risking his job. For this reason, and
because of the general understanding that the President is in
charge of the executive branch, agency heads will generally fol-
low the President on matters of importance. Most likely, they will
acquiesce in the President's preference, even when that prefer-
ence runs contrary to their own. In practice, then, the distinction
between presidential influence and command might be thin in-
deed.
Nonetheless, it may be important to acknowledge that, as a
technical matter, the decision rests with the agency head. Such
an understanding might bolster agency heads in their conflicts
with the White House and with OIRA. Moreover, there is a sub-
stantial difference between the power to fire and the power to
make the ultimate decision in particular cases. A discharge is
highly visible and comes with significant political costs; an agen-
cy head can be fired only rarely (though the threat of discharge
or of some other, lesser sanction can be exercised more frequent-
ly). It therefore seems plausible to conclude, as the conventional
view does, that while the President may discharge, he may not
otherwise force decisions, at least if Congress has allocated deci-
sional authority to a particular agency.
Even if the conventional view is right in theory, enforcing it
is difficult in practice. Suppose, for example, that the Administra-
tor of EPA has reached a considered judgment in favor of course
of action A. Suppose that the Vice President prefers course of
action B and that it is generally clear that the President agrees
with the Vice President. If the EPA Administrator yields, has the
law been violated? Not necessarily. As long as the Administrator
is acting in an area of discretionary policy-making judgment, she
might consider herself a team player and agree, on principle, to
follow presidential judgments. If the relevant statute does not
notes 107-23.
' Some support for this understanding is provided both by early opinions of the
Attorney General, see the discussion in Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Govern-
ment: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 Colum L Rev 573, 604-05 (1984),
and by an important dictum in Myers v United States: "Of course there may be duties so
peculiarly and specifically committed to the discretion of a particular officer as to raise a
question whether the President may overrule or revise the officer's interpretation of his
statutory duty in a particular instance." 272 US 52, 135 (1926).
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require EPA to take a particular course of action, it is far from
clear that this arrangement would violate the law. The boundary
between presidential influence and command is surely difficult to
police-judicially or otherwise.
At least in public terms, Presidents Reagan and Bush did not
challenge the conventional view. They did not suggest that the
President could displace the ultimate agency decision. But it is
unclear that what we have called the conventional view ever
adequately described the actual practice of executive branch
policy-making. As a practical matter, some mechanism, informal
or otherwise, must exist for resolving intrabranch conflicts. There
is some evidence that the White House has often stepped into the
breach in these circumstances, particularly when the conflicts
involve unusually significant policy issues. 8 At times this White
House role has been consultative, but at other times it appears to
have involved the direct resolution of the relevant conflicts.99
There have long been other informal mechanisms for resolving
interagency, conflicts.100 Little public documentation of the
course of White House involvement is available from which to
draw firm conclusions about the actual White House role.
From the vantage point of theory, Executive Order 12866
appears more aggressive than past executive orders. First, the
Order explicitly creates a formal White House review process to
resolve interagency conflicts or conflicts between agencies and
OMB.1 1 Second, the Order specifies that, to the extent permitted
by law, the President or the Vice President, acting in consulta-
tion with the agency head, shall resolve the conflict.' This pro-
vision effectively authorizes the White House to suggest, or possi-
bly even to dictate, policy outcomes in cases of executive branch
conflict.' 0' If this provision means that the agency head can be
' See McGarity, Reinventing Rationality at 100-01 (cited in note 13) (discussing Vice
President Bush's resolution of a major conflict between OSHA and OMB). In private con-
versations, Professor Thomas Kauper, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice,
Antitrust Division, 1972-76, and Sally Ann Payton, Chief Counsel, Urban Mass Transpor-
tation Administration, United States Department of Transportation, 1973-76, have
described this White House role in interbranch conflicts involving executive agencies
during their tenure in office.
' For example, the account in McGarity, Reinventing Rationality at 100-01 (cited in
note 13), describes Vice President Bush as having definitively resolved the conflict be-
tween OSHA and OIMB.
10 Private conversation with Peter Strauss, General Counsel, Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, 1975-76 (describing mechanisms for resolving EPA-NRC conflicts).
'0' Executive Order No 12866 § 7, 3 CFR at 648 (cited in note 18).
102 Id.
"' The Order states: "At the end of this review process, the President, or the Vice
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overridden by the White House, it might seem a striking asser-
tion of authority. Indeed, many Democrats had vigorously com-
plained that Presidents Reagan and Bush had displaced authori-
ty vested by law in the relevant agency head. It would be ironic if
President Clinton successfully asserted the very authority that
had been so controversial in the hands of his predecessors.
Precisely how bold an innovation this provision is, however,
depends on two considerations. The first is whether it merely
codifies in a more formal way-with more procedural protections
and greater public accountability-the kind of White House over-
sight of the executive branch that has long existed in fact. Ap-
pearances notwithstanding, there is good reason to believe that
Executive Order 12866 is significant mostly for the constraints it
imposes on presidential oversight, rather than for its apparent
expansion of the presidential role. The various procedural innova-
tions discussed above' are designed to enhance public confi-
dence and participation in administrative government precisely
by publicly defining and constraining the White House role.
A second, and related, consideration is how the phrase "to
the extent permitted by law" will be interpreted by the various
executive branch actors. The more the relevant statutes are un-
derstood to require that agency expertise be brought to bear on
specific issues, the less scope the Order will effectively give to
White House influence. As long as a statute's text, history, struc-
ture, and purposes do not give the agency the power of decision,
however, the seemingly aggressive new provisions in the Clinton
Executive Order do not appear to contemplate an unlawful White
House oversight role. Indeed, if the statute does give the agency
the power of decision, the "to the extent permitted by law" provi-
so means that the President cannot override that power. In any
case, Congress retains ultimate substantive control; it can enact
whatever substantive standards it likes, and the President can-
not violate those standards.0 5
President acting at the request of the President, shall notify the affected agency and the
Administrator of OIRA of the President's decision with respect to the matter." Id. The Or-
der does not specify whether the affected agency is to take the President's decision as
advisory or binding.
1 See text accompanying notes 81-87.
105 There is likely to be some constitutionally protected core to the executive branch
under Article H that Congress cannot control; for example, if Congress sought to make the
Secretary of State not removable at the will of the President, Article 11 would probably be
violated. But short of unusual situations in which Article II precludes congressional con-
trol, Congress has considerable latitude to structure the relationships of agencies and the
White House. See Lawrence Lessig and Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Adminis-
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Moreover, it will be difficult, for reasons noted above, for
these issues to be litigated. The presidential review process is
likely to be invoked only for singularly important regulatory
initiatives, and even then, only when executive branch conflicts
cannot be worked out cooperatively. Indeed, in the first eight
months since the Order took effect, the process had yet to be
employed."o When the process is invoked, the heads of execu-
tive agencies are unlikely to say that presidential command has
overridden agency judgment, rather than that presidential input
has made for a more informed agency decision.
D. Incorporating the Independent Agencies
President Reagan declined to include the independent agen-
cies within the requirements of his two executive orders. In part,
this appears to have been a political judgment. The Democratic
Congress, skeptical of the executive orders in general, might well
have been outraged by an assertion of presidential authority over
the independent agencies, which Congress often considers "its
own." But the judgment was based partly on law as well. The
extension of the executive orders to the independent agencies
would have raised difficult constitutional and statutory questions.
Under President Reagan, the Department of Justice concluded
that the President had the legal authority to extend the orders,
but no one disputes the novelty and complexity of the ques-
tion.10
7
On the other hand, strong policy reasons favor including the
independents within some degree of presidential authority. Often
a substantial overlap exists between the work of independent and
executive agencies. Consider the antitrust responsibilities of the
FTC and the Department of Justice, or the labor policy of the
NLRB and the Secretary of Labor, or the labelling policies of the
FDA and the Department of Agriculture. It is important to coor-
dinate these activities so as to ensure a degree of coherence and
consistency. Also, and equally important, much of the indepen-
dent agencies' work lies squarely within any administration's
highest priorities. The FCC, for example, controls communica-
tions policy, an issue of central importance to Vice President
Gore. Some of the most important work in the area of health and
tration, 94 Colum L Rev 1, 106-18 (1994).
106 Report on Executive Order No 12866, 59 Fed Reg at 24283 (cited in note 28).
" See Memorandum for the Honorable David Stockman at 357 (cited in note 93).
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safety is conducted by independent agencies, including the FDA
and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC"). If the indepen-
dents are placed outside of the President's domain, much of na-
tional policy may escape the Administration's grasp except to the
extent that other, indirect mechanisms of control act as a surro-
gate.0
8
President Clinton has moved to incorporate the independent
agencies within the system of presidential oversight, at least in a
modest way. The unified regulatory agenda, including all pro-
posed regulations, will require the participation of the indepen-
dents.0 9 More important, the annual regulatory plan must in-
clude submissions from the independent agencies, and here the
Vice President has an opportunity to advise and consult."0 This
is only a modest step, for there is no clear evidence that the
agency's discretion may be overturned or even influenced by the
President. But it is still bold and dramatic, simply because it is
unprecedented. President Clinton might have gone further than
Presidents Reagan and Bush both because of less-intense politi-
cal fear-a Democratic Congress is less likely to object to such a
step from a Democratic President-and also because of an espe-
cially strong commitment to centralized presidential oversight of
the large policy judgments made by independent agencies.
The legal question-whether the President has any legal
authority to supervise the independents, and which particular
means of supervision might be constitutional-has not been an-
swered."' The Supreme Court has not yet defined "inefficiency,
neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office,"" 2 the ordinary stan-
dards for presidential removal of members of the independent
commissions. Nor does anything in Humphrey's Executor-the
case establishing the validity of the independent agency
form-speak to the particular issue of the degree of presidential
authority over the independents."' We know that independent
" These include appointment of the Chair, replacement of the retirees, and others.
See Strauss, 84 Colum L Rev at 590-91 (cited in note 97). In fact, there is little evidence
that, in the long run, the independents deviate significantly from presidential wishes. See
Terry M. Moe, Regulatory Performance and Presidential Administration, 26 Am J Pol Sci
197, 221 (1982).
i" Exec Order No 12866 § 4(b), 3 CFR at 642 (cited in note 18).
110 Id § 4(c), 3 CFR at 642-43.
... We draw here Lessig and Sunstein, 94 Colum L Rev 1 (cited in note 105), which
also contains a lengthy historical discussion.
1 See, for example, 15 USC § 41 (1988 & Supp 1992); 29 USC § 661(b) (1988 & Supp
1992).
1' Humphrey's Executor v United States, 295 US 602, 629-32 (1935).
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agencies can exist, but we do not know precisely how indepen-
dent Congress has made them or could choose to make them. If
the statutory words allow some scope for presidential removal
and hence supervisory power, the degree of independent adminis-
tration of the laws can be solved simply as a matter of statutory
construction; the constitutional issue need not be reached be-
cause a degree of presidential power exists as a statutory matter.
It might be possible to interpret the relevant statutes as
allowing a degree of removal and supervisory power to remain in
the President. Purely as a textual matter, the words "good cause"
or "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office" seem to
grant the President something in the way of supervisory and
removal power. Perhaps they allow him, for example, to dis-
charge, as inefficient or neglectful of duty, those commissioners
who have frequently or on important occasions acted in incompe-
tent ways. Perhaps too they allow him to discharge officials
whom he finds incompetent because of their consistently foolish
policy choices." 4 If this is a correct interpretation of the remov-
al provisions, certainly a degree of procedural supervision would
be acceptable.
This result might seem counterintuitive in light of the fre-
quent understanding that independent agencies are entirely im-
mune from presidential policy-making."5 But some language in
Bowsher v Synar might support this conclusion." 6 In Bowsher,
the Court held that Congress could not delegate power to admin-
ister the Gramm-Rudman statute to the Comptroller General,
because-and this is the key point-the Comptroller was unduly
subject to congressional control. In the Court's view, those who
execute the law must not be subject to the policy-making authori-
11 See Geoffrey P. Miller, The Debate Over Independent Agencies in Light of Empirical
Evidence, 1988 Duke L J 215, 217.
1 This understanding is perhaps embraced, though obliquely and in dicta, in
Humphrey's Executor, which describes the commissioners of the FTC as "independent of
executive authority, except in its selection." 295 US at 625. For a recent application of this
understanding, see Borders v Reagan, 518 F Supp 250 (D DC 1981), vacated, 732 F2d 181
(DC Cir 1982), invalidating President Reagan's attempt to remove a member of the
District of Columbia Judicial Nomination Commission. Although the statute contained no
express removal provision, the court interpreted the statute to establish a fixed tenure in
office not subject to presidential removal. This result followed from the statutory under-
standing that Commission members "be isolated from political considerations and political
changes in order that they may exercise their decisions free from outside influences," 518
F Supp at 255; the intent of the statute "was to ensure complete independence of Commis-
sion members from any presidential direction so that the members could be single.minded
in their pursuit and evaluation of merit," id at 260.
"a 478 US 714 (1986).
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ty of Congress except insofar as legislative instructions are em-
bodied in substantive law." The relevant statute allowed Con-
gress to discharge the Comptroller for "abuse of office," "neglect
of duty," or "malfeasance.""8 The Court said that these "very
broad" terms meant that Congress had "in effect retained control
over the execution of the Act ..... "' In the Court's view,
"[these terms are very broad and, as interpreted by Congress,
could sustain removal of a Comptroller General for any number
of actual or perceived transgressions of the legislative will."2
Read in a certain way, this language in Bowsher might be
thought to have significant implications for the legitimacy of
presidential supervision over the independent agencies. On a
strong reading, Bowsher could be taken to hold that traditional
removal constraints still leave the President with considerable
legally permissible latitude to remove-and hence super-
vise-independent agency heads. On a weaker reading, Bowsher
is not applicable to the presidential setting at all, and even if it
is, it merely recognizes that, however legally constrained removal
authority might be, as a practical matter even supposedly inde-
pendent officials can still be subject de facto to considerable pres-
sure and oversight. The opinion is unclear on whether the
Bowsher Court was concerned that the Comptroller General was
insufficiently independent of Congress as a matter of law or of
fact.
The question is important because the words governing con-
gressional power over the Comptroller General are substantially
the same as the words governing presidential power over inde-
pendent agencies. If those words have the same meaning in these
admittedly different contexts, and if one endorses the strong
reading of Bowsher, the President turns out to have considerable
power over the commissioners. On this reading, the President
would have broad removal power over the independent agencies,
with correlative powers of supervision and guidance. As a matter
of statutory interpretation, the "independent" agencies would be
subject to a significant degree of legally legitimate presidential
oversight."
117 Id at 726.
m" Id at 729.
Id at 729, 734.
"2 Id at 729.
" It would of course be plausible to suggest that because of the difference in the con-
texts, the same words should have different meanings. Perhaps a statute restricting con-
gressional power over the Comptroller General should be understood to impose thinner
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Perhaps it would be wrong to say that the Court would or
should embrace this strong view of Bowsher as a matter of consti-
tutional compulsion. But even if it would not, Bowsher might still
be grounds for courts to invoke a clear-statement principle, one
that allows the President a degree of supervisory power over the
commissions. For those troubled by the independent agency form
as a matter of policy or constitutional law, such an approach
would minimize the risks of this form and promote coordination
and accountability in government. Such an approach would rec-
ognize that many independent agencies perform policy-making
functions identical in nature to those of the executive agencies,
and that the performance of such functions by truly independent
agents raises sufficiently serious structural questions to require
clear congressional authorization.'22
On the weaker reading of Bowsher, which tends to find sup-
port in subsequent cases, 2 ' the Court did not call into question
the traditional understanding that independent agencies are
highly insulated, as a statutory matter, from presidential over-
sight. Bowsher recognized that some influence and pressure
might exist as a practical matter, but the Court did not legiti-
mate this influence by acknowledging any legal basis for such de
facto oversight, certainly if exercised by the President over the
independents.
For present purposes, we need not attempt to resolve these
underlying complexities. On either reading of Bowsher, it is rea-
sonable to conclude that the modest and partial inclusion of the
independent agencies within Executive Order 12866 is entirely
lawfil. The Clinton Order does not bind the independents to
presidential directives. In some situations, guidance and consul-
tation might actually become policy dictation, in which case dif-
limitations than a statute controlling presidential power over independent commissioners.
Such a reading would hardly be an implausible reconstruction of legislative goals.
1 See Peter L. Strauss and Cass R. Sunstein, The Role of the President and OMB in
Informal Rulemaking, 38 Admin L Rev 181 (1986).
123 In Mistretta v United States, 488 US 361, 410-12 & nn 32-35 (1989), the Court de-
scribed a standard removal "for good cause only" provision as one that gave the president
only "limited" power "in order to safeguard the independence" of the relevant agency. Not-
ing that the removal constraint at issue was "precisely the kind that was at issue in
Humphrey's Executor v. United States," the Court described such provisions as "specifi-
cally crafted to prevent the President from exercising 'coercive influence' over independent
agencies." For an earlier decision to the same effect, see Wiener v United States, 357 US
349, 352 (1958). In discussing a good-cause removal provision, the Wiener.Court described
Congress as having created "a body that was [to be] 'entirely free from the control or
coercive influence, direct or indirect,' of either the Executive or the Congress." Id at 355-
56 (citations omitted).
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ferent legal issues would be raised. On its face, however, the
Order is acceptable. If the President may discharge commission-
ers for "neglect of duty" or "inefficiency in office," surely he is
entitled to ask for a statement of annual plans, and at least to
offer his suggestions on whether those plans are sensible.
HI. REGULATORY ENDS, REGULATORY SUBSTANCE:
PRELIMINARY NOTES
A. In General
It is now time to discuss substantive issues. The Reagan
orders, of course, were founded on distinctive ideas about regula-
tory failure. Executive Order 12866 takes a new position on that
problem.
We begin our analysis of this substantive shift with a gener-
al suggestion. Many conflicts over regulatory policy are best un-
derstood in light of three paradoxes. First, public perceptions of
risk over time do not necessarily track, and in fact at times may
run counter to, actual changes in the risks people face. Second,
expert and lay judgments about risk frequently diverge. And
third, public distrust of bureaucracies leads toward demands for
both centralization and democratization of the regulatory process.
The first paradox can be understood in the following way.
During the last twenty years, regulatory initiatives and techno-
logical changes have significantly reduced the average level of
environmental, occupational, and other risks, at least as a gener-
al rule.' Consider the following data:
4 To cite just three examples, air quality, water quality, and automobile safety have
significantly improved, in part as a result of regulation. Dori Meinert, Air cleaner in '92;
expected to be better in '93, San Diego Union-Tib B3 (Nov 5, 1993) (between 1983 and
1992, the number of Americans living in counties with air quality considered unhealthy
by federal standards fell from 100 million to 54 million); Casey Bukro, 20 years later,
Earth Day's legacy lingers, Chi Trib § 1 at 1, 10 (Apr 16, 1990) ("Seventy-four percent of
rivers now meet water quality standards."); Mike McKesson, Safety matters, poll shows
buyers want it but don't quite get it, Chi Trib § 17 at 6 (May 29, 1994) (noting that the
rate of traffic deaths per 100 million vehicles has dropped significantly each year since
1980); Sandra Blakeslee, Concentrations of Lead in Blood Drop Steeply, NY Times A18
(July 27, 1994) (studies show that regulatory phaseout of lead additives for gasoline
between 1976 and 1991 led to 78 percent decline of average level of lead in bloodstreams).
See also Cass R. Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution 77-81 (Harvard, 1990) (cataloguing
regulatory successes as well as failures); United Nations Development Programme,
Human Development Report 1994 (Oxford, 1994) (showing dramatic international increas-
es in life expectancy, literacy, GNP per capita, and other indicators of well-being).
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TABLE 1. Principle Death Risk Trends'
1930-1940
1940-1950
1950-1960
1960-1970
1970-1980
1980-1990
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Annual rate of increase in death rates
(per 100,000 population)
Work Home Motor vehicle
-1.8 -0.2 -3.3
-2.3 -2.2 -4.0
-2.8 -2.1 -3.5
-1.2 -1.7 -0.8
-1.6 -2.7 -3.4
-3.2 -2.4 -4.3
Along most dimensions, moreover, there seems to be no problem
with the stock of available resources.2
At the same time, however, public concerns about risk have
risen significantly. 27 The public seems to appreciate neither the
reductions that have been made nor the full factual picture about
risk levels. These considerations point to a serious conflict be-
tween public perceptions of risk on the one hand and trends and
facts on the other. A 1978 study makes the point especially vivid.
The authors gave respondents information about the fatality rate
for one risk-in the first sample for motor vehicles, in the other
for electrocution. The authors then asked for risk estimates for a
series of other risks. The following table shows the ratio of the
respondents' risk perceptions to the actual risks:
TABLE 2. Perceived versus Actual Risks"8
Cause of death
Smallpox
Poisoning by vitamins
Botulism
Perceived risk/actual risk
where motor vehicle acci-
dent risk is reference point
Perceived riskactual
risk where electrocution
risk is reference point
(base risk of zero) (base risk of zero)
1.27 1.16
1.97 1.96
Reprinted from W. Kip Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs 285 (Oxford, 1992). © 1992 by
Oxford University.
' See Jerry Taylor, The Challenge of Sustainable Development, Regulation 35, 37-38
(No 1, 1994).
7 For a discussion of the distinction between popular and expert opinion, see Breyer,
Breaking the Vicious Circle at 33-39 (cited in note 6).
'" Reprinted with permission from Sarah Lichtenstein, et al, Judged Frequency of Le-
thal Events, 4 J Experimental Psych: Human Learning & Memory 551, 564 (1978). © 1978
by the American Psychological Association, Inc.
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Measles 1.39 1.47
Fireworks 1.54 1.26
Smallpox vaccination 0.17 0.22
Whooping cough 0.69 0.62
Polio 0.80 0.55
Venomous bite or sting 1.67 1.85
Tornado 1.82 2.86
Lightning 0.32 0.37
Nonvenomous animal 0.71 0.54
Flood 1.77 2.71
Excess cold 0.81 0.73
Syphilis 1.15 1.05
Pregnancy, childbirth,
and abortion 2.98 2.78
Infection hepatitis 1.19 0.80
Appendicitis 1.03 0.87
Electrocution 0.65 1.96
Motor-train collision 0.74 0.95
Asthma 0.65 0.47
Firearms 1.26 1.42
Poisoning 0.96 0.92
Tuberculosis 0.59 0.43
Fire and flames 1.62 1.86
Drowning 0.85 0.91
Leukemia 0.81 0.92
Accidental falls 0.68 1.03
Homicide 2.10 1.30
Emphysema 0.69 0.86
Suicide 1.42 0.97
Breast cancer 0.66 0.61
Diabetes 0.34 0.22
Motor vehicle accident 6.34 5.76
Lung cancer 1.00 1.33
Stomach cancer 0.43 0.26
All accidents 6.77 9.32
Stroke 0.54 0.31
All cancer 1.70 2.00
Heart disease 0.49 0.51
All disease 0.75 1.14
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Second, and relatedly, there is a sharp conflict between ex-
pert and lay judgments about risks." 9 Though this conflict is
still widely ignored, and its foundations are not precisely under-
stood, it should be treated as a central question confronting regu-
latory policy, for it bears directly on many issues of law and poli-
cy.3 ° Experts' level of technical knowledge with regard to risk
has increased dramatically, in part because of the maturation of
the disciplines of risk assessment and risk management. Yet
public willingness to permit policy to be made on the basis of this
knowledge has declined dramatically. The most noteworthy ex-
ample in the last decade was the impasse over long-term nuclear
waste disposal. While scientists viewed the technical problem as
"trivial,"13 public opposition made site selection and prepara-
tion almost impossible. As one participant put it, "It is embar-
rassingly easy to solve the technical problems, yet impossible to
solve the political ones." 132 Consider a comparison between EPA
and public understandings of environmental risk:
TABLE 3. Rating Health Risks 33
Public ranking of risks EPA experts ranking
1. Hazardous waste sites Medium-to-low
2. Exposure to worksite chemicals High
3. Industrial pollution of waterways Low
4. Nuclear accident radiation Not ranked
5. Radioactive waste Not ranked
As we will see, this paradox is different from the first, since the first turns on fac-
tual misperceptions, whereas the second at least potentially involves a disagreement in
judgments of value.
"3 See James E. Krier, Round Table Discussion: Science, Environment, and the Law,
21 Ecol L Q 343, 356 (1994) ("resolution of this conflict should logically precede all other
technical environmental issues, [but] this matter is being largely ignored in the ongoing
debate about risk").
" Bernard L. Cohen, Before It's Too Late: A Scientist's Case for Nuclear Energy 119
(Plenum, 1983).
H. W. Lewis, Technological Risk 246 (Norton, 1990).
Reprinted with permission from Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle at 21 (cited in
note 6) (citing national public-opinion polls by the Roper Organization in December 1987
and January 1988; Frederick Allen, Environmental Protection Agency, based on Environ-
mental Protection Agency, Unfinished Business: A Comparative Assessment of Environ-
mental Problems (1987)).
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6. Chemical leaks from underground
storage tanks
7. Pesticides
8. Pollution from industrial accidents
9. Water pollution from farm runoff
10. Tap water contamination
11. Industrial air pollution
12. Ozone layer destruction
13. Coastal water contamination
14. Sewage-plant water pollution
15. Vehicle exhaust
16. Oil spills
17. Acid rain
18. Water pollution from urban runoff
19. Damaged wetlands
20. Genetic alteration
21. Nonhazardous waste sites
22. Greenhouse effect
23. Indoor air pollution
24. X-ray radiation
25. Indoor radon
26. Microwave oven radiation
Medium-to-low
High
Medium-to-low
Medium
High
High
High
Low
Medium-to-low
High
Medium-to-low
High
Medium
Low
Low
Medium-to-low
Low
High
Not ranked
High
Not ranked
Some of these disparities reflect differences in purely factual
assessments; others reflect differences in valuation. It may well
be, for example, that the public concern over microwave oven
radiation is based on a simple misperception of facts. There is a
"fact" about the level of radiation that microwave ovens emit
(though public assessments may also reflect judgments about the
value of microwave ovens, the possibility of individual control,
and so. forth). On the other hand, evaluations of ozone layer de-
struction are not based only on facts-there may well be no "fact"
that experts can identify-but also on assessments about how to
proceed in circumstances of uncertainty in which future genera-
tions are at risk. Consider more generally the following chart,
showing disparities between public and expert perceptions of
risk:
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TABLE 4. Ordering of Perceived Risk for Thirty
Activities and Technologies 
4
League
of Active
Activity or Women College Club
technology Voters students members Experts
Nuclear power 1 1 8 20
Motor vehicles 2 5 3 1
Handguns 3 2 1 4
Smoking 4 3 4 2
Motorcycles 5 6 2 6
Alcoholic beverages 6 7 5 3
General (private)
aviation 7 15 11 12
Police work 8 8 7 17
Pesticides 9 4 15 8
Surgery 10 11 9 5
Fire fighting 11 10 6 18
Large construction 12 14 13 13
Hunting 13 18 10 23
Spray cans 14 13 23 26
Mountain climbing 15 22 12 29
Bicycles 16 24 14 15
Commercial aviation 17 16 18 16
Electrical power
(nonnuclear) 18 19 19 9
Swimming 19 30 17 10
Contraceptives 20 9 22 11
Skiing 21 25 16 30
X-rays 22 17 24 7
High school and
college football 23 26 21 27
1 Reprinted with permission from Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 Science 280,
281 (Apr 17, 1987). © 1987 by the American Association for the Advancement of Science.
"Experts" here means fifteen people selected nationwide for their professional interest and
expertise in risk management. Included among the fifteen were a geographer, an environ-
mental policy analyst, an economist, a lawyer, a biologist, and a government regulator of
hazardous materials (ages ranged from twenty-nine to sixty-eight, with a median of forty-
two). Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff, and Sarah Lichtenstein, Characterizing Perceived
Risks, in Robert W. Kates, Christoph Hohenemser, and Jeanne X. Kasperson, eds, Per-
ilous Progress: Managing the Hazards of Technology 91, 116 (Westview, 1985). "Active
Club" is an organization of business and professional people devoted to community service
activities. Id.
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Railroads 24 23 29 19
Food preservatives 25 12 28 14
Food coloring 26 20 30 21
Power mowers 27 28 25 28
Prescription antibiotics 28 21 26 24
Home appliances 29 27 27 22
Vaccinations 30 29 29 25
The third paradox stems from the fact that public frustration
with the bureaucracies designed to deal with these issues pushes
in two quite different directions for reform. On the one hand, the
sense of inconsistent, duplicative, and cumulatively burdensome
regulation leads to demands for more centralized national con-
trol, especially at the presidential level. On the other hand, the
sense that remote federal bureaucracies make policy without
regard to the concerns or values of the people affected suggests
the need for more participatory, decentralized decision-making
structures. There can be a sharp conflict between these two un-
derstandings-producing a paradox involving the desire for cen-
tralization, coordination, and hierarchical control on the one
hand, and the need for participation and democratic deliberation
on the other.
Executive Order 12866 attempts to address all three para-
doxes. It tries, for example, to enhance the values of both central-
ization and participation, and to do so simultaneously. Thus the
Order increases public disclosure of communications between
outsiders and the executive branch, and promises to maintain
open channels of communications.'35 At the same time that the
new Order increases the centralization of the regulatory process,
it also seeks to expand participation in new, more centralized
forums. 3 ' Thus the Administration seems to favor not only
negotiated rule making, an increasingly popular if controversial
means of building private judgments into rule making from the
start, but also public meetings, policy discussion groups, and
focus groups as means to obtain public input at early stages.
There is also interest in appointing an ombudsman (already in
use in the FDA, the Internal Revenue Service, and the Comptrol-
12 See Exec Order No 12866 § 4(e), 3 CFR at 643-44 (cited in note 18).
' The main document leading to the Order emphasized the need to promote public
awareness and greater participation. See Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Better Regulations: The
National Performance Reuiew's Regulatory Reform Recommendations, 43 Duke L J 1165,
1172 (1994). See also Carnegie Commission, Risk and the Environment at 87-90, 115-16
(cited in note 6).
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ler of the Currency), in forming toll-free hotlines, and in using
computers, electronic bulletin boards, and e-mail as means to
facilitate public discussion."7
We will return to the first two paradoxes below. For the
present, we evaluate the Order's efforts to address the paradox
between centralization and democratic participation. To do so, we
begin by considering recent discoveries about the relationship
between government institutions and the public in the risk-regu-
lation process.
B. Public Trust and Effective Regulation
The extent of public trust in various regulatory authorities is
a critical, but widely neglected, element in risk regulation. To say
that trust plays an important role may seem obvious or banal.
But an understanding of the mechanisms of creating trust is
central to more effective regulatory policy.
Trust is important to the regulatory process in at least three
ways. First, levels of trust shape public knowledge about risk.
Second, levels of trust influence the ability of regulators to com-
municate effectively about risk. Finally, public trust is critical to
public acceptance of regulatory proposals for dealing with risk.
Public perceptions of risk are filtered through judgments
about the trustworthiness of the authorities charged with respon-
sibility for managing those risks, and about the benefits of activi-
ties that produce risk. As one observer puts it, "acceptance of any
risk is more dependent on public confidence in risk management
than on the quantitative estimates of risk. . . .""' Thus, risk-
perception research shows that people view medical technologies
using radiation and chemicals (x-rays and prescription drugs) far
more favorably than industrial technologies involving similar
radiation and chemicals (nuclear power, pesticides, and industri-
al chemicals). 9 Even if the risks are similar when measured in
expected value terms, the former are viewed as high benefit, low
risk, and clearly acceptable, while the latter are viewed as low
benefit, high risk, and unacceptable. The difference appears
traceable, in part, to the high degree of trust in physicians, who
Lubbers, 43 Duke L J at 1172 (cited in note 136).
13 Chauncey Starr, Risk Management, Assessment, and Acceptability, 5 Risk Analysis
97, 98 (1985).
" Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk: Reflections on the Psychometric Paradigm, in
Sheldon Krimsky and Cominic Golding, eds, Social Theories of Risk 117, 127 (Praeger,
1992).
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manage the former, as compared to government and industry offi-
cials, who manage the latter.
Similarly, risk-communication studies have shown that the
"same risk" is perceived differently in different communities or at
different times. These differences have been attributed to the
public's confidence in the social and political institutions in-
volved. When community residents trust local public and corpo-
rate officials, the residents are more willing to accept official
information about hazards. Where this trust is lacking, communi-
ties turn to outside sources of information about risk and remain
highly skeptical of official sources.' Studies of community will-
ingness to accept hazardous waste sites establish that the pro-
cess of consent to siting, and the extent of community control
over management, are important to gaining acceptance.' On a
broader basis, a comparative study of environmental policy in
Britain and the United States concludes that heightened concern
in the United States about environmental risks stems from great-
er distrust in major social and political institutions, particularly
large corporations and government.'
Public officials must understand the dynamics of trust cre-
ation and destruction in order to develop more effective regulato-
ry policy. Trust is difficult to build and easy to destroy. In the
public mind, negative events are more salient than positive ones:
the former carry considerably more weight. In addition, sources
of trust-destroying news are viewed as more credible than
sources of trust-building news. They also receive more media
attention. Finally, distrust, once started, tends to perpetuate
itself, partly, perhaps, because of risk aversion with respect to
catastrophic events. As one example of these processes of risk
aversion, studies have shown that people report that they gener-
ally have little confidence in animal studies as predictors of the
human health effects of chemicals. Yet when told that a specific
chemical has been found carcinogenic in animals, people express
"4 June Fessendon-Raden, Janet M. Fitchen, and Jenifer S. Heath, Providing Risk
Information in Communities: Factors Influencing What is Heard and Accepted, 12 Sci Tech
& Human Values 94, 96 (Summer/Fall 1987).
14 Daniel J. Fiorino, Technical and Democratic Values in Risk Analysis, 9 Risk Analy-
sis 293, 295 (1989). ,
" David Vogel, National Styles of Regulation: Environmental Policy in Great Britain
and the United States 253-59 (Cornell, 1986).
" The arguments here draw on Paul Slovic, Perceived Risk, Trust, and Democracy, 13
Risk Analysis 675, 676-77 (1993).
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"considerable confidence" in the relevance of this study for hu-
man health.'
The problem of trust is exacerbated by conflicts between
expert and lay systems for evaluating risk. This is perhaps the
central difficulty in contemporary risk regulation, with pervasive
consequences for the design of regulatory policy. To build the
trust necessary to find acceptable regulatory solutions, agencies
should recognize the conflict between expert and lay assessments,
pay attention to lay evaluations of risk, and seek to communicate
risk information effectively. For reasons explored below, we be-
lieve that policymakers should view lay and expert reasoning as
two distinct styles of rational risk assessment, neither of which
has a monopoly on rationality. Governmental efforts to base
policies on expert risk assessments are likely to be viewed as
"democratic elitism."45 Such efforts could undermine them-
selves by destroying the trust necessary to make programs work.
The dynamics of trust suggest several points about the regu-
latory process, only some of which are addressed by Executive
Order 12866. First, government should do more to advertise in
good faith its own successes in improving water quality,
workplace safety, and the like. This matter is not discussed in
the Clinton Order. It is a conspicuous gap, for public skepticism
about risk regulation is likely to be fueled if people are unaware
that numerous programs have succeeded. A special public goal of
the Clinton Administration in general has been to provide "na-
tional performance review," so as to encourage government to
deliver on its promises, to create good incentives for public em-
ployees, and to allow citizens to monitor governmental perfor-
mance.'46 Ironically, Executive Order 12866 fails to provide a
mechanism for ensuring review of OIRA's performance under the
Order itself. We suggest that such a mechanism be created. 47
It is important for the government to provide a record of the
actual effects of its initiatives-to establish goals and to report on
progress in meeting those goals.
Second, the creation of trust is inhibited by the American
tendency to resolve policy conflicts in adversarial settings, partic-
ularly litigation, in which individual experts further accentuate
"A Id at 678.
145 See Peter Bachrach, The Theory of Democratic Elitism: A Critique 7-9 (Little,
Brown, 1967).
1'4 See Lubbers, 43 Duke L J at 1169 (cited in note 136).
.4 See also Paul R. Verkuil, Is Efficient Government an Oxymoron?, 43 Duke L J 1221,
1231-34 (1994).
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their conflicts with each other. These contests tend to destroy
trust in experts as a whole. By encouraging alternative struc-
tures, such as negotiated rule making, the Clinton approach
might well have the effect (whether intended or not) of creating
decision-making structures that build trust."
Third, any perception that presidential oversight is corrupted
through the illegitimate influence of interest groups-even in iso-
lated instances-will have pervasive adverse effects on public
trust in oversight institutions. The Clinton Order makes an effort
to respond to the last two of these points, and perhaps we can
expect that in its implementation it will respond to the first point
as well.
IV. REGULATORY ENDS: COSTS, BENEFITS, COMPARATIVE RISKS,
AND RATIONALITY
One of the most hotly disputed issues in law and policy in-
volves the use of analytical decision-theory techiques for guiding
regulatory choices. The most familiar issue involves the role of
cost-benefit analysis ("CBA"). Less familiar, but increasingly
important, is the emerging role of comparative risk assessment
("CRA"). While CBA advocates explore whether a particular poli-
cy is justified, CRA has a more confined role. The goal of CRA is
to ensure better priority setting by ranking risks in terms of
their seriousness. CRA is concerned with ensuring that the most
serious risks are addressed first, rather than with the more con-
troversial determination of whether the benefits of any particular
regulation exceed its costs.
During the 1980s, public disputes focused primarily on CBA.
In the most dramatic victory for CBA, the Reagan
Administration's two executive orders called, "to the extent per-
mitted by law," for the application of CBA to all regulatory deci-
sions.' The Clinton Order offers a different approach to the
role of CBA in the regulatory process.
To some extent, Executive Order 12866 continues the com-
mitment, certainly in appearance, to CBA. Thus, the Order re-
quires agencies to "assess all costs and benefits," to choose from
among alternative regulatory approaches those that "maximize
"8 But see Susan Rose-Ackerman, Consensus Versus Incentives:A Skeptical Look atRegula-
tory Negotiation, 43 Duke L J 1206 (1994) (comparing regulatory negotiation unfavorably
with economic incentives).
"' Exec Order No 12291 § 2, 3 CFR at 128-29 (cited in note 1); Exec Order No 12498 §
1, 3 CFR at 323 (cited in note 3).
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net benefits," and to "propose or adopt a regulation only upon a
reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended regula-
tion justify its costs."50 At the same time, the Clinton Order
offers an expansive and eclectic list of the kinds of benefits that
must be taken into account. These include "potential economic,
environmental, public health and safety, and other advantages;
distributive impacts; and equity." 5' The concern for distributive
impacts may be related, in part, to recently emerging controver-
sies over the race-related impacts of environmental policy; a
subsequent Executive Order deals with that concern directly.
5 2
The Order also emphasizes that "qualitative measures of costs
and benefits that are difficult to quantify" remain "essential to
consider."53
The text of Executive Order 12866 suggests ambivalence and
caution toward CBA. On the one hand, the basic commitment to
a form of CBA is maintained. This is an especially important
development, for it ratifies an aspect of the Reagan orders that
had been particularly controversial. On the other hand, the list of
factors that must be included in this analysis is broadened
significantly, with open-ended and potentially ambiguous vari-
ables. It is reasonable to wonder whether a form of CBA can re-
main coherent if it does not use a single metric or if it empha-
sizes qualititative differences. Indeed, the actual use of CBA by
OMB during the 1980s justifies at least some concern whether
CBA even in its purportedly purest form, as undertaken by actu-
al government agents, is likely to avoid a high degree of discre-
tionary judgment about relevant values. One detailed study nota-
bly concludes that there were "literally hundreds of cases of OMB
" Exec Order No 12866 § 1(a), (b)(5)-(6), 3 CFR at 638-39 (cited in note 18).
... Id § 1(a) at 639.
" See Exec Order No 12898, 59 Fed Reg 7629 (1994). For one of the first discussions
of this problem in the legal literature, see Note, Remedying Environmental Racism, 90
Mich L Rev 394 (1991). For general discussion, see Robert W. Collin, Environmental
Equity: A Law and Planning Approach to Environmental Racism, 11 Va Envir L J 495
(1992); Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing 'Environmental Justice': The Distributional Effects
of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw U L Rev 787 (1993); Rae Zimmerman, Issues of Clas-
sification in Environmental Equity: How We Manage Is How We Measure, 21 Fordham
Urban L J 633 (1994); Rae Zimmerman, Social Equity and Environmental Risk, 13 Risk
Analysis 649 (1993). For a cautionary note on these arguments, see Vicki" Been, Locally
Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods: Disproportionate Siting or Market
Dynamics?, 103 Yale L J 1383 (1994). Bills have been introduced into Congress calling for
attention to these issues. See S 1161, 103d Cong, 1st Sess (June 24, 1993), in 139 Cong
Rec S8085 (June 24, 1993); HR 2105, 103d Cong, 1st Sess (May 12, 1993), in 139 Cong
Re H2462 (May 12, 1993).
' Exec Order No 12866 § 1(a), 3 CFR at 639 (cited in note 18).
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intervention into agency rulemakings to urge less stringent regu-
lations, and at most a handful of cases of OMB urging the agen-
cies to regulate more stringently.""5 Perhaps OMB was re-
sponding reasonably to consistent agency overreaching and hence
to consistent failure to justify regulation in light of its costs.
More plausibly, however, CBA at times became a political tool for
pursuit of an antiregulatory agenda based on something other
than actual numbers.
We seek to make a broader point in this Part. Public ambiva-
lence toward CBA, and the ambivalence reflected in Executive
Order 12866, are rooted in deeper forces having to do with funda-
mental questions about the nature of "rational" choice among
competing policies.
What we say about CBA will bear on CRA as well. Unlike
CBA, comparative risk assessment does not require that risk-
reducing policies be justified by showing that their "benefits"
exceed their "costs." Instead, CRA stems from recognition of the
fact that government can address only some of the risks that
people face. Thus, the Vice President's "Reinventing Government"
report recommends explicitly that the federal government "[riank
the seriousness of environmental, health or safety risks and de-
velop anticipatory approaches to regulatory problems."155 Con-
gress has shown interest in the same idea. 55
Executive Order 12866 is less clear, but it points in the same
direction. The Order requires that "each agency shall consider, to
the extent reasonable, the degree and nature of the risks posed
by various substances within its jurisdiction."'57 It also requires
each agency's Regulatory Plan to include a statement with each
proposed action, explaining how the action will reduce risks "as
well as how the magnitude of the risk addressed by the action
relates to other risks within the jurisdiction of the agency."58
The Order does not, however, expressly require comparative risk
assessment. The reasons for its failure to take this step are con-
McGarity, Reinventing Rationality at 286-87 (cited in note 13).
1 Gore, Report of the National Performance Review at 168 (cited in note 25).
For example, the Johnston Amendment states: "In promulgating any final regula-
tion relating to human health and safety or the environment... the Secretary of Environ-
mental Protection shall publish in the Federal Register an estimate... of the risk to the
health and safety... of the public ... and the costs associated with ... the regula-
tion...." S 171 § 123(a) (cited in note 29). See also the discussion of the Johnston
Amendment in Craig Gannett, Congress and the Reform of Risk Regulation, 107 Harv L
Rev 2095, 2101-03 (1994), reviewing Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle (cited in note 6).
15 Exec Order No 12866 § 1(b)(4), 3 CFR at 639 (cited in note 18).
15 Id § 4(c)(1)(D) at 642.
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nected, we believe, to the Order's ambivalence toward cost-benefit
analysis.
159
A. Competing Conceptions of Rationality and Value
1. Common critiques.
During the 1980s, numerous critiques of the theory of CBA
emerged. A common complaint was that CBA was biased against
the benefits of regulation, since these tend to be "soft variables"
not easily quantified. 16' To the extent this was a criticism of the
way CBA tended to operate in practice, it did not necessarily
indict the theory of CBA. The response was that when CBA was
improperly applied, it ought to be made more sophisticated."'
There are by now several different techniques for attempting to
assign some value to benefits such as cleaner air, safer drinking
water, or less-hazardous work environments. Many of these tech-
niques, such as contingent valuation, are more advanced than
measures characteristic of first-generation CBA. To be sure, they
still face considerable problems. But the undervaluation-of-soft-
variables critique proves both too much and too little. For in the
absence of some effort to get a handle on the relative benefits and
costs of policies, that critique by itself provides no guidance to
making sensible policy.
A second and also common criticism was that CBA fails to
address distributional issues, or that it is biased against the
poor. There is force to this objection in some contexts. Actual
willingness to pay in real market settings-the typical criterion
for calculating costs and benefits-depends on ability to pay, and
in this sense it can incorporate a kind of bias against the poor.
Certainly, to the extent that regulation is designed to promote
distributive goals, CBA will be unhelpful. But this need not be a
decisive argument against CBA in all contexts. Regulators will
inevitably have to find some means to assess the tradeoffs among
employment, health, environmental quality, and cost in choosing
among different regulatory standards. CBA can assist regulators
159 It might still be possible to rank risks while taking account of social judgments of
the sort we defend below. We mean to be raising complexities about comparative risk as-
sessment, while still recognizing that the technique has much promise.
160 Some had emphasized this point long before the Reagan initiatives. See, for exam-
ple, Laurence H. Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?, 2 Phil & Pub Aff 66, 96-97
(1972).
161 See David W. Pearce and R. Kerry Turner, Economics of Natural Resources and the
Environment 141-58 (Johns Hopkins, 1990).
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with this endeavor, while any relevant distributional consider-
ations can also be kept in mind. More specifically, it may well be
possible to adjust the analysis for any distributional biases, by
reassessing certain variables when they are first assigned or by
undertaking a separate distributional assessment.62 Thus, we
might undertake CBA in the ordinary fashion, and then take
distributional goals into account at an independent stage of in-
quiry. Executive Order 12866 might well be taken to suggest this
approach in its references to "distributive impacts" and "equity."
A third objection to CBA was that scientific uncertainty
made it impossible to say anything concrete or quantitative about
the benefits of much regulation.'" Often we do not know how
potent a carcinogen is, or the magnitude of risks associated with
a certain pollution problem. At best, we can extrapolate from ani-
mal data, where human analogues may be weak, and from epide-
miological data, where it is hard to control for confounding vari-
ables, where subpopulations may not be typical, and where links
between doses and responses may be highly uncertain. In these
circumstances, the assignment of a number for "benefits" will be
based on a great deal of guesswork and perhaps on tacit, unartic-
ulated judgments of value. It will hardly be a purely scientific
enterprise,"6 for a range of policy judgments will be involved as
well.
165
Judgments about costs may be more tractable, but there are
many problems here too. 6 Ex ante estimates will usually de-
pend on industry projections which, as past practice has shown,
are likely to be self-serving.6 7 In any case, technological change
makes projected costs a hazardous enterprise. Sometimes new
devices will develop to provide controls at greatly reduced ex-
pense.
In light of the difficulty of projecting costs and benefits, CBA
often has a spuriously objective and scientific cast."ca And the
1 Compare the human development index and the separate discussion of
distributional effects. See United Nations Development Programme, Human Development
Report 1993 10-20 (Oxford, 1993); United Nations Development Programme, Human Develop-
ment Report 1994 at 96-100 (cited in note 124).
" For a good summary, see Breyer and Stewart, Administrative Law and Regulatory
Policy at 335-43 (cited in note 70).
11 See I-S. Shrader-Frechette, Risk and Rationality: Philosophical Foundations for
Populist Reforms (California, 1992).
1 See the careful discussion in Robert A. Pollak, Regulating Risks, 33 J Econ Lit
(forthcoming March 1995), reviewing Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle (cited in note 6).
1" See, for example, Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs at 170-73 (cited in note 125).
167 Id at 170-76.
" See the discussion of the costs and benefits of AIDS and its prevention in David
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difficulty of projection sometimes leads government to require a
margin of safety, reflecting a form of risk aversion designed to
allocate the burden of scientific uncertainty. But this problem is
not necessarily a sufficient reason to abandon the attempt. Some-
times CBA can be undertaken because the uncertainties are rela-
tively small. Sometimes it is possible to project a range of esti-
mates. When this is not possible, it might be useful to do the best
we can with those variables that can be identified. Perhaps it will
not be feasible to do a CBA, but government can move in that
direction by identifying the range of known costs, known benefits,
and factual uncertainties.
2. Expert and lay judgments.
For these reasons, we believe that the deepest objections to
CBA lie elsewhere. They are best understood as another manifes-
tation of the opposition between expert and lay approaches to
evaluating risk. Experts tend to endorse a particular conception
of rationality when using CBA (or CRA) to decide among policy
choices; this conception of rationality is embedded within a spe-
cific set of assumptions about how risks ought to be valued. Aver-
age citizens tend to operate from within different systems of
valuing risks; as a result, they invoke a radically different and
much more complex and unruly conception of rationality in decid-
ing among regulatory policies.
Surely citizens are sometimes confused. Their views may
depend on incomplete or bad information, or on a misunderstand-
ing of good information. In such cases, their judgments should
not be made the basis of public policy. But sometimes citizens'
judgments do not rest on demonstrable cognitive errors. Instead,
different ideas about value are at work. When this occurs, nei-
ther of these conceptions of value can be endorsed over the other
as a general matter; the selection depends on context and on the
particular purpose for which judgments are required. Purely
scientific considerations will not permit us to say which is the
right way to resolve what rational policy choice ought to mean in
the regulatory setting.'69 Instead, we have two or more compet-
ing understandings of rationality. 7 9 We cannot decide a priori
Charny, Economics of Death, 107 Harv L Rev 2056 (1994), reviewing Tomas J. Philipson
and Richard A. Posner, Private Choices and Public Health: The AIDS Epidemic in an
Economic Perspective (Harvard, 1993).
"E For a good collection, see Sheldon Krimsky and Cominic Golding, eds, Social Theo-
ries of Risk (Praeger, 1992).
170 See Clayton P. Gillette and James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U Pa L
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or in advance of actual democratic deliberation which of these
competing frameworks of values to bring to bear on particular
regulatory problems.
There are complex theoretical issues in the background here.
Sometimes the term "rational" is understood to refer simply to
instrumental judgments having to do with the best way to
achieve given ends.'7' To the extent that expert and lay judg-
ments diverge because of different judgments about appropriate
ends-not different instrumental judgments-this understanding
of rationality will hardly permit us to choose between them.
Sometimes the term "rational" is meant to allow assessments not
just of means-ends connections, but of ends themselves. We
might, for example, examine how ends have been formed, and
when distorting influences appear-like A's judgment that X is
true because A wants X to be true-we might find irrationality.
Thus, we might find irrationality when people discount risks
because they do not want those risks to be large.'72 Irraiionality
might also be found when ends conflict with one another.
We cannot undertake a full comparison here of the rationali-
ty of what we are calling lay and expert assessments of risk. It is
doubtful that any such assessment could make sense in the ab-
stract; any conception of rationality requires, for its defense, an
understanding of the setting in which it is being used. A few
words may, however, be helpful by way of background. There is
no fully specified understanding of the values that underlie either
expert or lay judgments. Intriguingly, no careful statement seems
to exist of the criteria that underlie expert judgments. In general,
experts appear to work with some version of expected utility
theory, discounting harms by their probability or working from
annual aggregate deaths;73 as we will soon see, laypeople reject
this approach in important ways. At least as a general rule, the
expert model relies on a one-dimensional scale in which the com-
Rev 1027, 1071 (1990).
171 See the comparison of "the rational" and "the reasonable" in John Rawls, Political
Liberalism 48-54 (Columbia, 1993). A recent general discussion is Robert Nozick, The
Nature of Rationality (Princeton, 1993).
1 See Economics and Cognitive Dissonance, in George A. Akerlof, An Economic
Theorist's Book of Tales: Essays that Entertain the Consequences of New Assumptions in
Economic Theory (Cambridge, 1994). See also Jon Elster, Sour Grapes: Studies in the
Subversion of Rationality 26 (Cambridge, 1983).
' See Shrader-Frechette, Risk and Rationality (cited in note 164); Slovic, 236 Science
at 283 (cited in note 134) ("When experts judge risk, their responses correlate highly with
technical estimates of annual fatalities."); Slovic, Perception of Risk at 121 (cited in note
139) ("[E]xperts appear to see riskiness as synonymous with expected annual mortality.").
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mon metric is how many annual deaths or injuries are likely to
occur from a given risk.174
This difference makes it necessary to say something about
expected utility theory. Notably, expected utility theory was origi-
nally understood as a positive rather than a normative theo-
ry,'75 though economists now use it both for positive and nor-
mative purposes. As a positive approach, expected utility theory
is at best an incomplete success, for it meets a large number of
well-documented anomalies-some reflecting irrationality (seen
as such in light of common understandings of that term), some
reflecting complex judgments of value that cannot easily be
shown to be irrational.7 ' As a positive approach, the chief vir-
tue of expected utility theory lies in the absence of a well-speci-
fied, administrable competitor. 7 As a normative approach,
however, expected utility theory has yet to find a substantial
defense in principle.'78 In any case, the relatively unrestrictive
assumptions of expected utility theory certainly do not require
that regulators look at the simple question: How many lives are
at stake because of risk X? But experts and many others adopt
an approach to regulation that emphasizes sheer numbers, an ap-
proach that looks at the single value of lives saved.
It is not simple, however, to show how that approach might
be defended. If we are trying to decide which risks to regulate,
why would it make sense to take only the total harm and to
discount it by its probability, while ignoring all other plausibly
relevant factors? 9 Voluntarily incurred risks need not be treat-
1 This emphasis on sheer quantity pervades Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle
(cited in note 6), though Breyer does not exclude the possibility that other factors are
relevant.
'7 Jean Hampton, The Failure of Expected Utility Theory as a Theory of Reason, 10
Econ & Phil 195 (1994).
' See Richard H. Thaler, Quasi Rational Economics 137-66 (Russell Sage, 1991), for
a catalogue.
'7 A candidate is "regret theory." See Graham Loomes and Robert Sugden, Regret
Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational Choice Under Uncertainty, 92 Econ J 805
(1982).
178 Hampton, 10 Econ & Phil 195 (cited in note 175).
179 Expected value approaches, based on discounting the harm by its probability, could
not easily incorporate these factors; expected utility theory has much weaker require-
ments and might well be able to take account of these factors. See id at 206-10. See also
the discussion of decision theory and public judgments in Sarah Lichtenstein, et al, When
Lives Are in Your Hands: Dilemmas of the Societal Decision Maker, in Robin M. Hogarth,
ed, Insights in Decision Making 91 (1990) (arguing that officials should ignore some
aspects of individual judgments but take account of others). It is unnecessary for present
purposes to sort out the complex relations among cost-benefit analysis, expected value
theory, decision theory, and expected utility theory.
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ed the same as involuntarily incurred risks. Risks that involve
especially gruesome deaths, such as those from AIDS-related
illnesses, might be thought different from other risks. It is possi-
ble to defend, with reasons, the idea that (for example) cata-
strophic or irreversible risks deserve priority over noncata-
strophic and reversible risks (other things being equal or nearly
so), and very hard to defend the opposite idea. 80 Widespread
cultural understandings of this sort not only have a democratic
pedigree, they also make sense.'8' Risks are qualitatively differ-
ent, and even if they all involve life, they should not be thought
the same.
With these considerations in mind, some seeming anomalies
in risk regulation dissolve. What appear to be "special" expendi-
tures to control the risk of AIDS might be justified in light of the
nature of death from AIDS, the distinctive fear produced by the
AIDS crisis, and the nature of the groups at risk from AIDS.'82
Or a society might rationally reject the ignition interlock, pre-
venting cars from starting unless the seatbelt is buckled, and
"s We are using as our criterion some general version of the search for reflective
equilibrium, in which particular and general judgments come into coherence. See John
Rawls, A Theory of Justice 20-21 (Harvard, 1971).
,8 Congress has recognized this principle in past decisions. See Confirmation Hear-
ings for Stephen G. Breyer, to be an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme
Court, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 103d Cong, 2d Sess 6 (July 12, 1994) (Miller
Reporting transcript) (statement of Sen Joseph R. Biden) ("We choose to take into account
social values and norms whether or not they make good, purely economic sense."). See
also Confirmation Hearings for Stephen G. Breyer, to be an Associate Justice of the
United States Supreme Court, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 103d Cong, 2d Sess 42
(July 14, 1994) (Miller Reporting transcript) (statement of Sen Joseph R. Biden):
The American people have no doubt that more people die from coal dust than
from nuclear reactors, but they fear the prospect of a nuclear reactor more than they
do the empirical data that would suggest that more people die from coal dust, having
coal-fired burners. They also know that more lives would be saved if we took that 25
percent we spend in the intensive care units in the last few months of the elderly's
lives, more children would be saved. But part of our culture is that we have conclud-
ed as a culture that we are going to, rightly or wrongly, we are going to spend the
money, costing more lives, on the elderly. We made that judgment.
I think it's incredibly presumptuous and elitist for political scientists to conclude
that the American people's cultural values in fact are not ones that lend themselves
to a cost-benefit analysis and presume that they would change their cultural values if
in fact they were aware of the cost-benefit analysis. I have no doubt the more people
know that more people die of cigarettes than they do of other substances but they've
concluded they'd rather have the money spent on research in other areas. We make
those decisions every day, and I am delighted that as a judge, you are not going to be
able to take your policy prescriptions into the Court.
" Compare Charny, 107 Harv L Rev 2056 (cited in note 168), with Philipson and
Posner, Private Choices and Public Health (cited in note 168).
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approve of other regulations that do not interfere so pervasively
with individual choice, even if they do worse from the standpoint
of cost per life saved.'83 For this reason, lay understandings are
not merely a competing conception of rationality, but can be rich-
er and more rational than the expert alternatives.'
To the extent that CBA promises a disciplined analytic tool
for assisting regulatory choices, it is appealing. In light of its sub-
stantive appeal and promise of administrability, it may well be a
useful approach for regulators to follow. But to the extent that it
contains a contestable conception of rationality and value-one
that experts favor but that is often at odds with more widely
shared and also-respectable conceptions of rationality-it be-
comes a means of suppressing competing understandings of both
reason and value, and of selecting an approach that cannot easily
be shown to be superior in principle. An important task of con-
temporary regulatory strategies is thus to determine "how to
make the decisionmaking process more democratic."'85 Atten-
tion to the divergence between expert and lay judgments reveals
several more specific problems with traditional CBA that, we be-
lieve, have not been sufficiently appreciated. Much the same can
be said for CRA. 88
B. Expert Perspectives on Risk, Rationality, and Policy
It is hard to challenge the view that law and policy should be
assessed on the basis of inquiries into the advantages and disad-
vantages of different courses of action. Nor do we disagree with
the proposition that comparisons should be made across regulato-
ry programs, so as to ensure that social resources are devoted to
the most serious problems. Better priority setting is an important
social goal. CBA and comparative risk assessment (measuring
risks against one another, without measuring risks against dol-
lars) often appear to be the most promising means of systematiz-
ing such inquiries.
1" See Jerry L. Mashaw and David L. Harfst, The Struggle for Auto Safety 133-40
(Harvard, 1990), for discussion of the ignition interlock issue.
1" See the revealing discussion by a former risk quantifier in Harry Otway, Public
Wisdom, Expert Fallibility: Toward a Contextual Theory of Risk, in Sheldon Krimsky and
Cominic Golding, eds, Social Theories of Risk 215 (Praeger, 1992). Otway urges that we
conceive "authentic communication between experts and citizens as an integral part of the
social relations of technology and the sharing of power and responsibility." Id at 228.
" KLS. Shrader-Frechette, Risk Analysis and Scientific Method. Methodological and
Ethical Problems with Evaluating Societal Hazards 188 (Reidel, 1985).
1 We discuss willingness to pay and other possible solutions in Part IV.G.
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Yet this process of seeking consistency can incorporate con-
tentious assumptions about what it would mean for policy choices
to be consistent and rational. In particular, this approach re-
quires regulators to create a single metric along which diverse
regulatory policies can be compared. The tools of analytic deci-
sion theory are used to formulate such a metric. Thus, this ap-
proach uses probabilistic, quantitative techniques that treat risk
in aggregate terms-as the expected number of injuries, deaths,
or other adverse consequences over a given time. It emphasizes
the end states that policies produce, not the processes by which
harms are imposed or through which policy is made. This kind of
aggregation-use of a common metric (such as dollars spent per
life saved, or even total lives saved)-and emphasis on end states
is required to make the kinds of comparisons across policies such
techniques seek.187
Through these techniques, information such as that in the
following table is generated. To many, this information is star-
tling and disconcerting; it suggests that federal regulation is
pervasively arbitrary and chaotic:
TABLE 5. Cost-Effectiveness of Selected Regulations"
Regulation
Unvented Space Heater Ban
Aircraft Cabin Fire Protection Standard
Auto Passive Restraint/Seat Belt Standards
Steering Column Protection Standard
Underground Construction Standards
Trihalomethane Drinking Water Standards
Aircraft Seat Cushion Flammability Standard
Alcohol and Drug Control Standards
Auto Fuel-System Integrity Standard
Standards for Servicing Auto Wheel Rims
Aircraft Floor Emergency Lighting Standard
Concrete & Masonry Construction Standards
Crane Suspended Personnel Platform Standard
Agency
CPSC
FAA
NHTSA
NHTSA
OSHA-S
EPA
FAA
FDA
NHTSA
OSHA-S
FAA
OSHA-S
OSHA-S
Cost per pre-
mature death
averted ($ mil-
lions 1990)
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.6
0.6
0.7
"a7 As we will see, there is no well-specified set of criteria used by experts in ranking
risks. We are attempting to set out some of the implicit understandings.
"s Reprinted with permission from Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle at 24-27 (cited
in note 6).
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Passive Restraints for Trucks and
Buses (Proposed) NHTSA 0.7
Side-Impact Standards for Autos (Dynamic) NHTSA 0.8
Children's Sleepwear Flammability Ban CPSC 0.8
Auto Side Door Support Standards NHTSA 0.8
Low Altitude Windshear Equipment and
Training Standards FAA 1.3
Electrical Equipment Standards (Metal Mines) MSHA 1.4
Trenching and Excavation Standards OSHA-S 1.5
Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance
Systems (TCAS) FAA 1.5
Hazard Communication Standard OSHA-S 1.6
Side-Impact Standards for Trucks, Buses,
and MPVs (Proposed) NHTSA 2.2
Grain Dust Explosion Prevention Standards OSHA-S 2.8
Rear Lap/Shoulder Belts for Autos NHTSA 3.2
Standards for Radionuclides in Uranium Mines EPA 3.4
Benzine NESHAP (Original: Fugitive
Emissions) EPA 3.4
Ethylene Dibromide Drinking Water Standard EPA 5.7
Benzine NESHAP (Revised: Coke Byproducts) EPA 6.1
Asbestos Occupational Exposure Limit OSHA-H 8.3
Benzene Occupational Exposure Limit OSHA-H 8.9
Electrical Equipment Standards (Coal Mines) MSHA 9.2
Arsenic Emission Standards for Glass Plants EPA 13.5
Ethylene Oxide Occupational Exposure Limit OSHA-il 20.5
Arsenic/Copper NESHAP EPA 23.0
Hazardous Waste Listing for Petroleum
Refining Sludge EPA 27.6
Cover/Move Uranium Mill Tailings (Inactive
Sites) EPA 31.7
Benzene NESHAP (Revised: Transfer
Operations) EPA 32.9
Cover/Move Uranium Mill Tailings (Active
Sites) EPA 45.0
Acrylonitrile Occupational Exposure Limit OSHA-H 51.5
Coke Ovens Occupational Exposure Limit OSHA-H 63.5
Lockout/Tagout OSHA-S 70.9
Asbestos Occupational Exposure Limit OSHA-H 74.0
Arsenic Occupational Exposure Limit OSHA-H 106.9
Asbestos Ban EPA 110.7
Diethylstilbestrol (DES) Cattlefeed Ban FDA 124.8
Benzene NESHAP (Revised: Waste Operations) EPA 168.2
1,2-Dichloropropane Drinking Water Standard EPA 653.0
Hazardous Waste Land Disposal Ban (1st, 3d) EPA 4,190.4
Municipal Solid Waste Landfill Standards
(Proposed) EPA 19,107.0
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Formaldehyde Occupational Exposure Limit OSHA-H 86,201.8
Atrazine/Alachlor Drinking Water Standard EPA 92,069.7
Hazardous Waste Listing for Wood-Preserving
Chemicals EPA 5,700,000.0
We do not disagree with the general claim that these differ-
ences are reason to examine whether something has gone wrong.
On the contrary, poor priority setting is an unmistakable fact of
modern bureaucratic life, and better priority setting is a crucial
task for modern government. And in view of the enormous dis-
parities in the seeming cost-effectiveness of various programs in
reducing risk, who could object to the idea that we should sys-
tematize costs and benefits and compare them in order to make
more rational policy choices?
This is the foundation of the experts' case for CBA. "Soft"
benefits must be properly valued, and distributional consider-
ations must be taken into account where appropriate, but on the
experts' view these are marginal refinements to the basic CBA
approach. On that view, CBA must still be followed in order to
enable us to make more consistent regulatory policy, to set our
priorities more effectively, to discipline analysis, and to constrain
what would otherwise be ill-informed decisions or pure political
power struggles over the direction of policy. These concerns also
favor some centralized institution that can make these kinds of
comparative assessments across agencies and programs.
189
Arguments of this sort do support some form of comparative
risk assessment and CBA. But the ambivalence toward CBA
reflected in Executive Order 12866 is nonetheless justified,"9
and we aim to support that ambivalence here by emphasizing
three less well-understood problems with CBA techniques. After
discussing these problems, we briefly suggest modifications to
Executive Order 12866 that might more effectively respond to
these problems.
C. Lay Perspectives on Risk, Rationality, and Policy
There is a strikingly consistent finding in risk studies:
Laypeople assess risk through different value frameworks from
those implicitly embedded in expert approaches. Laypeople do not
look only or even primarily to expected annual mortality; they
See id at 59-72 for a lucid discussion.
1" See the discussion of problems with the cost-per-life-saved charts in Lisa
Heinzerling, Political Science, 62 U Chi L Rev 449, 462-63 (1995).
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look as well at a number of factors determining the acceptability
of different risks in different contexts. These factors cannot be
said to generate a "hard" model of risk assessment, but they do
represent an articulable framework for making judgments about
risk levels.
Of course, laypeople disagree sharply among each other, just
as experts do. Notably, there are national and international vari-
ations in judgments about risk. In a careful study in Canada,
women systematically perceived risks as being worse than men
perceived them; for every one of the thirty-three items studied,
women believed that risks were equal to or higher than what
men believed.'91 In the same study, perceptions of both risk and
benefit were correlated with age, education, and region of resi-
dence.'92 Nearly two dozen studies have shown that women per-
ceive nuclear power as more risky than men do. 9' In a compar-
'ative study of American and Hungarian students, the latter per-
ceived risks as lower for eighty-four of ninety activities.'94
Notwithstanding these differences among citizens, there is a
pervasive and sharp distinction between lay and expert perspec-
tives. It is important to be clear about where this difference lies.
Some of the difference does stem from simple confusion, or from
heuristics that produce systematic errors.'95 But in many cases,
the difference does not result from misinformation or from cogni-
tive distortions about risk analysis.
For example, when people are asked to order well-known
hazards in the expected value terms that experts use, such as the
number of deaths and injuries they cause every year, people often
do quite well. 9 ' Yet if they are then asked to rank these haz-
ards in terms of risk, the orderings of experts and laypeople be-
gin to diverge dramatically.'97 The difference, then, is not only
one of information or factual knowledge. 98
191 Slovic, Perception of Risk at 129 (cited in note 139).
192 Id.
Id.
1" Id at 126.
"' See generally Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis
of Decision Under Risk, 47 Econometrica 263 (1979). For a clear, nontechnical catalogue,
see also Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini, Inevitable Illusions: How Mistakes of Reason Rule
Our Minds (Wiley & Sons, 1994).
" M. Granger Morgan, Risk Analysis and Management, Scientific Am 32, 35 (July
1993).
' Id. See also Stuart Hill, Democratic Values and Technological Choices 55-89
(Stanford, 1992), for an optimistic account of citizens' capacities to assess risks.
1 See generally John Doble and Jean Johnson, Science and the Public: A Report in
Three Volumes (Kettering, 1990), a detailed study showing that people can approach risk
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These different systems of value mean that judgment about
risk is frequently context dependent. Decision-analytic techniques
traditionally used by experts are concerned with aggregate annu-
al mortality or morbidity rates. However, for laypeople, the most
salient contextual features include: (1) the catastrophic nature of
the risk; (2) whether the risk is uncontrollable; (3) whether the
risk involves irretrievable or permanent losses; (4) the social
conditions under which a particular risk is generated and man-
aged, a point that connects to issues of consent, voluntariness,
and democratic control; (5) how equitably distributed the danger
is or how concentrated on identifiable, innocent, or traditionally
disadvantaged victims, which ties to both notions of community
and moral ideals; (6) how well understood the risk process in
question is, a point that bears on the psychological disturbance
produced by different risks; (7) whether the risk would be faced
by future generations; and (8) how familiar the risk is.'99 Differ-
ent formulations for these and similar distinctions include how
"dreaded" and how "observable" particular risks are. In particu-
lar, "[clitizens' responses to technological risks ... are far more
likely to be dictated by their perceptions of whether they can
exercise personal control in the event of an accident than by the
careful weighing of the worths of uncertain outcomes."2"
People systematically assign a high valuation to risks that
are perceived to be involuntarily run-compare public reactions
to risks from smoking to public reactions to risks from nuclear
power accidents. About 150,000 people die each year from smok-
ing-related causes, as compared with no apparent deaths from
nuclear power accidents;2"' yet enormous resources are invested
issues quite thoughtfully, even in the presence of expert uncertainty.
In the aftermath of the unusually public deliberative process EPA employed in the
ASARCO case, see text accompanying notes 295-96, one careful study surveyed residents
who had attended the public hearings. The study concluded that the extent to which
people were factually informed about the risks at issue did not play a significant role in
their evaluation of how much risk should be tolerated. "[HIaving or not having the facts
did not seem to make much difference in how people reacted to risks." Brian N.R. Baird,
Tolerance for Environmental Health Risks: The Influence of Knowledge, Benefits,
Voluntariness, and Environmental Attitudes, 6 Risk Analysis 425, 434 (1986).
Some of these are discussed in Slovic, Perception of Risk at 120-25 (cited in note
139); Carnegie Commission, Risk and the Environment at 88-89 (cited in note 6); William
W. Lowrance, Of Acceptable Risk: Science and the Determination of Safety 86-94
(Kaufnann, 1976); Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle (cited in note 6). It has even been
suggested that perceptions of social control over one's environment have a bearing on
health and longevity, independently of the level of relevant risks. See S. Leonard Syme,
The Social Animal and Health, Daedalus 79, 84-85 (Fall 1994).
2' See Hill, Democratic Values and Technological Choices at 21 (cited in note 197).
"0' See Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle at 6-7 (cited in note 6).
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in preventing the latter, and until recently almost no resources
were invested in preventing the former. (It is notable that recent
regulatory efforts with respect to smoking have followed and
produced important changes in social norms, a point that we take
up below.) Qualitative differences of this kind are not included
within ordinary cost-benefit techinques to the extent that the lat-
ter concentrate only on end states.
The important point is that it can be fully rational to attend
to contextual differences of this sort. Indeed, approaches that
attend to such differences are, in many contexts, more rational
than approaches that concentrate only on end states.20 2 It is ful-
ly plausible to believe that expenditures per life saved ought to
vary in accordance with (for example) the voluntariness of the
risk or its catastrophic quality. Such beliefs appear widespread.
Interviews with workers, for example, reveal that their valua-
tions of workplace risks depend upon such contextual features as
the overall structure of workplace relations, how much say work-
ers have in how the risks are managed, and the nature of the partic-
ular jobs performed.03
Consider also the fact that the quantitatively identical level
of exposure to certain chemicals is viewed as more acceptable by
research scientists, exposed during the course of carrying out
basic research, than by laboratory assistants, who clean the haz-
ards up after an experiment is finished.0 4 To aggregate these
different perspectives and assume that one common value is at
stake in reducing mercury exposure is therefore wrong. For the
scientist, the meaning of the risk, and the appropriate level of
social resources to be spent to eliminate it, depend on the fact
that it is tied up with professional work that is highly valued
socially, personally rewarding, voluntarily assumed, and associat-
ed with traditions of scientific inquiry. If people do value risks
differently depending on these sorts of contextual features, and if
these valuations are reasonable, then democratic policy should
22 See text accompanying notes 177-84. For some notations on the complex notion of
rationality, see Rawls, Political Liberalism at 48-54 (cited in note 171).
2 See generally Richard H. Pildes, The Unintended Cultural Consequences of Public
Policy: A Comment on the Symposium, 89 Mich L Rev 936, 958-59 (1991).
' Elizabeth Anderson, Values, Risks, and Market Norms, 17 Phil & Pub Aff 54, 61
(1988). See also Amartya Sen, Freedoms and Needs: An Argument for the Primacy of
Political Rights, New Republic 31, 32-33 (Jan 11, 1993) ("There are deep and fundamental
and intuitively understood grounds for rejecting the view that confines itself merely to
checking the parity of outcomes, the view that matches death for death, happiness for
happiness, fulfillment for fulfillment, irrespective of how all this death, happiness, and
fulfillment comes about.").
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recognize the relevant contextual differences. Something of this
kind may be reflected in the obscure use of the word "equity" in
Executive Order 12866.
Attention to context, and particularly to the social conditions
under which risks are produced and managed, returns us to the
crucial role of public trust in effective regulatory policy.0 5
Among the features that determine lay attitudes toward risk are
people's judgments about the "acceptability of [the] social process-
es for making decisions about risk.""6 This point has at least
three consequences for the morality and strategy of government
risk regulation. First, risk policy cannot reasonably focus on end
states alone. If institutions are restructured to bring about more
(apparently) consistent outcomes, but through processes that are
less publicly acceptable, public institutions will be corresponding-
ly less effective. Second, it is doubtful whether such institutions
will be able, in fact, to bring about these more consistent results,
at least if consistency is defined as uniform expenditures per life
saved. In the absence of public support, policies recommended by
decision theory are not likely to be effectively implemented.
Third, in evaluating policies, we should be quite cautious about
comparisons that involve only end states (as in Table 5). In moral
or democratic terms, greater expenditures may be justifiably
demanded for quantitatively similar risks precisely because peo-
ple consider the values at stake to differ in the various contexts
in which these risks are imposed.0 7
All this is no reason to be complacent about the dramatic
disparities shown in Table 5. Divergences in regulatory policies
that are so extreme might well reflect little more than interest-
group pressures, confusion, lack of appreciation for trade-offs, or
reflexive responses to sensationalist anecdotes. Moreover, we do
not mean to suggest that policymakers should blindly defer to
citizen assessments of risks in all circumstances. Ours is a repub-
lic, not a pure democracy, and a high premium is placed on delib-
eration rather than on snapshots of public opinion."' It there-
fore makes sense to ensure that citizens' judgments result from
an appropriately structured deliberative process. 20 9
See Part ]I.B.
See Fiorino, 9 Risk Analysis at 295 (cited in note 141). See also text accompanying
note 145.
' See Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics 168-69 (Harvard, 1993);
Sen, New Republic at 36 (cited in note 204).
' See Federalist 10 (Madison), in Clinton Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers 77
(Mentor, 1961).
' See Hill, Democratic Values and Technological Choices at 112-42 (cited in note
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As we have said, citizen valuations are hardly uniform; ordi-
nary people disagree with each other, just as experts do. Some-
times citizens misunderstand the problem. Not all differences
between lay and expert assessments reflect rational though com-
plex lay judgments, or different conceptions of rationality and
different frameworks of value. Knowledge about the bases for
citizen evaluations of risk has increased dramatically in recent
years. We now know that where these evaluations differ from
expert ones, they might do so for any of a number of reasons. In
some contexts, lay evaluations rest on what can properly be char-
acterized as mistaken factual understandings, including those
that result from distortions in information processing and similar
cognitive errors. What we emphasize here is that in other con-
texts, what to experts, policymakers, and others might appear to
be factual misunderstandings actually reflect different and legiti-
mate valuations of risk.
The question of how policy should respond in situations of
conflict between expert and lay assessments of risk is thus com-
plex and not resolvable through any general rule. Nonetheless,
we can offer some initial distinctions.
At one pole, lay assessments of risk sometimes rest on cer-
tain heuristics, or rules of thumb for processing information, that
may make sense in the contexts in which they are adopted, but
that are inappropriate bases for making public policy.21 These
heuristics include psychological devices that lead to risk assess-
ments that policymakers should treat as factually erroneous. For
example, cognitive psychologists have uncovered the central role
of the "availability" heuristic in ordinary decision making.21'
"Availability" means that people's assessment of one risk de-
pends, at times, on how readily similar events come to their
minds. When this effect is at work, people will overestimate the
197), for a discussion of citizen deliberation in the context of nuclear power. On the effect
of deliberation on judgments, see Norman Frohlich and Joe A. Oppenheimer, Choosing
Justice: An Experimental Approach to Ethical Theory 95-113 (California, 1992); John M.
Orbell, Alphons J.C. van de Kragt, and Robyn M. Dawes, Explaining Discussion-Induced
Cooperation, 54 J Personality & Soc Psych 811 (1988).
210 See the lucid analysis of the potential relevance to regulatory policy of prospect
theory, heuristics and biases, and cognitive pathologies found in Roger G. Noll and James
E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for Risk Regulation, 19 J Legal Stud
747 (1990); see also Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs at 101-10 (cited in note 125). Of course, ex-
perts or government policymakers might be subject to the same cognitive distortions as
lay decision makers; any difference cannot be assumed, but must be demonstrated. See
James E. Krier, Risk and Design, 19 J Legal Stud 781 (1990).
211 Noll and Krier, 19 J Legal Stud at 754 (cited in note 210).
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probability that an event will occur if the occurrence of similar
events comes easily to mind, but will underestimate the probabil-
ity otherwise.
Whether similar events do come to mind can depend on how
recently they occurred or how dramatically they were presented
when they did occur. The "facts" about a certain risk do not differ
when someone happens to remember a particularly salient recent
event, but people's assessments of those facts can be greatly af-
fected. Lay estimates of how high the risk is from hazardous
landfills, for example, may depend on how readily people recall
Love Canal or similar episodes. The gap here between objective
and perceived levels of risk is not a function of different values,
but of what can properly be viewed as cognitive errors based on
misinformed understandings of the actual probabilities of certain
events.
At the other pole are the cases we seek to emphasize: those
in which experts and laypeople value differently the same "objec-
tive" risk (understood in terms, say, of aggregate lives at stake)
as a result of features of the context that expert decision-theoret-
ic or cost-benefit techniques obscure. These are the contexts in
which people might demand, for example, that fewer social re-
sources be devoted to "the same level" of risk reduction when the
risks are viewed as voluntarily assumed rather than when they
are viewed as involuntarily imposed, or when the risks occur in
social conditions viewed as illegitimate rather than legitimate.
Between these poles are situations in which it is unclear
whether expert and lay differences stem from factual errors or
alternative values. For example, experts are often troubled by the
public's refusal to view risks in linear terms; laypeople some-
times express greater concern over a low-probability event with
large potential tragic costs than probability theory would consid-
er rational. This difference might reflect the well-known cognitive
difficulties people manifest in dealing with low- and high-proba-
bility events.2' Alternatively, it might reflect the view that cat-
astrophic events entail costs considerably beyond deaths, injuries,
and other material costs-such as the destruction of social sta-
bility.
For example, the "Buffalo Creek Syndrome" has been docu-
mented several times in the aftermath of major disasters. Nearly
two years after the collapse of a dam that left 120 dead and 4,000
homeless, psychiatric researchers continued to find significant
21 For discussion of these difficulties, see id at 754-60.
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psychological and sociological changes; survivors were
"characterized by a loss of direction and energy," other "disabling
character changes," and a "loss of communality."213 One evalua-
tor attributed this loss of direction specifically to "the loss of
traditional bonds of kinship and neighborliness."214 The
nonlinearity of lay evaluations of risk in the context of potential
disasters may thus reflect a high premium on avoiding the dis-
tinctive kinds of losses associated with disasters. If so, differences
between lay and expert assessments rest on genuine value differ-
ences (four times as many deaths may be much more than four
times as bad) rather than on factual errors in cognitive processes
of ordinary people.
The proper response to conflicts between lay and expert as-
sessments of risk should therefore depend on an understanding
of the reasons for these differences in different contexts. Where
differences stem from cognitive errors, such as the availability
heuristic, policymakers can properly exert leadership and not
defer to lay assessments. Indeed, policymakers would do well to
seek to educate the public about the factual fallacies underlying
popular assessments; education on this count might be a major
aspect of implementation of Executive Order 12866, in a process
of producing a sense of relative risk.215 Policymakers might also
"strike when the iron is cold"21 6 by postponing policy-making
until some time after a triggering event has occurred-thus re-
ducing the distorting effects of availability. Because regulatory
overkill is a frequent short-term response to sensationalist trig-
gering events,217 it may well make sense to wait until the crisis
period has ended, notwithstanding the difficulty of doing so.
The matter should be analyzed differently when the differ-
ences arise from clashes between the value frameworks of ex-
perts and laypeople. In such cases there is no reason to defer to
experts; democracies should be responsive to the informed values
of their citizens.1 8 Policymakers and experts can seek to per-
213 Fiorino, 9 Risk Analysis at 295 (cited in note 141).
214 Id, citing J.D. Robinson, M.D. Iiggins, and P.K. Bolyard, Assessing Environmental
Impacts on Health: A Role for Behavioral Science, 4 Envir Impact Assessment Rev 41
(1983).
215 See text accompanying notes 299-301.
21" Noll and Krier, 19 J Legal Stud at 774 (cited in note 210).
21 William A. Niskanen, Environmental Policy: A Time For Reflection, Regulation 9,
11 (No 1, 1994).
211 See Stephen Breyer, The Economics of Aids, NY Times Book Rev 24 (Mar 6, 1994),
reviewing Philipson and Posner, Private Choices and Public Health (cited in note 168), for
critique of Posner's prescriptions for AIDS research funding on democratic grounds.
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suade others that a particular perspective reflects the most ap-
propriate set of public values, but there is no purely scientific so-
lution to this conflict. When differences in risk assessment rest
on differences in the underlying values at stake, conflicts can be
legitimately resolved only through deliberative democratic deci-
sion making.219 Experts should be full participants, but when
deliberation ends, the outcome produced by the process should be
respectedY0
Our final point is that often there is no way to know, a prio-
ri, whether expert and lay differences turn on facts or values
(putting to one side the complex relation between the two). Yet
another reason for promoting participation in regulatory pro-
cesses (to the extent that it is feasible"') is therefore that pub-
lic participation is required to elicit the reasons that lay assess-
ments of risk might differ from expert ones. This participation
should take the form of informed deliberation about regulatory
means and goals. Only after policymakers understand the rea-
sons behind these differences can they know whether the reasons
rest on factual errors or value conflicts; only with such informa-
tion can policymakers know how best to respond to the systemat-
ic problem of conflicts between expert and lay evaluations of
risky
2
The tentativeness of Executive Order 12866 with respect to
CBA might well be taken to reflect understandings, explicit or
implicit, of this general sort. The right response to these under-
standings would be based on the simple principle that policy
involving risk should be seen as a political process to be informed
by expert judgment and analysis, rather than as a technocratic
process in which citizens are entitled to participate at best spo-
radically. More specifically, a reinvented regulatory state that
appreciates this principle might seek to (1) adapt analytic models
so that they better incorporate appropriately informed lay evalu-
ations; (2) design, to the extent feasible, more effective mecha-
nisms for citizen participation and education to enable articula-
21 See Daniel Hausman and Michael McPherson, Preference, Belief, and Welfare, 84
Am Econ Rev 396, 398 (1994) (arguing that in area of risk assessment, welfare should not
be understood in terms of private preferences, but instead in terms of standards that
emerge from processes of "rational and open deliberation").
22 See generally Carnegie Commission, Risk and the Environment (cited in note 6);
Pildes, 89 Mich L Rev at 965 (cited in note 203).
221 See text accompanying notes 307-18.
Of course, officials cannot garner the necessary information from public opinion
alone; there must be more investigation into its roots. See text accompanying notes 231,
295.
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tion of informed perspectives; (3) emphasize contextual features
of risk-exposure and process concerns as well as those of end
states; and (4) focus on the importance of building public trust in
risk-producing and risk-managing institutions.
D. Incommensurability and Disaggregating Costs and Benefits
Thus far, our principal suggestion has been that CBA is
inadequate to the extent that it is solely concerned with end
states. A generalization of this criticism is that traditional CBA
is obtuse-in the sense of insufficiently fine grained-insofar as it
tries to measure diverse social goods along the same metric.
Suppose, for example, that we are told that the cost of a certain
occupational safety regulation is $1 million, and that the benefit
is $1.2 million. To make a sensible evaluation, we need to know a
great deal more. What do these numbers mean? To which groups
do they refer, with what histories and claims? Are the cost-bear-
ing groups those that are appropriately faced with this burden,
because (for example) they are imposing nonvoluntary risks on
others? Or consider the decision whether to fund more AIDS
research rather than research exploring the risks posed by de-
struction of the ozone layer. What is the relevance of the fact
that AIDS often comes from voluntary activity, in which the
associated risk may be known?223 That gay men are
disproportionately at risk? That AIDS strikes young people with
many productive years ahead of them? That the risks posed by
destruction of the ozone layer might be faced mostly by future
generations and very broadly shared throughout the population?
How would we know if we are devoting too much of our limited
regulatory resources to AIDS or ozone layer research?' Or con-
sider the problem of distributional effects of regulatory problems
and solutions. Does it matter if a certain environmental hazard is
concentrated in low-income or minority neighborhoods? Does it
matter if the costs of disposing of hazardous waste, for example,
are borne disproportionately by minority group members? A re-
cent executive order answers such questions in the affirma-
tiveY 5
A point made much of in Philipson and Posner, Private Choices and Public Health
(cited in note 168).See Carnegie Commission, Risk and the Environment at 89 (cited in note 6) ("We
believe that these value choices should not be made covertly by unaccountable 'experts.'").
' See Exec Order No 12898, 59 Fed Reg 7629 (cited in note 152).
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We do not do well if we see such diverse goods as greater
employment, protection of endangered species, lower prices,
distributional effects, and cleaner air along a single metric, one
that erases the qualitative differences among these goods. 6 At
least in principle, it would be better to have a disaggregated
system for assessing the qualitatively different effects of regula-
tory impositions. Not all benefits are fungible, nor are all costs.
This is a separate problem from the more familiar difficulty of
comparing costs and benefits against each other once they have
been aggregated.
Through considerations of this sort, we might be able to
make some progress toward reform of existing cost-benefit analy-
ses. Through regulatory-impact analyses, people should be al-
lowed to see the diverse effects of regulations for themselves, and
to make judgments based on an understanding of the qualitative
differences. If all of the relevant goods are aligned along a single
metric, they become less visible, or perhaps invisible. In addition
to conventional cost-benefit analysis, what is necessary is a full
accounting of the various social consequences of regulation. Those
consequences should be described in a way that allows a detailed
view of what the costs and benefits specifically are. Once greater
specificity is added, we will not be thinking in terms of simple
costs and benefits at all. There is no algorithm to say what ought
to be done once the more specific accounting is before us. Judg-
ments involving controversial political and moral values will
necessarily be made through ordinary administrative and demo-
cratic processes.
Disaggregating costs and benefits, identifying qualitatively
different effects, and taking account of effects on diverse groups
makes sense on several grounds. First, it is a way of taking into
account certain features of ordinary evaluations of risk. Second,
this approach enables regulators to focus on distributional is-
sues-on issues of who gains and who loses. Third, judgments
about the relevant moral context of risks can be made more intel-
ligently once we have a more specific understanding of the inter-
ests that bear the costs and benefits.
See generally Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics (cited in note 207); Cass R.
Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 Mich L Rev 779 (1994); Richard
H. Pildes, Conceptions of Value in Legal Thought, 90 Mich L Rev 1520 (1992), reviewing
Martha C. Nussbaum, Love's Knowledge (Oxford, 1990); Richard H. Pildes and Elizabeth
S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and
Democratic Politics, 90 Colum L Rev 2121 (1990).
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Public deliberation will be enhanced when analytic tools are
used to generate information calibrated to the kinds of consider-
ations that appropriately informed citizens consider relevant. It
should be unnecessary to emphasize that regulatory choices typi-
cally have effects along multiple dimensions. Rather than reduc-
ing these to a single metric of "costs" or "benefits," it is better to
enable decision makers to assess the different kinds of effects on
different interests. To be sure, there are advantages in simplicity,
and on this count conventional CBA has virtues in spite of its
crudeness. But for those who want aggregate data on costs and
benefits, nothing precludes arguing that the disaggregated data
should be used in a simpler way.227
E. Expressive Dimensions of Regulatory Policies
A third problem with CBA approaches is that they necessari-
ly focus on the quantitative or material effects of policies. They
cannot take into account what we will call the expressive dimen-
sions of legal and political choices. By expressive dimen-
sions-what might be understood as cultural consequences of
choice-we mean the values that a particular policy choice, in the
specific context in which it is taken, will be generally understood
to endorse. Policy choices do not just bring about certain immedi-
ate material consequences; they also will be understood, at times,
to be important for what they reflect about various value commit-
ments-about which values take priority over others, or how
various values are best understood. Both the material conse-
quences and the expressive consequences of policy choices are
appropriate concerns for policymakers"'
' Compare the annual Human Development Report of the United Nations Develop-
ment Programme (published by Oxford), offering disaggregated data and a general index
to allow for cross-country comparisons. See Cass R. Sunstein, Well-Being and the State,
107 Harv L Rev 1303, 1319-23 (1994).
"' Robert Nozick makes a very similar point, though through the language of utility
theory, in his recent argument that decision theory, and rational choice theory more
generally, must be broadened beyond the way economists and others have understood
these theories to date. See Nozick, Nature of Rationality at 26-35 (cited in note 171).
Nozick argues that we must recognize the symbolic utility of acts, as well as their more
familiar causal utility. An act can be important not just for the consequences it directly
brings about, but also because it stands for or symbolizes a commitment to other princi-
ples and actions. Moreover, Nozick argues, as we do, that it is often the expressive compo-
nent of what an action symbolizes that is important: "the symbolic connection of an action
to a situation enables the action to be expressive of some attitude, belief, value, emotion,
or whatever." Id at 28. To those who would deny the importance to an adequate decision
theory of the expressive or symbolic dimension of action, Nozick rightly says, "A large
part of the richness of our lives consists in symbolic meanings and their expression, the
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The expressive dimensions of policy choices can become rele-
vant in several ways. Let us take a contentious and somewhat
stylized example. Trade issues often involve difficult trade-offs
between the interests of current workers and those of current
and future consumers (and perhaps future workers as well).
Lowering protective tariffs might displace current workers, who
might or might not be able to find substitute employment, while
enhancing consumer welfare by making the same goods available
more cheaply. An aggregate cost-benefit analysis would require
that all these effects be treated as qualitatively the same. We
might reject that approach, however, on the view that the inter-
ests of various workers and various consumers are qualitatively
distinct. In that case, we could not resolve this conflict simply by
determining which choice maximized net benefits. Instead, we
would face a political and moral choice about how to assess the
interests of the workers affected as against those of the consum-
ers benefited. Of course, we would still want to know as much as
possible about the precise quantifiable effects on workers and
consumers of the proposed policy. But we would ultimately have
to decide how to value the various interests affected. That valua-
tion might in turn affect remedial measures, including efforts to
facilitate alternative employment for displaced workers.
These conflicts arise regularly in the trade area. Now sup-
pose policymakers repeatedly prefer consumer interests in these
symbolic meanings our culture attributes to things or the ones we ourselves bestow." Id at
30. Indeed, Nozick concedes that his earlier political claims in Robert Nozick, Anarchy,
State, and Utopia (Basic Books, 1974), are inadequate precisely because they fail to
recognize "the importance to us of joint and official serious symbolic statement and
expression of our social ties and concern... ." Nozick, Nature of Rationality at 32 (cited
in note 171). As he now says: 'The libertarian view looked solely at the purpose of govern-
ment, not at its meaning; hence, it took an unduly narrow view of purpose, too." Robert
Nozick, The Examined Life: Philosophical Meditations 288 (Simon & Schuster, 1989).
From these principles, Nozick argues that decision theory must recognize the possi-
bility of conflicts or trade-offs between the symbolic and causal utilities of actions. He does
not make clear whether he thinks these types of utilities are commensurable, but he sug-
gests the contrary in asserting that "symbolic utilities must be treated as a separate
component of a theory of decision and not simply incorporated within existing (causal and
evidential) decision theories." Nozick, Nature of Rationality at 34 (cited in note 171). He
identifies at least one situation with perhaps important implications for public policy
where symbolic, rather than causal, routes provide the key to rational choice: because
certainty itself seems to have symbolic utility for us, the difference between probabilities
(or risks) of 0.9 and 1.0 may be greater than that between 0.8 and 0.9. Id. Much of our
effort here is to incorporate recognition of the importance of expressive or symbolic
concerns to rational choice and decision theory into an approach to risk regulation. We do
not, however, share Nozick's view that it is sensible to think in terms of a "decision
utility" aggregating symbolic utility with other utilities.
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conflicts. This sequence might leave affected workers with the
sense that, in every case, the political community is subordinat-
ing their interests to those of others. When officials are next
faced with a similar conflict, it could well be rational to opt for a
policy that valued the interests of workers (at least if they are in
the same affected sectors) over those of consumers. That might be
so even if, in aggregate cost-benefit terms, consumer benefits
would "outweigh" the harms to adversely affected workers.
Such a choice would be important precisely because it would
express the social conviction that the interests of workers are
seriously valued. This is a highly stylized example, of course, and
the right choice in any particular context will depend on many
factors, including the precise magnitude of the relevant costs and
benefits (at some point, the sacrifice in material benefits might
become too great to justify the expressive or social gains)Y9
The important point is that a concern for the values being ex-
pressed through policy choices-the expressive dimensions of
political decisions-is itself an appropriate matter for
policymakers.
Many other legal issues, such as protection of endangered
species, recycling requirements, affirmative action, "hate speech"
codes, and others similarly implicate concerns for the expressive
dimensions of legal judgments. Often legal debates are partly
about the appropriate attitude to express via legal norms, °
and many people urge that a certain measure is desirable be-
cause it expresses the appropriate attitude toward the interests
at stake.
When evaluating a legal norm, then, we might ask whether
the norm expresses an appropriate valuation of an event, person,
group, or practice." The point matters for two reasons. The
first is, broadly speaking, based on a prediction about the facts:
An inappropriate valuation via law may influence social norms
and experiences, and push them in the wrong direction. If the
' Note too that the stylized discussion treats "workers" as a relatively unitary group;
but workers are consumers too, and many of them might be helped, on balance, by ini-
tiatives of the sort we are discussing.
' For discussions of the central role that such concerns for expressive harms play in
constitutional law, including in the Supreme Court's recent, controversial equal protection
decision involving race-conscious election districting, Shaw v Reno, 113 S Ct 2816 (1993),
see Richard H. Pildes and Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and
Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 Mich L
Rev 483 (1993).1 1 We borrow in the next three paragraphs from Sunstein, 92 Mich L Rev 779 (cited
in note 226).
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law wrongly treats something solely as a commodity, for example,
the social understanding of what that good is may be adversely
affected. That is, the good might come to be treated more gener-
ally as a commodity. It is appropriate to criticize the law on this
ground.
This objection is based on an empirical claim that the kinds
of valuation reflected in law will affect social valuations in gener-
al. Sometimes this is right, but sometimes it is not. Society is
filled, for example, with market exchange of goods (like pets,
which are not valued in the same way as money) that are valued
for reasons other than use. The question therefore remains
whether the asserted effect on social norms actually occurs. It is
fully plausible, for example, to say that although a law that per-
mits prostitution reflects an inappropriate valuation of sexuality,
the speculative effect of the law on social norms is an implausible
basis for objection.
But there is a second ground for endorsing the expressive
function of law, and this ground is not about social effects in the
same sense. To understand this idea, it is helpful to start with
the personal interest in integrity. Following the suggestive dis-
cussion by Bernard Williams, we might say that individual be-
havior is not concerned solely with states of affairs, and that if it
were, we would have a hard time making sense of important
aspects of our lives. 2 Personal integrity, commitment, and the
narrative continuity of a life matter enormously as well. In
Williams's example, someone might refuse to kill an innocent
person at the request of a terrorist, even if the consequence of
the refusal is that many more people will be killed. Our re-
sponses to this case are not adequately captured in purely
consequentialist terms.
At the social and legal level, there may be an analogue. A
society might identify the kind of valuation to which it is commit-
ted, and insist on that kind, even if the consequences of the insis-
tence are obscure or unknown. A society might (for example)
insist on an antidiscrimination law for expressive reasons even if
it is unclear whether the law actually helps members of minority
groups. A society might protect endangered species partly be-
cause it believes that the protection makes best sense of its self-
understanding, by expressing an appropriate valuation of what it
means for one species to eliminate another.
' Bernard Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in J.J.C. Smart and Bernard Wil-
lams, eds, Utilitarianism: For and Against 108-09 (Cambridge, 1973).
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These expressive or symbolic dimensions of policy are central
in many regulatory contexts. They are just as real and significant
as other dimensions of policy. Part of what policy-making does is
to define, interpret, and create collective understandings and
values. Moreover, current decisions can structure the ways future
problems will be characterized and can help determine what
counts as a problem at all. Decisions today crystallize collective
understandings in ways that shape the perceived meaning and
appropriate resolution of future choices. Understandably, people
often evaluate present choices with these considerations in mind.
CBA approaches cannot adequately capture all the expres-
sive dimensions of policy choices. They are designed to address
other dimensions. CBA deals with the material gr quantitative
dimensions, not the interpretive and expressive ones. CBA exam-
ines alternative end states; it compares, for example, how much
it would cost to reach a state in which health was protected to a
certain degree against a particular risk. It cannot take account of
the meaning of the transition-the values the transition will be
socially understood to express-from one end state to another.
The meaning of the policy depends on interpretation of the back-
ground against which it is enacted. This process of interpretation
must take place in ways other than through CBA.
Perhaps in theory, some types of expressive concerns could
be incorporated into CBA. This is perhaps most conspicuously
true when the concern is the way law shapes social attitudes and
the resulting effects of social attitudes on the allocation of re-
sources. For example, mandatory recycling policies might be
justified, in part, as a means of shifting attitudes about consump-
tion and the environment in general; the resulting changes in
social norms might change consumption patterns themselves. In
theory, the predicted shifts in attitudes, and hence in actual
consumption, could be quantitatively modeled. In practice, of
course, incorporating the way legal policies might shape atti-
tudes, and the effect on material goods of such attitudinal
changes, is likely to be extremely difficult, not least because of
the highly speculative empirical questions involved.
Other ways in which expressive concerns are relevant to
policy are even more difficult to capture through CBA. Consider
the fact that policies express values that maintain the integrity
of important national commitments; this concern cannot be ad-
dressed through CBA unless it could somehow be based on highly
refined measures that reflect (a distinctive form of) public judg-
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ments about those commitmentsY Where policies are relevant
intrinsically for the importance of the values they express, CBA
cannot incorporate this concern, unless measures of willingness
to pay could somehow be designed to capture public judgments
about intrinsic value. Sometimes what is at stake is ensuring
various groups that their interests are valued in the political
process, rather than consistently subordinated to other interests.
The values of political legitimacy, stability, and fairness are not
taken into account via CBA.
We might therefore urge the following conclusions. Ordinari-
ly, CBA does not include expressive considerations at all. Recent
innovations, designed to provide careful measure of private valu-
ations, attempt to incorporate such considerations insofar as they
are reflected in aggregate individual judgments about how much
it is worth spending to prevent harms or to provide benefits.
Some public-health economists assert that expressive concerns
will indeed be reflected through such measures. 4 But aggre-
gated individual judgments are unlikely to reflect public judg-
ments in a satisfactory way, since they will rarely be reflective
and reached after a process of discussion and reason giving.2
The ambivalence of Executive Order 12866 with respect to
CBA might well reflect an understanding of these expressive
dimensions of regulation. The Order says that "qualitative" costs
and benefits must be included: "Costs and benefits shall be un-
derstood to include both quantifiable measures (to the fullest
extent that these can be usefully estimated) and qualitative mea-
sures of costs and benefits that are difficult to quantify, but nev-
ertheless essential to consider." In addition, the Order's concern
for the "equity" of policy alternatives might reflect concern for the
expressive dimensions of policy choicesY This ambivalence
seems to play out by retaining the form of CBA, but by trying to
fold additional considerations into it. The problem is that certain
central considerations are simply incompatible with the usual
form of CBA. In the next Section, we suggest certain modifica-
" The mere fact that certain values are expressed through public action does not, of
course, mean that those values must be endorsed. As with any other values at stake in
public policy, whether expressive values ought to be endorsed in any context depends on
public debate (and constitutional principles) about the legitimacy of those values.
' See George Tolley, Donald Kenkel, and Robert Fabian, Valuing Health for Policy:
An Economic Approach 345-91 (Chicago, 1994).
' See text accompanying notes 247-74. Contrast the discussion of aggregated private
judgments as opposed to deliberative outcomes in James Fishkin, Democracy and Deliber-
ation (Yale, 1992).
' Exec Order No 12866 § 1(a), 3 CFR at 639 (cited in note 18).
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tions to Executive Order 12866 that would be a first step toward
addressing the kinds of problems that we have emphasized here.
F. Proposed Modifications
CBA should not necessarily be abandoned in light of the
problems we have identified. Even if these problems were
thought to be quite serious, CBA could play a useful role in policy
analysis. This is true from both a theoretical and a pragmatic
perspective. Even in theory, CBA could still help discipline and
systematize important aspects of the policy-making process. It
forces more focused and precise thinking about the potential
consequences of policy. Pragmatically, there is even more to be
said for retaining some role for CBA. Perhaps this way of pro-
ceeding offers a less than full description of what is really at
stake; but if the alternative is a totally intuitive, ad hoc process,
even the rough tools of CBA might be preferable. Moreover, a
completely open-textured and undisciplined regulatory process
would be an invitation to allow interest-group power and sensa-
tionalist anecdotes, rather than deliberation, to determine regula-
tory priorities and approaches. Taken to an extreme, this view
might suggest that we ought to act- "as if" CBA can take all rele-
vant considerations into account, even though we recognize that
this is wrong.
We reject this extreme view, at least until a convincing em-
pirical case is made that it is the best we can do. Instead, we
believe that CBA should continue to be a part of the regulatory
process, but a part whose relation to the whole is understood in a
particular way."
First, as suggested above, CBA should be modified to allow
disclosure of and publicity for disaggregated cost and benefit
data. Second, as also suggested above, policymakers should view
CBA as a tool to inform thoughtful decision making, not as some
uniquely objective mode of analysis that dictates what must be
done.
Instead, policymakers should assess the results of CBA, but
also examine the possibility that it fails to capture the relevant
values at issue. There is nothing exotic about this suggestion.
Few people suppose that CBA can tell us whether to devote limit-
ed research funds to AIDS, global climate change, heart disease,
"' Compare the discussion in Carnegie Commission, Risk and the Environment at 78-
80 (cited in note 6).
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or breast cancer. Few people suppose that an analysis of endan-
gered species cases, or of antidiscrimination policies, should turn
exclusively on CBA. Of course no algorithm can specify a formula
by which judgments should be made in different contexts. It may
make sense to experiment with various approaches that are
based on different contextual judgments; as we have seen,
individuals' contingent valuations diverge across risks, and regu-
latory choices should incorporate the relevant contextual judg-
ments so long as they are well informedY Where expert and
lay assessments appear at odds, lay perspectives should be iden-
tified and explored to the extent feasible. If lay assessments rest
on factual misinformation, or on cognitive distortions in the way
inferences are drawn from the known facts, they need not be
credited. But to the extent that they reflect different valuations
of risk, such as concern for how equitably distributed a risk is, or
whether the processes by which the risk is imposed and managed
are fair, they are the kind of citizen preferences, backed up by
legitimate reasons and values, that democracies should take
seriously.
To capture the benefits of CBA while recognizing its limita-
tions, a range of possible approaches would be reasonable. First,
regulators could use recent work on the contingent valuation or
quality of life years (the "QUALY" approach" 9) to take account
of qualitative distinctions among diverse risks. ° Most promis-
ingly, such work would make it possible to obtain quantitative
measures of qualitative distinctions, as in (for example) the fact
that people seem willing to spend three times as much to prevent
a cancer death as to prevent an immediate death. If such mea-
sures are to be used, it would of course be necessary to ensure
that such judgments are reflective (as polls for willingness to pay
may not).
Second, it may make sense to experiment with more formal-
ized efforts to include within CBA many of the factors that we
have discussed. 1 On this view, officials might make explicit
the relevant value judgments and the weights assigned to them
in the process of ranking. For example, irretrievable losses or
23 See Part IV.G.
=' See Tolley, Kenkel, and Fabian, Valuing Health for Policy at 118-36 (cited in note
234).
24 See text accompanying notes 268-72.
21 See Carnegie Commission, Risk and the Environment at 88-90 (cited in note 6).
Compare United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1994
(cited in note 124) (doing something of this kind to compile human-development index).
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involuntarily-run risks might be treated distinctively by receiving
a specified weight in the assessment of relevant values. Some
agencies would do well to try efforts of this kind. Much of the
appeal of conventional CBA probably stems not from its formal
superiority, but simply from the fact that it is both administrable
and conventional. Compare in this regard the effort to replace
Gross National Product with other, more finely tuned measures
of social well-being. Many of those more finely tuned measures
can be formalized and made operational.242 Executive Order
12866 appears to invite an approach of this kind with its refer-
ence to a range of factors not included within conventional CBA.
To date, there appears to be only one formal effort to inte-
grate judgments about risk into a formal analysis of policy alter-
natives. Two Swiss analysts have developed such an approach in
order to assist in making decisions about the safety of transpor-
tation systems and ammunition storage depots. 3 The method
allocates more money for risk reduction with respect to dangers
that are poorly understood, hard to control, and faced involun-
tarily. American policymakers would do well to build on this
basic idea.
A third possible approach, also making sense of some of the
ambiguities in the Clinton Order, would be an explicitly two-
stage decision process. The first stage should consist of a cost-
benefit analysis, limited to the kinds of costs and benefits that
can reasonably be quantified. This first stage will generate valu-
able information that can be used for many purposes, including
threshold comparisons of policies in different risk-regulating
areas. In a second stage, decision makers should explicitly ad-
dress and articulate the other values, if any are relevant, that
the CBA cannot take into account. These may include the equita-
ble and distributional considerations referred to directly in Exec-
utive Order 12866, as well as the conflicts between expert and
lay valuations and concerns for expressive issues we have dis-
cussed here.
Through this two-stage process, both the benefits of CBA and
its limitations can be recognized. Efforts to deliberate in this way
will also enable clearer understandings of just what trade-offs
2 See the discussion in Sunstein, 107 Harv L Rev at 1323-27 (cited in note 227).
243 See Slovic, Perception of Risk at 151 (cited in note 139), discussing H. Bobnenblust
and T. Schneider, Risk Analysis: Can It Be Improved by Formal Models?, Paper Presented
at the Annual Meeting of the Society for Risk Analysis, Knoxville, Tenn (1984). Slovic sug-
gests that the model be adapted to consider additional factors.
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are involved in the choice among competing regulatory alterna-
tives. In a reinvented regulatory state, conventional CBA should
assist the democratic process, but not displace it.
A fourth possible approach would involve the creation of
participatory mechanisms to enable citizens to express their
judgments about different risks in different contexts. Citizen
panels and discussion groups might be convened to this end.'
In the late 1980s, an experimental effort showed that citizens can
be made well equipped to evaluate problems involving risk, and
that expert uncertainty need not produce lay confusion."
There are obvious difficulties in selecting participants and in
deciding how to present information about risks. But the Clinton
Administration has expressed interest in experimenting with
approaches of this sort," and it is hard to evaluate them until
we have seen how they work in practice.
Thus far we have emphasized cost-benefit analysis, but what
we have said bears on comparative risk assessment as well. It is
indeed important to rank risks in terms of their seriousness, and
any ranking will have a crucial technocratic dimension. But judg-
ments about seriousness cannot be only technocratic. They also
require a variety of evaluative judgments. Comparisons of risks
should make those judgments explicit, identify underlying crite-
ria, and embody not simply an assessment of magnitude of risk
discounted by its probability, but also a range of now-familiar
contextual features.
G. Willingness to Pay or QUALYs as Solutions?
Thus far we have focused on the contrast between expert and
lay conceptions of value and rationality. Some applications of
CBA do rely on expert attributions of value to risk. But some
defenders of CBA might share our concern about technocratic
conceptions of value; in response, they would insist that the eco-
nomic tools of CBA are particularly well suited to taking lay
valuations into account. They would argue that turning to eco-
nomics enables ordinary lay understandings of risk to be incorpo-
rated into policy-making through economic assessments of the
costs and benefits-to individuals-of various policy choices.
See Carnegie Commission, Risk and the Environment at 89-90 (cited in note 6).
2" See text accompanying notes 298-99.
2" See Lubbers, 43 Duke L J at 1172 (cited in note 136). Reason for caution emerges
from Eric RA.N. Smith, The Unchanging American Voter 219-21 (California, 1989).
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There are two general techniques by which economists seek
to make these assessments. After briefly discussing these two
alternatives and their problems, we will also consider an alterna-
tive, not based on economics, that attempts to incorporate lay
valuations directly into the policy-making process.
1. Revealed preferences and willingness to pay.
In its most traditional form, CBA attempts to assess the
"soft" variables of regulatory benefits through measures of pri-
vate willingness to pay for these benefits. 7 On this view, peo-
ple reveal the values they attach to various goods through their
actual behavior in market or market-like settings. If we attend to
the choices people actually make, we will be able to infer from
them the valuations assigned to various goods. This process will
then appropriately reflect lay understandings of costs and be-
nefits.
Thus, if citizens truly fear exposure to nuclear power, their
conduct should reveal a willingness to pay a great deal to avoid
such exposure, no matter what experts say about the risk. If
citizens distinguish between voluntarily incurred risks and invol-
untarily imposed ones, the willingness-to-pay criterion will reflect
the distinction. Diversely valued risks will generate diverse valu-
ations. Properly applied, CBA need not and does not incorporate
expert judgments at the expense of citizen judgments. Instead, it
relies on the latter.
Some provocative approaches attempt to determine the "val-
ue of life" by assessing willingness to pay for risk reductions.'
And to be sure, risks are traded on markets in the sense that
"expenditures on seatbelts, airbags, airline safety, safety caps on
medicine, preventive check-ups, suntan lotion, and a multitude of
other factors represent market expenditures on risk reduc-
tion."249 The Bush Administration explicitly urged the willing-
ness-to-pay criterion on the ground that "the amount that people
are willing to pay for a good or service is the best measure of its
See Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs at 34-50 (cited in note 125).
249 See id at 17-74.
29 Food and Drug Administration, Regulatory Impact Analysis of the Final Rules to
Amend the Food Labeling Regulations, 58 Fed Reg 2927, 2939 (1993).
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value to them."' 0 This approach appears to be a prevalent one
in the agencies."
Thus the Food and Drug Administration enthusiastically
embraced the willingness-to pay methodology. 2 In assessing
the costs and benefits of food labelling regulations, for example,
the FDA relied on studies establishing a range of between $1.5
million and $3 million for the value of a life saved." The FDA
calculated the benefits range in large part by multiplying antici-
pated lives saved by these amounts. In another study the FDA
used a figure of $3 million per life saved.' Other agencies,
usually using willingness to pay, have placed a monetary value
on lives at risk. The Federal Aviation Administration found a
cost per life saved of about $1 million to be acceptable; 5 it usu-
ally uses a minimum value of $2.6 millionY6
' See Office of Management and Budget, Regulatory Program 1990.1991 at xx (cited
in note 52). The Administrative Conference reached a similar conclusion, though more
cautiously. See Recommendations of the Administrative Conference Regarding Admin-
istrative Practice and Procedure and Correction, Recommendation No 88-7, 53 Fed Reg
39585, 39586-87 (1988).
" See Ted R. Miller, Willingness to Pay Comes of Age: Will the System Survive?, 83
Nw U L Rev 876, 886-89 (1989).
Regulatory Impact Analysis, 58 Fed Reg 2927 (cited in note 249).
Id at 2939-40. These numbers were updated for inflation.
Food and Drug Administration, Lead-Soldered Food Cans, 58 Fed Reg 33860,
33869 (1993).
' Federal Aviation Administration, Emergency Locator Transmitters, 59 Fed Reg
32050 (1994).
' Federal Aviation Administration, Airworthiness Standards; Emergency Exit
Provisions for Normal, Utility, Acrobatic, and Commuter Category Airplanes, 59 Fed Reg
25766, 25771 (1994). But the willingness-to-pay idea has not been uniformly accepted.
OSHA and the Department of Transportation have shown ambivalence about willingness
to pay as a criterion, with Transportation using $2.5 million as a benchmark. Coast
Guard, Recreational Boating Safety Equipment Requirements, 58 Fed Reg 41602, 41607
(1993). See also NHTSA's refusal to place a value on life. National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Lamps, Reflective Devices, and
Associated Equipment, 58 Fed Reg 52021, 52024 (1993). On OSHA, compare Occupational
Safety and Health Administration, Control of Hazardous Energy Sources (Lock-
outtTagout), 58 Fed Reg 16612, 16614-16 (1994) (describing cost-benefit analysis as
inconsistent with statute), with Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Safety
Standards for Stairways and Ladders Used in the Construction Industry, 55 Fed Reg
47660 (1990) (examining willingness to spend as illustrative). On Transportation, compare
The price of life, Economist 74 (Dec 4, 1993) (report that National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration looks to "cost per fatal equivalent, (a weighted sum of deaths and injuries
prevented)"), with Recreational Boating Safety Equipment Requirements, 58 Fed Reg at
41607, and Coast Guard, Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacons and Visual
Distress Signals for Uninspected Vessels, 59 Fed Reg 8100, 8102 (1994) (using willingness
to pay). The Consumer Product Safety Commission has refused to ascribe a particular
monetary value to life, though it has used $2 million for purposes of analysis. Consumer
Product Safety Commission, Infant Cushions and Pillows Filled with Foam, Plastic Beads
or Other Granular Material, 57 Fed Reg 27912, 27915 (1992).
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But there are several problems with willingness-to-pay ap-
proaches based on actual market transactions. First, behavior
does not necessarily reveal preferences in the way this approach
assumes. We cannot get a good sense of what people value simply
from choices, since choices are a function of context and since
they are inarticulate-poor predictors of future behav-
ior-without an account of what lies behind themY Several
scholars have shown that even the weakest axioms of revealed
preference theory can fail.s For example, it is usually assumed
that if someone prefers A to B in a situation of binary choice, he
should also prefer A to B if some third alternative C is intro-
duced. But this is often wrong. Someone may prefer A to B, but B
to A and C, because the choice of A over B shows no global or
acontextual judgment. For example, the choice of A (a medium-
sized piece of cake) over B (a large piece of cake) may reflect a
desire to be moderate, a desire that can also justify the choice of
B over A and C (a huge piece of cake)Y9 Thus, we cannot rank
order individual preferences on the basis of choices alone or with-
out some account of what values underlie choices.
Actual market choices are, of course, heavily dependent on
the distribution of income and wealth. Workers who appear will-
ing to accept a certain "wage premium" to work in a more risky
environment do not necessarily thereby proclaim how much they
value their own health. Instead, they may reveal far more nar-
rowly how much they value additional income, given the amount
' See, for example, Amartya Sen, Internal Consistency of Choice, 61 Econometrica
495 (1993). The argument that rational choices need not exhibit transitivity, particularly
when public policy-making is involved, is developed in Pildes and Anderson, 90 Colum L
Rev at 2175 (cited in note 226). Pildes and Anderson further argue that, because rational
choices in the policy-making context need not exhibit transitivity, Arrow's Theorem is
largely irrelevant to the normative analysis of democratic institutions. Empirical confir-
mation of all this can be found in Elliott Aronson, The Social Animal 124-25 (W.M. Free-
man, 7th ed 1995) (discussing an experiment in which the choice between A and B was
materially affected by the introduction of a new, third, unattractive choice C).
See, for example, Sen, 61 Econometrica 495 (cited in note 257).
Id at 498-503; Aronson, The Social Animal at 124-25 (cited in note 257).
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they now have."' Ignorance of risk levels is also, of course, fre-
quent.
Second, and relatedly, any preference arguably revealed
through actual behavior is often highly specific to the particular
context. Smoke alarm purchases, cap safety expenditures, and
use of suntan lotion cannot plausibly be said to reflect general
judgments about the value of life. Such consumption behavior is
highly geared to context. In any case, a willingness to spend $X
to eliminate a 1110,000 risk of death does not necessarily entail a
willingness to pay $10X to eliminate a 111,000 risk of death, a
willingness to pay $10OX to eliminate a 11100 risk of death, or a
willingness to pay $1,OOOX to eliminate a 1110 risk of death."'
Or a willingness to spend $Y to eliminate a risk in a context
when the risk is under the purchaser's control, voluntarily in-
curred, and limited to just one individual does not reveal how
much that person would be willing to pay to avoid the same risk
when it is out of her control, involuntarily inflicted, and affects
many people. Although willingness to pay purports to be ground-
ed in actual choice patterns, its use in public policy frequently
requires purported valuations to be abstracted from the contexts
in which they arise. This makes the approach insensitive to high-
ly relevant contextual differences. A related problem is the sharp
disparity between willingness to pay and willingness to ac-
cept.26
2
Finally, willingness-to-pay measures ignore the distinction
between the valuations people express in private, market trans-
actions and those that they express in democratic arenas.
What people are prepared to pay as private consumers is often,
and appropriately, different from what they think society (and
' Evidence of problems in taking particular decisions to reflect global valuations is
provided by the sharp disparity between willingness to pay and willingness to accept, see
Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, Environmental Law, 22 J Legal Stud 217, 226-
29 (1993). It is also shown by the substantial disparities in the relevant studies. See
Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs at 69 (cited in note 125) (showing "implicit" valuations ranging
from $100,000 to $15.6 million within the labor market); id at 66 (showing valuations out-
side the labor market ranging from $70,000 to $4 million); id at 52-54 (showing valuations
ranging from $600,000 to $16.2 million). See also the discussion of context in Hill, Demo-
cratic Values and Technological Choices at 69-70 (cited in note 197).
" See also Charny, 107 Harv L Rev at 2065 (cited in note 168) ("A person might
accept $10,000 to incur a 1% risk of being killed-does that mean that he would give up
his life for $1 million, or accept $500,000 for a 50% chance of being killed? Of course
not.").
Sunstein, 22 J Legal Stud at 225-27 (cited in note 260).
See Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics at 210-12 (cited in note 207);
Sunstein, 22 J Legal Stud at 253 (cited in note 260).
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they, as members of society) ought to pay to avoid certain risks.
Much empirical evidence confirms this point; for example,
"[pleople were, in fact, found on average to bid more for an im-
provement for everyone in the United States than for just them-
selves." '2 Judgments made in the context of democratic deci-
sion making are designed .to elicit different motivations and dif-
ferent considerations from those made in market transactions.
Through exchange of different perspectives, collective decision
making, and social-regarding reasoning, democratic arenas pro-
duce different valuations from those revealed in market are-
nas.
265
2. Contingent valuation as a surrogate for willingness to
pay.
In response to these and other problems, public health pro-
fessionals and some economists have recently developed alterna-
tives that seek to mimic market transactions, but do not rely on
them. These are called contingent valuation methods. Rather
than looking at actual choices, these methods ask people hypo-
thetical questions about how much they would be willing to pay
to avoid certain harms or conditions. The most advanced methods
involve lengthy interview sessions designed to provide informa-
tion, give a sense of context, and allow discussion in a way that
fosters deliberative results. 6
Some economists view contingent valuation not as a different
form of willingness to pay, but as fundamentally inconsistent
with willingness to pay. The virtue of willingess to pay-indeed,
its entire point, on this view-is that it focuses on actual behav-
ior. Because contingent valuation does not, it is unreliable.267
Tolley, Kenkel, and Fabian, Valuing Health for Policy at 318 (cited in note 234).
For detailed examination of the difference between individual and social perspectives on
health problems, see the recent study of the external costs of smoking and drinking in
Willard G. Manning, et al, The Costs of Poor Health Habits (Harvard, 1991); Willard G.
Manning, et al, The Taxes of Sin: Do Smokers and Drinkers Pay Their Way, 261 JAMA
1604 (1989).
' See Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics at 210-12 (cited in note 207);
Sunstein, 22 J Legal Stud at 253 (cited in note 260). Note, however, that altruism is
reflected in contingent valuation studies, see Tolley, Kenkel, and Fabian, Valuing Health
for Policy at 318 (cited in note 234), that some valuations studies make a large effort to
give people adequate information, see id at 278-99, and that democratic judgments can
reflect distortions of their own.
S6e Tolley, Kenkel, and Fabian, Valuing Health for Policy at 290-94 (cited in note
234); Symposium, Contingent Valuation, J Econ Persp 3 (Fall 1994).
' Id at 187-89; Peter A. Diamond and Jerry A. Hausman, Contingent Valuation: Is
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Moreover, it enables people to behave strategically because they
need not validate their preferences through actual choices.
Yet contingent valuation also seems to improve on some of
the features of actual willingness to pay. It can be made more
context specific and sensitive; there is no need to abstract and
generalize from context-based choices because no actual choices
are involved. Hypothetical questions about what people would be
willing to pay can be designed for virtually any context. In addi-
tion, distributional problems can be minimized by asking the
questions of an appropriately representative pool. Investigators
can then average responses to generate an average, hypothetical
willingness to pay to avoid various conditions.
Much recent work with contingent valuation techniques has
sought to elicit values for different states of health.2" The re-
sults do reflect qualitative differences among what laypeople
appear to consider diverse risks."9 In such studies, for example,
people purport to be willing to pay a much greater amount to
avert cancer deaths (from $1.5 million to $9.5 million) compared
to unforeseen instant deaths (from $1 million to $5 million).270
More generally, this work generates tables like the following:
TABLE 6. Mortality Values by Cause of Death27'1
Value Estimates
(millions)
Category
(per statistical life) Low Medium High
Unforeseen instant death 1.0 2.0 5.0
Asthma/bronchitis 1.3 2.5 5.5
Heart disease 1.25 2.75 6.0
Emphysema 1.4 3.5 9.0
Lung cancer 1.5 4.0 9.5
Some Number Better than No Number?, J Econ Persp 45, 49-54 (Fall 1994).
Id at 323-44; Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs at 51-74 (cited in note 125).
See discussion of "state of the art health values" in Tolley, Kenkel, and Fabian,
Valuing Health for Policy at 323-44 (cited in note 234).
20 Id at 341-42.
"7 Table reprinted with permission from id at 342. © 1994 by the University of
Chicago. All rights reserved.
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Similarly, these survey techniques purport to show that people
value days of illness-from coughing spells, headaches, nausea,
sinus congestion, and so forth-in diverse amounts.2
Nonetheless, we think that contingent valuation methods
have serious limitations as a means of incorporating lay valua-
tions into public policy. Most significantly, it is difficult to believe
that people answering hypothetical questions can assign mean-
ingful dollar values to various possible health or other risks. The
more context sensitive the method attempts to become, the more
its hypothetical nature becomes problematic, bordering on the
fantastic. The leading practioners of contingent valuation purport
to discover that people are willing to pay $90 to have a day of
relief from angina if they have had it for only one day, but $288
for ten days of relief if they have had angina for twenty daysY
It is hard to take these figures seriously. (Ask yourself how much
you would be willing to pay to avoid a day of angina, or two days
of coughing spells, or a week of nausea.) In economic terms, peo-
ple have a difficult time assigning hypothetical dollar values to
bundles of commodities they virtually never confront in everyday
experience.
In addition, contingent valuation methods still suffer from
the private/public valuation distinction. What people would be
willing to pay to eliminate certain conditions for themselves, and
how they think public resources should be allocated, remain
distinct questions. The latter often implicate principles beyond
pain reduction, such as moral notions about responsiblity, desert,
fairness, and the like not at issue in the hypothetical private
resource decision. Public policy should incorporate lay valuations
to a greater extent than it now does, we believe; but what mat-
ters are lay valuations about public choices, not those about self-
regarding, private choices." 4 Perhaps an improvement for con-
2 Id at 99.
' Id at 89. The dollar figures are mean bid values, and relief means a "Mild day."
4 An additional familiar problem with willingness-to-pay measures, whether hypo-
thetical or actual, is the empirical difference from willingness-to-accept measures and the
conceptual uncertainty about which measure--offer price or asking price-should be
deemed the more reliable indicator of value. To some extent, this effect is a product of
distribution-of-wealth considerations already mentioned, but it stems from other forces as
well. See generally Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler, The
Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, J Econ Persp 193, 194 (Winter
1991). In the field of health, willingness-to-accept valuations have tended to be "apprecia-
bly larger" than willingness-to-pay ones. Tolley, Kenkel, and Fabian, Valuing Health for
Policy at 74 (cited in note 234). Compare Charny, 107 Harv L Rev at 2067 (cited in note
168) (arguing that enormous disparity likely exists between what potential AIDS victims
appear through behavior to be willing to pay to eliminate the risk versus what they would
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tingent valuation methods would be to start asking people how
much they think society ought to pay to eliminate various risks,
rather than how much they as individuals would pay. This ques-
tion creates different problems insofar as it makes it hard to
consider budget constraints and opportunity costs, but it has
advantages as well.
3. Alternative individual valuation measures: QUALYs.
Efforts to ground collective risk-regulation decisions on citi-
zen valuations, rather than technocratic ones, need not take the
form of willingness to pay or its surrogates common to economic
analysis. These valuations need not be commensurated with
dollars in order to be useful for public policy. For those hoping to
ground policy in individual valuations but seeking to formalize
the process in ways beyond what is traditionally characteristic of
democratic deliberation, other alternatives exist. In the health
field, much attention has focused on evaluating preferences for
healthy conditions (or aversion to unhealthy ones) in terms of
what are called quality-adjusted life years ("QUALYs). 75
A QUALY is a measure of health based on people's attitudes
toward various conditions. It rejects the concept of monetary
evaluation of health; instead, it focuses on how people value
various health states. It seeks to generate a means of comparing
various states of health through a single metric, so that compari-
sons and trade-offs can be made for public policy purposes. The
measure attempts to take into account both quantitative benefits
of health improvement, such as increase in life expectancy, and
more qualitative improvements, such as quality-of-life benefits.
Like contingent valuation methods, the QUALY approach
works by asking people through interview techniques to express
their strength of preference for various health states. The most
advanced methods disaggregate the process by asking people to
describe how they would value a health improvement along sev-
demand ex ante for being subjected to the risk). Advocates of contingent valuation tend to
assert that willingness-to-pay valuations are "more realistic" under most circumstances
without explaining what "more realistic" means or offering convincing evidence in sup-
port. Id. Some studies, however, do suggest that in repeated experiments, offer and asking
prices converge a fair amount, but still not completely, as subjects gain more familiarity
with the valuation task. David S. Brookshire and Don L. Coursey, Measuring the Value of
a Public Good: An Empirical Comparison of Elicitation Procedures, 77 Am Econ Rev 554
(1987).
25 The measure was first described in Richard Zechauser and Donald Shepard, Where
Now for Saving Lives?, 40 L & Contemp Probs 5 (1976).
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eral dimensions: mobility, physical activity, social activity, and
the kinds of symptom effects involved. 6 The answers to these
questions are combined into a single scale, ranked 0.0 (for death)
to 1.0 (for optimum functioning). The result is an index of utility
for health states measured on an interval (or cardinal) scale. By
independently determining the cost of various treatments and
their likely outcomes, it is possible to suggest a cost per QUALY
of various public programs. Alternative programs can then be
ranked in what is essentially a utility-based cost-effectiveness
scale.
An important advantage of the QUALY method is that it
eliminates the distribution-of-income problems of other methods.
The QUALY approach rests on a strict egalitarian premise; the
value of various states of health should be independent of the
economic status of the particular people in those states. Willing-
ness to pay and contingent valuation treat health like any other
market commodity, while QUALY approaches view health as a
distinct good that should be distributed according to a nonmarket
logic. 7 Costs are still relevant, of course, but they are not
brought in at the individual decision level.
QUALY methods help rank and prioritize health states,
assuming resources for health care are not unlimited. Public
bodies then decide how much in the way of social resources to
devote to risk reduction. This, in fact, is essentially the method
Oregon used in its efforts to reform state Medicaid. Experts and
citizens generated a priority list of health conditions, through
QUALY-like analysis; the legislature then decided how much to
fund Medicaid; and the priority list was then to be used to allo-
cate these funds to specific treatments.
In addition, it seems to us more plausible that if answers to
hypothetical questions can be at all meaningful, they are more
likely to be meaningful when people are choosing states of health
than when people are purporting to assign dollar values to those
states. Because the former draws more directly on people's actual
experiences with their health and the health of others, it is likely
276 An important work in the development of these multidimensional measures is
Robert M. Kaplan and James W. Bush, Health-Related Quality for Life Measurement of
Evaluation Research and Policy Analysis, 1 Health Psych 61 (1982). For a general survey
of QUALY approaches, see George W. Torrance, Measurement of Health State Utilities for
Economic Appraisal: A Review, 5 J Health Econ 1 (1986). For a recent general discussion,
see Tolley, Kenkel, and Fabian, Valuing Health for Policy at 118-36 (cited in note 234).
' For an argument supporting this view, see Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A
Defense of Pluralism and Equality 64-94 (Basic Books, 1983).
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to be more credible. Moreover, the divergence between the valua-
tions people attach to various health states as individuals and as
participants in collective decision making seems likely to be
smaller than the divergence in willingness to pay would be. In-
deed, individual rankings of QUALYs seems quite close to actual
democratic decision making, but in some ways a possible im-
provement. There is no collective deliberative process, but indi-
vidual deliberative thought might be enhanced by considering
each health state carefully in a setting not characterized by the
compression of issues, interest-group pressures, and time con-
straints typical of legislative settings.
Of course, the QUALY approach still must justify itself
against several skeptical objections. Whether its formalism is
illusory, and whether people can make the fine-grained distinc-
tions required in what remain hypothetical settings, remain open
questions. But among public policy methods for evaluating health
and risk issues that seek to incorporate individual valuations in
a systemtatic and more formal way, the QUALY approach has
much to commend it.
4. Tentative conclusions.
In identifying the crucial conflict between lay and expert con-
ceptions of value and rationality, we have sought to assert the
legitimacy of lay perspectives in many regulatory contexts. With
that end in mind, we have suggested some means by which
policy-making processes can do better at incorporating appropri-
ately informed lay perspectives. It is too early in the development
of these new means to argue confidently that any particular
means is best.
With respect to the three specific alternatives we have just
discussed, the QUALY approach seems the most promising. But
these are not the only means by which lay valuations can be
incorporated into administrative and legislative processes. As the
ASARCO and Oregon examples below suggest,278 creative
policymakers committed to ensuring sufficient public participa-
tion will no doubt devise other innovative means for doing so.
Moreover, although we have identified numerous potential prob-
lems with willingess-to-pay and contingent valuation approaches,
these approaches, particularly contingent valuation, are still at
experimental stages of development. As these and other experi-
278 See text accompanying notes 295-96, 307-18.
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ments continue, it is possible that different methodological ap-
proaches will converge toward a range of similar values for vari-
ous benefits of regulation. If so, that convergence would be use-
ful, whatever the seeming problems in any particular approach.
More importantly, policy-making tools must be evaluated
pragmatically, not theoretically. Here, as elsewhere, the best
should not be made the enemy of the good. A method of policy-
making should not be condemned because it suffers from certain
theoretical limitations. Any limitations must be weighed against
those that characterize the potential alternatives. Even a method
that suffers certain limitations might generate better policy than
the alternatives.
This pragmatic perspective is particularly important in the
regulation of health and environmental risks. If more analytical
techniques like comparative risk assessment, contingent valua-
tion, and QUALYs are dismissed out of hand, the question is
what alternatives will determine policy priorities and content. If
the policy process will instead be dominated by interest-group
pressure, sensationalist media stories, and political influence,
these more formal tools might look less bad.
If several approaches converge on the same individual valua-
tions of health states, for example, it might become appropriate
to use those valuations as baselines. We might do so not out of a
(mistaken) view that these were "the real values" of health, but
out of a belief that commitment to a consensus of this sort would
improve policy-making. Commitment to these values might facili-
tate more sensible priority setting, for example. Policymakers
would have to offer special, convincing justifications for regula-
tions that valued health benefits much differently from these
consensus values. Again, that would not be because these values
necessarily reflected the right valuation to put on health, but
because a constraint of this sort would, on balance, improve the
overall policy-making process.
H. An Expert Cadre? Justice Breyer's Proposal
We are now in a position to offer some thoughts on Justice
Breyer's provocative and influential proposal for an elite core of
well-trained and experienced public servants, charged with the
task of rationalizing risk regulation and establishing a sensible
system of regulatory priorities."' This proposal incorporates a
27 Breyer, Breaking The Vicious Circle at 59-63 (cited in note 6).
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number of ideas. First, Justice Breyer proposes that a new career
path be created that would enable a select group of government
employees to rotate through executive, legislative, and adminis-
trative offices that address health and environmental issues."
Second, these employees would be part of a small, centralized
administrative group with an extremely broad agenda for ratio-
nalizing risk-regulation policy. Their mission would include creat-
ing regulatory priorities within as well as across agencies; com-
paring programs to determine how resources could best be allo-
cated to reduce risks; and, most generally, "building an improved,
coherent risk-regulating system, adaptable for use in several dif-
ferent risk-related programs.""' To realize these goals, Justice
Breyer argues that this elite core would require interagency ju-
risdiction as well as substantial political independence and, per-
haps paradoxically, substantial political power.
Several features of this proposal are promising. Viewed most
modestly, the proposal builds on the current process of OIRA
supervision, but would enhance that process by broadening the
perspectives brought by OIRA to its coordinating role. Currently,
OIRA employs economists and policy analysts; by enhancing
OIRA's scientific and technological skill, these reforms might
enable OIRA both to bring more scientific insight to its role and
to foster greater interagency coordination of the technical aspects
of risk regulation in general. Similarly, the idea of enhancing the
breadth of perspectives, political and technical, among risk regu-
lators by rotating them through several governmental institu-
tions is appealing. Indeed, OIRA has announced plans to begin
this kind of rotation program. 2
But Justice Breyer's proposal places too much stress, we
believe, on the technocratic side of risk regulation, and too little
on the democratic side.' Of course Justice Breyer recognizes
the centrality of questions of value to risk regulation; he appreci-
ates the conflict between expert and lay perspectives on value;
and he acknowledges that these conflicts often have no solution
that science can fix.' But by centralizing so many aspects of
mo Id at 59-60.
2" Id at 60.
2' Lubbers, 43 Duke L J at 1178 (cited in note 136).
' See Heinzerling, 62 U Chi L Rev at 471-72 (cited in note 190); David A. Dana,
Setting Environmental Priorities: The Promise of a Bureacratic Solution, 74 BU L Rev 365
(1994), reviewing Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle (cited in note 6). See also note 174
and accompanying text.
' See Stephen Breyer, Regulation and its Reform 155 (Harvard, 1982).
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risk regulation in a small cadre of experts, this approach pro-
vides, we think, insufficient space for a deliberative process
among competing perspectives about risk and its control, and too
little basis for incorporating reflective public understandings
about qualitative differences among diverse risks.
Justice Breyer's institutional structures are designed to ra-
tionalize and coordinate public-policy choices, which is an impor-
tant social goal. But as Justice Breyer acknowledges, the relevant
choices require not only rationalization, but also deliberative
decisions about appropriate valuations of health, safety, economic
welfare, and the like.' If we emphasize deliberation as well as
rationalization, we may doubt whether the setting of major public
priorities should be centralized in one small executive branch
entityY For this reason, the Carnegie Commission, in a recent
influential report on the risk-regulation process, rejected propos-
als to centralize risk assessment in this way.287 The proposals
we offer here recognize Justice Breyer's powerful criticisms of
current regulatory approaches, but are designed to produce a
better mixture of technocratic and democratic virtues, a mixture
that emphasizes the deliberative and democratic side of risk
regulation a bit more than do Justice Breyer's proposals.
More particularly, we urge that any cadre of risk managers
should be attentive not simply to numbers of lives saved, overall
or per dollar spent, but also to public judgments about the con-
texts in which risks are incurred, and hence to the full range of
factors that make risks tolerable or intolerable. Responding to
the democratic objection, Justice Breyer contends that the public
is primarily concerned with saving more lives rather than fewer,
and that for that reason the current system does not reflect real
public judgments."5 There is truth to the contention. But it is
far too simple to say that the public wants to save more lives
rather than fewer. The public is willing to spend a great deal
more to prevent a death from cancer than to prevent an instant
death-indeed, it may well be willing to spend three times as
Dana, 74 BU L Rev at 381 (cited in note 283).
For related points about the pitfalls of entirely technocratic approaches to risk
regulation, see Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Cri-
tique of Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 Colum L Rev 562 (1992).
' Carnegie Commission, Risk and the Environment at 83 (cited in note 6) ("After
careful deliberation we concluded that centralizing risk assessment in a single entity
would be likely to diminish substantially the healthy diversity of views about risk that is
found in our current multiagency system.").
See Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle at 49-51 (cited in note 6).
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much to do so. 9 Or consider, for example, the question wheth-
er to devote resources to the prevention of asthma in children, a
growing problem, or instead to the prevention of stratospheric
ozone depletion-or compare the use of taxpayer funds to protect
the rainforest with the use of the same funds to clean up sites on
the Superfund priorities list.2" The public is legitimately inter-
ested not only in quantities-in how many lives are saved-but
also in a range of contextual factors that determine whether risks
are acceptable or not. Concern for those factors cannot simply be
"deemed" irrational."'
Justice Breyer is aware of these contextual factors. 2 But
both his presentation of the risk problem and his institutional
reform are less attentive to them than they might be. Risk man-
agers should build into their decisions a careful awareness of
qualitative differences among different kinds of risks and should
attempt to expose their evaluative judgments to public scrutiny
and review." Any expert cadre ought therefore to base
allocational decisions not simply on aggregate lives saved, but
also on evaluative considerations that require significant public
input. Our more specific suggestions above are designed to find
the right mix of expert and public perspectives on the risk-regu-
lation processY4
I. Further Issues about Participatory Reforms
We have spoken of enhancing public involvement in regulato-
ry policy-making, largely in order to build trust; but this task
requires considerable work. Thus far, the United States lacks
much experience with participatory initiatives, and there are few
developed institutional structures for providing effective partici-
pation. For these reasons, initial agency efforts in this area are
likely to be fraught with difficulty.
EPA's efforts in the ASARCO case are among the most note-
worthy of these initial efforts. 5 To determine the appropriate
' See Tolley, Kenkel, and Fabian, Valuing Health for Policy at 341 (cited in note
234).
See Dana, 74 BU L Rev at 383 (cited in note 283).
29 See text accompanying notes 201-03.
See Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle at 33 (cited in note 6). See also Breyer,
Regulation and its Reform at 155 (cited in note 284).
See Carnegie Commission, Risk and the Environment at 75-82 (cited in note 6).
See Part IV.F.
2 Robert B. Reich, Public Administration and Public Deliberation: An Interpretive Es-
say, 94 Yale L J 1617, 1632-41 (1985).
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level of trade-off between health and jobs associated with the
operation of a copper smelter in Tacoma, Washington, EPA Ad-
ministrator William Ruckelshaus held three public workshops in
Tacoma during the summer of 1983. The record on these efforts
was, at best, mixed. Some residents and editorial-page writers
complained that the issue was too sophisticated for public input;
Ruckelshaus initially complained that people demanded involve-
ment until they actually got it. But there were some good results
as well. EPA officials were educated about how to communicate
technical information effectively and about the public's nontech-
nical concerns. Two years after the experience, Ruckelshaus con-
cluded that residents had found common ground and that EPA
had made "the beginnings of a tradition of public deliberation
about hard issues."296 Other experiments have produced similar
judgments. 297
A particularly revealing effort has been that of the Public
Agenda Foundation, a private entity that has sought to create
techniques by which representative citizens are enabled to make
informed judgments about regulatory policy. 8 Working in ar-
eas of considerable complexity and uncertainty, such as solid
waste disposal and global warming, the Foundation created Citi-
zen Review Panels in several cities. Each panel met for three
hours. After filling out surveys designed to test their pre-deliber-
ation views, the participants then watched fifteen-minute videos
presenting balanced descriptions of the problems and advantages
of alternative solutions. Participants then discussed the issues in
jury-size groups of twelve, after which they were again surveyed.
Several results emerged. First, laypeople will substantially
change their views on many issues involving science and technol-
ogy if they are exposed to a complete and balanced discus-
sion-one that both acknowledges relevant uncertainties and
presents a framework of options. Second, on many issues, lay
understandings informed through the Citizen Review Panel pro-
cess came "strikingly" to parallel those of experts. Third, citizen
deliberation is hampered less by lack of exposure to the relevant
scientific facts than by the unavailability of frameworks within
296 Id at 1641.
' See, for example, Hill, Democratic Values and Technological Choices at 18-24 (cited
in note 197).
' The discussion in this and the following paragraph is based on information in
Doble and Johnson, Science and the Public (cited in note 198). A brief summary of the
results of the Public Agenda Foundation studies can be found in Carnegie Commission,
Risk and the Environment at 92-93 (cited in note 6).
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which those facts can by interpreted. Finally, on some issues
where lay and expert assessments continued to differ, experts
made the mistake of attributing the resistance to lack of under-
standing. But public opposition on these matters is grounded not
in misinformation or misunderstanding; it rests instead on seeing
different values at stake.
These early efforts suggest the possibility that effective delib-
erative structures can be found for exchanging expert and lay
ideas about risk. Continuing refinements will have to be made to
facilitate the kind of participation that will enhance public trust
in policy outcomes. Technological developments may assist in this
process. Risk assessment can be democratized, for example, by
computer and software technology that now enables anyone to
perform the risk analyses that only a decade ago were within the
sole province of only the most sophisticated organizations.'
The Clinton Administration has expressed interest in facilitating
public involvement through new technologies.0 0 If the idea
seems farfetched, consider the fact that it has already been used
effectively to enhance the legitimacy of one of the most charged politi-
cal decisions, the redistricting process.3' When public officials
are committed to enhancing public understanding and involve-
ment in deciding complex issues, technology can be employed to
serve these goals. Similarly, experiments with citizen review
panels or "policy juries" might capture the benefits of ASARCO-
like ventures more effectively. Of course, any efforts at citizen
involvement should not be simple "polls," but should instead
foster deliberation and informed judgments.
The Department of Energy's ("DOE") continuing conflict with
the public over siting a high-level nuclear waste repository is a
classic example of public policy's failure to respond effectively to
the paradoxes of regulation. Overwhelming political opposition,
which experts have failed to understand, has stymied DOE's
efforts. As one report describes, "Officials from DOE, the nuclear
industry, and their technical experts are profoundly puzzled,
frustrated, and disturbed by public and political opposition that
many of them consider to be based on irrationality and igno-
rance."30 2 Perceiving the problem largely in technical terms, and
Morgan, Scientific Am at 35 (cited in note 196).
"9 See Lubbers, 43 Duke L J at 1172 (cited in note 136).
3o1 See Frank J. Macchiarola and Joseph G. Diaz, The 1990 New York City Districting
Commission: Renewed Opportunity for Participation in Local Government or Race.Based
Gerrymandering?, 14 Cardozo L Rev 1175, 1221-24 (1993).
"' See Paul Slovic, James H. Flynn, and Mark Layman, Perceived Risk, Trust, and the
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failing to promote trust, DOE took actions over several years in
Nevada, the proposed location, that undermined its credibility.
Public opposition to the waste site soared as local residents came
to view DOE, the NRC, and Congress as the least trusted of all
public figures.03
DOE was fully aware of the problem. It sought to restore
confidence by, in essence, rearranging its organization chart and
promising to do a better job of risk management in the fu-
ture.0 4 But it is in the social and psychological dynamic of trust
that its loss cannot be restored so easily. More promising sugges-
tions for reforming the siting process include ensuring that state
and local governments have significant control over siting opera-
tions."' As the need for more significant institutional reform
comes to be recognized, the centrality of public trust to effective
policy must also be recognized. The procedural reforms of Execu-
tive Order 12866 are a first step in that direction.0 6
A final example comes from the debates over priority setting
in the allocation of Medicaid funds in Oregon.0 7 This was an
intriguing and ambitious effort to promote deliberative exchange
between both public and expert judgments.0 ' The state gave
the basic task to a Health Services Commission, an eleven-mem-
ber panel appointed by the Governor that included doctors, social
workers, consumers, and health and social program administra-
tors (the commissioners served voluntarily, for eighteen months,
each spending at least twenty hours per week).0 9 The Commis-
sion then elicited extraordinary public involvement in two stages,
one designed to focus on individual values, the other on commu-
Politics of Nuclear Waste, 254 Science 1603, 1603 (Dec 13, 1991).
30 Id at 1604.
Id at 1606.
Id at 1607. See generally Gerald Jacob, Site Unseen: The Politics of Siting a Nucle-
ar Waste Repository 164 (Pittsburgh, 1990) ("While vast resources have been expended on
developing complex and sophisticated technologies, the equally sophisticated political pro-
cesses and institutions required to develop a credible and legitimate strategy for nuclear
waste management have not been developed.").
" See the discussion of public involvement in Carnegie Commission, Risk and the
Environment at 79-83 (cited in note 6).
' See Tolley, Kenkel, and Fabian, Valuing Health for Policy at 353 (cited in note
234), discussing J.D. Golenski and S.R. Blum, The Oregon Medicaid Priority Setting
Project (Bioethics Consultation Group for the Medical Resources Foundation of Oregon,
1989).
' We discuss the Oregon case only for its relation to that issue, and not as a compo-
nent of health-care policy, a question that raises independent complexities.
Jean I. Thorne, The Oregon Plan Approach to Comprehensive and Rational Health
Care, in Martin A. Strosberg, et al, eds, Rationing America's Medical Care: The Oregon
Plan and Beyond 24, 28-29 (Brookings Institute, 1992).
[62:1
Reinventing the Regulatory State
nity values."' For the latter, the Commission held forty-seven
community meetings throughout the state, at which over one
thousand people participated. The aim of these meetings was to
encourage public deliberation over what kinds of values ought to
be most important in health-care policy. For the individual valua-
tions, the Commission conducted carefully designed telephone
surveys of Oregon residents about how they would assess the
quality of their own well-being under various conditions. This
process was designed not to force people to pretend to assign
monetary valuations to the benefits of health, but to rank order
different conditions in terms of how much they interfered with
quality of life.
31
'
Drawing on the community expressions of value, as well as
internal deliberation and polling involving cumulative voting, the
Commission created seventeen general categories of health care
and prioritized them.2 Thus, preventing death with full recov-
ery ranked first, reproductive services ranked sixth, and nonfatal
chronic conditions that could be treated once in a way that im-
proved quality of life ranked eleventh. 3 These categories were
the most important prioritization decisions. Within each category,
pairs of conditions and treatments were defined. These pairs
were then ranked in terms of their net benefits, based on the
individual quality-of-life valuations and outcome-of-treatment in-
formation from fifty-four panels of health-care providers. "
In the end, the Commission ranked 709 pairs of conditions
and treatments, then presented this list to the Oregon legisla-
ture. The Commission also asserted that the first nine categories
were essential to basic health care; the next four should be fund-
ed to the greatest extent possible; and the final four were valu-
able to individuals, but less cost-effective and less likely to pro-
duce substantial benefits. 5 The legislature responded by ex-
panding the money for state Medicaid and funding the list
through item 587; for the three groupings the Commission sug-
gested, the legislature funded 98 percent, 82 percent, and 7 per-
310 Michael J. Garland, Rationing in Public: Oregon's Priority.Setting Methodology, in
Martin A. Strosberg, et al, eds, Rationing America's Medical Care: The Oregon Plan and
Beyond 37, 45 (Brookings Institute, 1992).
31 Id at 44.
312 Id at 46-47.
3 Id at 40.
'11 Id at 48.
35 Id at 39.
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cent, respectively. 16 Evaluating the final result requires, in
part, detailed analysis of the substantive outcomes. There has
been some controversy on that question.317 But the basic mix of
public participation and expert contribution that the innovative
Oregon approach reflects seems to have generated considerable
public support 18 and is a promising start.
. Increased participation can, of course, introduce problems of
its own, and these problems must be taken into account in struc-
turing participation and in assessing its overall advantages and
disadvantages in different contexts. 9 In addition, the structur-
al features of certain regulatory problems might make it particu-
larly difficult to design appropriate participatory institutions for
them. For example, Professors Gillette and Krier argue that
many public risk sources seem to require centralized manage-
ment because they involve large-scale, even global, externalities.
Gillette and Krier also argue that democratic decision making
has tended to rely on incremental strategies in which feedback
from small steps, in a trial-and-error process, has been crucial to
policy development. For risks that involve long latency periods
and potentially catastrophic consequences, trial-and-error ap-
proaches-which they reasonably believe are inherent in strongly
democratic decision-making institutions-might be impracti-
cal. ° These are serious concerns that regulatory strategies in
certain domains will have to take into account. For present pur-
318 Id.
317 See Tolley, Kenkel, and Fabian, Valuing Health for Policy at 352-57 (cited in note
234); David C. Hadorn, Setting Health Care Priorities in Oregon: Cost-effectiveness Meets
the Rule of Rescue, 265 JAMA 2218 (1991).
31 Ron L. Wyden, Why I Support the Oregon Plan, in Martin A. Strosberg, et al, eds,
Rationing America's Medical Care: The Oregon Plan and Beyond 115, 118 (Brookings
Institute, 1992) (describing support for plan from approximately ninety labor, consumer,
senior citizen, and health groups); Thorne, The Oregon Plan Approach at 29 (cited in note
309) ("The work of the commission was an example of citizen involvement in government
at its best.").
" See generally Richard A. Harris and Sidney M. Milkis, The Politics of Regulatory
Change: A Tale of Two Agencies (Oxford, 1989) (chronicling the influence of ideas about
participatory democracy in the social regulation that emerged in the 1970s and noting
some of the difficulties of institutionalizing this approach).
" See Gillette and Krier, 138 U Pa L Rev at 1107 (cited in note 170) ("those who pro-
pose increased democratization of risk management will have to confront the fact of
democracy's historic reliance on trial and error as a means of resolving uncertainty in the
course of making policy"). EPA has started to take into account the different structural
features of different risk problems. In its reports applying the techniques of relative risk
assessment, EPA study committees have characterized the most pressing "high risk" prob-
lems precisely as those with large geographic scale, some degree of irreversible effects,
and slow response time for mitigation efforts. See Environmental Protection Agency,
Reducing Risk: Setting Priorities and Strategies for Environmental Protection 13-14 (1990).
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poses, our aim has been merely to suggest some important links
between competing ways of valuing risk and the kinds of institu-
tions best suited to make risk policy.
V. REGULATORY MEANS AND REINVENTED GOVERNMENT:
INFORMATION AND INCENTIVES
President Clinton and Vice President Gore have been com-
mitted to the goal of "reinventing government."321 The new ad-
ministration has issued many proposals for ensuring cost-effec-
tive, streamlined bureaucracy.322 Executive Order 12866 moves
in this direction by putting a number of cost-effective regulatory
strategies squarely within the set of principles governing agen-
cies. In this way, it goes well beyond Presidents Reagan and
Bush, who left such matters to the Office of Management and
Budget. Indeed, some of the Clinton Order basically codifies gen-
eral guidelines set out by OMB in previous administrations.323
The goal of reinventing government can be found in many
places in Executive Order 12866:
1. Each agency is under an obligation to test whether the
problem that a regulation is designed to overcome is itself a prod-
uct of an existing regulation.3"4
2. Each agency is obliged to identify alternatives to "direct"
regulation, including provision of information and economic in-
centives.3"
3. Each agency is required to choose cost-effective meth-
ods.32
6
4. Each agency is required, "to the extent feasible," to call for
performance objectives, "rather than specifying the behavior or
manner of compliance that regulated entities must adopt."327
5. Each agency must avoid inconsistent, incompatible, or
duplicative regulations. 8
"1 The term comes from the title of the influential book, Osborne and Gaebler, Rein-
venting Government (cited in note 25).
See generally Gore, Report of the National Performance Review (cited in note 25).
See, for example, Office of Management and Budget, Regulatory Program 1990-
1991 at 3-41 (cited in note 52).
Exec Order No 12866 § 1(b)(2), 3 CFR at 639 (cited in note 18).
Id § 1(b)(3) at 639.
'2 Id § 1(b)(5) at 639.
m Id § 1(b)(8) at 639.
32 Id § 1(b)(10) at 640.
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6. Each agency is required to draft simple and understand-
able regulations and thus to minimize uncertainty and litiga-
tion.3 2
9
To understand these aspects of the Order, and to obtain the
necessary background, it is desirable to explore where command-
and-control regulation has failed, and to see how information and
economic incentives might be better.' °
A. In General
1. Inefficiency.
The current system of public regulation is extraordinarily
inefficient. The annual net cost of regulation has been estimated
at between $44 billion and $400 billion.3"' So-called economic
regulation-calling for'price and entry controls in various sectors
of the economy-has produced unnecessary and exorbitant costs
for American consumers. Thus, some have estimated that airline
deregulation yielded gains to airlines and travellers of about $15
billion annually.2" The corresponding numbers for trucking de-
regulation and railroad deregulation were $30 billion and $15
billion respectively.33 3 By way of comparison, $15 billion is
about the amount that the federal government spends each year
on AFDC payments or highway construction.'
Nor are inefficiencies limited to the area of economic regula-
tion. The Food and Drug Administration has delayed the entry of
beneficial foods and drugs onto the market, perhaps increasing
risks to safety and health.33 5 NHTSA fuel-economy standards
Id § 1(b)(12) at 640.
In this Section, we draw on Cass R. Sunstein, Democratizing America Through
Law, 25 Suffolk L Rev 949 (1991), though we have made a large number of changes in,
and additions to, the presentation.
33 Hahn and Hird, 8 Yale J Reg at 253 (cited in note 9), contains an estimate of $44
billion; for references to other studies, and a suggestion that this is far too low, see The
Total Cost of Regulation?, Regulation 23-25 (Summer 1991). In the late 1980s, the Office
of Management and Budget estimated between $50 and $150 billion, see Office of Man-
agement and Budget, Regulatory Program of the United States Government, April 1,
1987-March 31, 1988 xii (US GPO, 1989). For an estimate of as high as $400 billion, see
Hopkins, 2 J Reg & Soc Costs at 25 table 2 (cited in note 7).
' Office of Management and Budget, Regulatory Program 1987-1988 at 6 (cited in
note 331), and citations therein. The costs and benefits of airline deregulation are not en-
tirely uncontroversial. See Laurence E. Gesell and Martin T. Farris, Airline Deregulation:
An Evaluation of Goals and Objectives, 21 Transp L J 105 (1992).
' Office of Management and Budget, Regulatory Program 1987-1988 at 6 (cited in
note 331).
' Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1992, US Office of Manage-
ment and Budget, Part 4 at 7, 10 (1991).
See Henry G. Grabowski and John M. Vernon, The Regulation of Pharmaceuticals:
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appear to have produced uncertain gains in light of the fact that
market pressures were forcing manufacturers to produce smaller
and more efficient cars and that, when those pressures abated,
Congress and the agency relaxed the standards."6 In addition,
some people argue that the standards may have led to significant
losses in lives as a result of producing more dangerous, lighter
vehicles."3 7 More generally, the United States spent no less
than $632 billion for pollution control between 1972 and 1985.
Some studies suggest that alternative strategies could have
achieved the same gains at less than one-quarter of the cost. 8
A pervasive source of regulatory inefficiency in the United
States is the use of rigid, highly bureaucratized "command-and-
control" regulation, which dictates, at the national level, control
strategies for hundreds, thousands, or millions of companies and
individuals in an exceptionally diverse nation. Command-and-
control regulation is a dominant part of American government in
such areas as environmental protection and occupational safety
and health regulation. In the environmental context, command-
and-control approaches usually take the form of regulatory re-
quirements of the "best available technology" ("BAT"), which are
almost always imposed only on new pollution sources. BAT strat-
egies are pervasive in federal law. Indeed, they are a defining
characteristic of regulation of the air, the water, and conditions
in the workplace. 9
One of the many problems with BAT strategies is that they
ignore the enormous differences among plants and industries and
among geographical areas. Some polluters can reduce emissions
much more cheaply per unit of reduction than others; command-
and-control approaches ignore the differential marginal costs of
pollution reduction, thereby making the process of reduction
much more costly. For example, large utilities can scrub their
plants more cheaply, ton for ton, than smaller plants."4 In view
of these differences, it is grossly inefficient to impose nationally
uniform technological requirements. 3" Often it makes little
Balancing the Benefits and Risks 37-43 (AEI, 1983).
See Mashaw and Harfst, The Struggle for Auto Safety at 235 (cited in note 183).
See Robert W. Crandall, et al, Regulating the Automobile 37, 143 (Brookings Insti-
tute, 1986).
See T.H. Tietenberg, Emissions Trading: an exercise in reforming pollution policy
41-45 (Resources Future, 1985).
' See, for example, Clean Air Act, 42 USC § 7411(a)(1) (1988 & Supp 1992); Clean
Water Act, 33 USC § 1316(a)(1) (1988 & Supp 1992).
'3' Matthew L. Wald, Risk-Shy Utilities Avoid Trading Emission Credits, NY Times
D2 (Jan 25, 1993).
3"1 There are other sources of inefficiency as well. BAT strategies require all new
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sense to impose the same technology on industries in diverse ar-
eas-regardless of whether they are polluted or clean, populated
or empty, or expensive or cheap to clean up. 2
In general, governmental specification of the "means" of
achieving desired ends is a good way of producing inefficiency.
Instead of permitting industry and consumers to choose the
"means"--and thus to impose a form of market discipline on that
question-government often selects the means in advance. The
governmentally prescribed means are often the inefficient ones,
at least in many of the contexts in which those means are ap-
plied.
Other inefficiencies in existing law stem from inadequate
attention to the problem of incentives. Consider, for example, the
Superfund statute, which was created to deal with the problem of
abandoned toxic waste dumps. Congress's basic strategy was to
impose joint and several liability on everyone with a connection
with the dump in question-managers or owners of the site,
generators of the waste, and transporters.' At first glance, the
strategy seems both fair and efficient: fair, because it imposes
cleanup duties on everyone; efficient, because it is likely to deter
everyone from contributing to the problem of abandoned waste
sites. But a predictable consequence of this strategy is to produce
incentives, not to clean up, but instead to have protracted litiga-
tion on the question of who is liable to whom. If everyone is lia-
ble, it is almost as bad as if no one is. The liability of each person
industries to adopt costly technology and allow more lenient standards to be imposed on
existing plants and industries. Through this route, BAT strategies actually penalize new
products, thus discouraging investment and perpetuating old, dirty technology. The result
is inefficiency in investment strategies, in innovation, and even in environmental protec-
tion.
Such strategies also fail to encourage new pollution-control technology and indeed
serve to discourage it by requiring its adoption for no financial gain. Under the BAT
approach, a company that innovates in this area will simply have to invest more in
pollution control. It will be punished rather than rewarded for the development of new
control technology. BAT strategies are also expensive to enforce, imposing on EPA and
OSHA a significant monitoring burden.
Additional inefficiency arises because BAT approaches are focused on the technology
at the end of the pipe. This addresses symptoms rather than causes of pollution. For
example, sulfur dioxide emissions (the major source of acid rain) are controlled by forcing
coal-fired power plants to adopt costly "scrubbing" strategies. A much cheaper method of
control is to encourage companies to switch to cleaner coal.
' For a discussion of the problems with the old Clean Air Act, see Bruce A.
Ackerman and William T. Hassler, Clean Coal/Dirty Air: or How the Clean Air Act
Became a Multibillion-Dollar Bail-Out for High-Sulfur Coal Producers and What Should
Be Done About It 30-33, 145 n 19 (Yale, 1981).
34 42 USC § 9607(a) (1988).
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is effectively "decreased" by virtue of the sheer numbers of people
who are liable as well. For each person contemplating possible
courses of action, liability must be understood in the context of a
situation in which many other people will be liable too. If hun-
dreds of people are subject to suit, one can be sure that there will
be endless litigation on the liability question. Thus it is that on
average, seven years and at least $4 million in transaction costs
are necessary before final cleanup even begins.3'
As we have seen, studies of the costs and benefits of regula-
tory programs show what appears to be a patchwork pattern,
including both too much and too little regulation. 5 This brief
summary should be sufficient to suggest that, from the stand-
point of efficiency, some of modern government is ill directed.
Some programs are not beneficial at all. Others have unnecessary
and costly side effects. We could obtain the same or higher ben-
efits much more cheaply.
2. Democracy.
We have stressed that regulation often has democratic as
well as economic goals. In practice, however, this democratic
aspiration has often been defeated. People rarely have enough
information to participate at all, or in a sufficiently informed
way, in the processes of government. The concentration of regula-
tion in Washington has hampered democratic deliberation both in
localities and in the private sphere. The use of complex techno-
logical mechanisms, and their centrality to actual outcomes, have
contributed to the power of well-organized interest groups over
the regulatory process."46
Democratic failures are well documented.' 7 We have seen a
number of democratic problems in the provision of information.
Interestingly, the BAT approach is itself troubling from the
standpoint of a well-functioning political process. That approach
ensures that citizens and representatives will be focusing their
attention not on what levels of reduction are appropriate, but
instead on the largely incidental and nearly impenetrable ques-
See E. Donald Elliott, Superfund: EPA Success, National Debacle?, Nat Resources
& Envir 11, 13 (Winter 1992).
See, for example, Table 5.
3' See Richard B. Stewart, Madison's Nightmare, 57 U Chi L Rev 335 (1990).
'47 Two examples are Ackerman and Hassler, Clean Coal/Dirty Air (cited in note 342),
and R. Shep Melnick, Regulation and the Courts: The Case of the Clean Air Act (Brookings
Institute, 1983).
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tion of what technologies are now available.' Because of its
sheer complexity, this issue is not easily subject to democratic
resolution. In addition, the issue that is the relevant one for
democratic politics-which is the appropriate degree and nature
of environmental protection-is one to which the BAT question is
only incidental.
The focus on the question of "means" also tends to increase
the power of well-organized private groups by allowing them to
press environmental and regulatory law in the service of their
own parochial ends. These ends include, for example, the promo-
tion of ethanol, which is helpful to corn farmers though not nec-
essarily to environmental protection; other fuels might well be
preferable on environmental grounds. 9
In this respect, the BAT strategy is emblematic of a far more
general problem in current regulation. Centralization at the na-
tional level diminishes opportunities for citizen participation.
There are ways of increasing such opportunities, but the means
are highly experimental. In its current form, national centraliza-
tion tends to promote intense and unproductive struggles among
well-organized factions. Education of citizens about the key is-
sues-risk levels and risk comparisons-is at best episodic. Pub-
lic attention tends to be focused on particular incidents, which
are gripping and sensationalistic but often misleading.
In these circumstances, it is difficult indeed to ensure that
citizens and representatives will be involved in deliberating
about different strategies for achieving social goals, or for decid-
ing what those goals are in the first place. By directing attention
to means, the system also creates powerful incentives for interest
groups to ensure that they are favored in the legislature or the
bureaucracy. Executive Order 12866 is designed to respond to
this problem insofar as it favors agency emphasis on regulatory
ends rather than on means and technologies.
' See Bruce A. Ackerman and Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law:
The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 Colum J Envir L 171, 174 (1988).
' See Jonathan H. Adler, Clean Fuels, Dirty Air, in Michael S. Greve and Fred L.
Smith, Jr., eds, Environmental Politics: Public Costs, Private Rewards 19, 28-29 (Praeger,
1992). Ends favored by parochial interests also include governmentally compelled use of
coal "scrubbers," which are helpful to eastern coal though not necessarily to air quality.
The use of already-clean coal might well be better. See Ackerman and Hassler, Clean
Coal/Dirty Air at 66-68 (cited in note 342).
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3. A note on distributional considerations.
We will now turn to information and economic incentives as
remedies of choice. At the outset, however, it is important to
emphasize that the two remedies have quite different
distributional consequences. Informational remedies tend to favor
the relatively well off. In the area of smoking, for example,
greater disclosure of risk levels has apparently had less signifi-
cant effects on the comparatively less educated poor, with smok-
ing prevalence declining five times faster among the more edu-
cated than among the less educated."'0
By contrast, economic incentives will predictably have their
most substantial effects on those who are less well off. In this
way, incentives are sometimes thought to operate as a regressive
tax. The point does not, however, count strongly against incen-
tives, which can ensure that the costs of social activities are
internalized. A cost-internalizing incentive system should not be
regarded as a regressive tax, any more than the price system
itself is a regressive tax. 5' The proper solution to high prices
for important commodities, under the price system, is not to fix
prices but instead to subsidize people who cannot afford them. So
too, the proper solution to high prices, under an incentive-based
system, is not to remove the incentives but to subsidize people
who cannot afford important social goods. The fact that economic
incentives may have especially harsh effects on the poor-by, for
example, raising the costs of transportation or food-argues for
efforts to minimize those effects, particularly by using the pro-
ceeds from the incentives themselves so as to help people who
need help. Incentives will predictably leave the wealthy with
more options than the poor. But the disproportionate effects of
incentives on the poor might not be so unfortunate if the conse-
quence is to reduce relevant harms, such as risks of cancer and
heart disease.
Nonetheless, the distributive effects should be taken into
account. We have suggested that economic incentives might be
accompanied by efforts to diminish effects on the poor. In addi-
'o J.P. Pierce, et al, Trends in Cigarette Smoking in the United States: Educational
Differences are Increasing, 261 JAMA 56 (1989). Note, however, the recent finding that
the percentage of white women who smoke has risen from 25 percent to 27 percent
between 1987 and 1992, whereas the percentage of black women who smoke dropped from
22 percent to 6 percent in the same period. Health Report, Time 38 (Nov 14, 1994). Black
women are of course poorer and less well educated as a group than white women.351 See Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Substance, 1991 Duke L J 607, 638-39.
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tion, the fact that informational remedies work best for the well
off suggests that informational remedies should be supplemented
by other approaches, educational or otherwise. In the area of
smoking, for example, some argue that consumers now know
enough to make informed choices and that additional informa-
tional efforts would be unwise. 52 But many people, including
the young and the less well educated, are not fully aware of the
risks. The public schools are a natural place to fill the gap. Thus,
in one project involving more than thirty thousand children in
grades four through seven from twenty states, a drop of 33 per-
cent in the self-reported rate of smoking among seventh graders
occurred (longer-term results are not yet known). 53 Other stud-
ies show a reduction of 5-10 percent in long-term smoking rates
among students exposed to health education.' Based on these
studies, some argue that school health education could save
169,110 lives over the next sixty years, for current fourth through
seventh graders. 55 The numbers are of dourse speculative, but
the numbers suggest the value of attending to the distributional
effects of informational campaigns.
B. Information
In many areas, perhaps the first and most basic problem
calling for governmental response is that people lack the neces-
sary information. With respect to social risks, the first goal ought
to be to ensure genuinely informed choices, rather than to dictate
outcomes from Washington. The initial line of regulatory defense
might therefore be educative rather than regulatory. Thus far,
the United States has tended to pursue the opposite strategy:
regulate first, educate only in exceptional cases. We might re-
verse our priorities. Executive Order 12866 appears to urge such
a shift by endorsing information provision as a remedy of
choice.355
Partly because of heuristics that produce errors, but more
importantly because of a simple lack of information, many Ameri-
cans are unaware of the risks that they face in day-to-day life.
Problems of this sort are especially likely in light of the fact that
ordinary people have a difficult time obtaining information about
See W. Kip Viscusi, Smoking: Making the Risky Decision (Oxford, 1993).
Tolley, Kenkel, and Fabian, Valuing Health for Policy at 376-78 (cited in note 234).
3s Id at 376-77.
35 Id at 376-78.
' See Exec Order No 12866 § 1(b)(3), 3 CFR at 639 (cited in note 18).
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risk. Causation is especially complex here, and accurate infer-
ences are difficult to draw. Often risks take many years to mate-
rialize. Individual susceptibility varies, and changing technology
makes learning from the past a hazardous enterprise."' Disclo-
sure by the government itself, or by others at the government's
behest, can promote both efficiency and democracy; hence Execu-
tive Order 12866 focuses on the provision of information as a
possible preferred remedy.35 But for information disclosure re-
quirements to achieve these ends, it is not enough that disclosure
be formally required. Officials should also attend to the content
of what is to be disclosed and the form it is to take.
We first turn to the economic and democratic justifications
for a regulatory emphasis on information disclosure. We then
discuss recent discoveries in the risk communication field con-
cerning the most effective forms of risk-related information.
1. Efficiency.
When information is lacking, there may well be a convention-
al case of market failure under economic criteria.35 To be sure,
information-like other goods-is a scarce commodity. Perhaps
the market has produced the optimal level of information. The
optimal level is unlikely to be "complete information," whatever
"complete" might mean. But there are several reasons why the
market for information may fail.
First, information is sometimes a public good. Once it is
available at all, or to anyone, it may well be available to every-
one or to many people. People can thus capture the benefits of
information without having to pay for its production. Once creat-
ed, a report discussing the risks posed by carcinogens in the
workforce may well benefit employees a great deal-but no indi-
vidual employer or employee has the right incentives to pay his
proportional share for the report. Each employer or employee has
the incentive to "free ride" on the efforts of others. The result is
that too little information will be forthcoming. This point applies
to materials about shared risks in general.
Second, manufacturers may have poor incentives to provide
information about hazardous products. Competition over the
" These points are well discussed in Susan Rose-Ackerman, Progressive Law and
Economics-And the New Administrative Law, 98 Yale L J 341, 356 (1988).
Exec Order No 12866 § 1(b)(3), 3 CFR at 639 (cited in note 18).
See Peter Asch, Consumer Safety Regulation: Putting A Price on Life and Limb 48-
50 (Oxford, 1988); Rose-Ackerman, 98 Yale L J at 356 (cited in note 357).
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extent of danger may decrease total purchases of the product
rather than help any particular manufacturer to obtain greater
sales. This phenomenon has sometimes played a role in discour-
aging competition over safety among manufacturers of tobacco
products. At least in principle, the phenomenon may occur fre-
quently.
360
Information asymmetries may produce a "lemons" problem,
in which dangerous products drive safe ones out of the mar-
ket.36 ' Imagine, for example, that producers know which prod-
ucts are safe, but that consumers cannot tell. Safe products may
not be able to compete if they sell for no higher price than dan-
gerous ones, if safe products are more expensive to produce, and
if consumers are unable to tell the difference. In that case, the
fact that sellers have information, while buyers do not, will en-
sure that "lemons -- here dangerous products-will dominate the
market. Regulation designed to provide information is the proper
remedy.
All this suggests that there may well be market failures in
the provision of information. At least as a presumptive matter,
government remedies are an appropriate response. These reme-
dies might take the form of governmentally provided information,
education campaigns, or disclosure requirements.
There is an incipient empirical literature on disclosure of
risks. In general, the findings suggest that disclosure can be a
helpful and cost-effective strategy.3 62 Workers do indeed re-
spond to new information about risks, by quitting or demanding
higher salaries. Consumers often react well to disclosure about
danger levels. In general, there is reason to think that govern-
ment-mandated disclosure, if suitably designed, can be an effec-
tive mechanism for promoting economic efficiency. On the other
hand, there are hazards in disclosure strategies, as we discuss
below.
There are, however, many cases in which companies compete over safety, and in
that sense the market often works as an effective check on dangerous products.
" See George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q J Econ 488 (1970).
' See W. Kip Viscusi, Wesley A. Magat, and Joel Huber, Informational regulation of
consumer health risks: an empirical evaluation of hazard warnings, 17 Rand J Econ 351
(1986); W. Kip Viscusi and Charles J. O'Connor, Adaptive Responses to Chemical Labeling,
74 Am Econ Rev 942 (1984); W. Kip Viscusi and Wesley A. Magat, Learning About Risk:
Consumer and Worker Responses to Hazard Information (Harvard, 1987).
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2. Democracy.
Suppose that we wanted to increase the democratic character
of contemporary government by promoting citizen participation
in, and control over, governmental processes. A good initial step
would be for government to provide enough information so that
people could make knowledgeable judgments.
Government might itself supply information, or require dis-
closure by private citizens and companies. Return, for example,
to the matter of expenditures per life saved.363 At the very
least, the American public should be informed of the disparities
among programs so that it can evaluate them. Or consider the
question of risk regulation in general. On that question, people
are often poorly informed.3" For example, people often seem
unaware of how the risks from new technologies compare to the
level of background risk in the natural environment. They some-
times do not have a clear sense of the relationships among differ-
ent risks that are confronted in everyday life. Information of this
sort ought to be widely available. The fact that it is not creates a
significant failure in government regulation. At least equally
important, it presents a large obstacle to citizenship. Workers
uninformed of risks are unable to participate usefully in the
process of deciding among different possible levels of workplace
safety. Local communities, seeking to decide whether to allow
toxic waste sites or plants that produce sulfur dioxide, need to be
in a position to make informed choices.
3. Pre-Clinton steps.
The national government has initiated a series of steps to-
ward disclosure of risks. Mandatory messages about risks from
cigarette smoking, first set out in 1965 and modified in 1969 and
1984, are of course the most familiar example. 365 The FDA has
long maintained a policy of requiring risk labels for pharmaceuti-
cal products. 366 EPA has done the same for pesticides and asbes-
tos." ' Congress requires warnings on products with saccha-
See John Morrall, A Review of the Record, Regulation 25, 29-34 (Nov/Dec 1986).
'4 Some of this is undoubtedly a product of heuristics of various sorts, discussed in
text accompanying notes 210-11. But more information could help overcome some of the
relevant biases.
= 15 USC §§ 1331 et seq (1988 & Supp 1992).
21 USC §§ 301 et seq (1988 & Supp 1992).
15 USC §§ 2601 et seq (1988 & Supp 1992).
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tin."8 There are numerous other illustrations. Indeed, the effort
to provide information counts as one of the most striking, if incip-
ient, developments in modern regulatory law. Consider three
especially notable initiatives.
In 1983, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
issued a Hazard Communication Standard ("HICS"), applicable to
the manufacturing sector. In 1987, the HCS was made generally
applicable. 69 Under the HCS, chemical producers and import-
ers must evaluate the hazards of the chemicals they produce or
import; develop technical hazard information for materials-safety
data sheets, and labels for hazardous substances; and, most im-
portantly, transmit this information to users of the relevant sub-
stances. All employers must adopt a hazard communication pro-
gram-including individual training-and inform workers of the
relevant risks.7 °
In 1986, Congress enacted an ambitious statute, the Emer-
gency Planning and Community Right to Know Act
("EPCRA). 71 Under this statute, firms and individuals must
report to state and local government the quantities of potentially
hazardous chemicals that have been stored or released into the
environment. Users of such chemicals must report to their local
fire departments about the location, types, and quantities of
stored chemicals. They must also give information about poten-
tial adverse health effects. A detailed report suggests that
EPCRA has had important beneficial effects, spurring innovative,
cost-effective programs from the EPA and from state and local
government. 2 Indeed, there is reason to believe that the public
release of information about discharge of toxic chemicals has by
itself spurred competition to reduce releases, quite independently
of any government regulation.73
The Food and Drug Administration has also adopted infor-
mational strategies. In its most ambitious set of proposals, 74
21 USC § 343 (o)-(p) (1988 & Supp 1992).
29 § CFR 1910.1200(g) (1993).
'7 For general discussions of warning standards, see Viscsi, Magat, and Huber, 17
Rand J Econ 351 (cited in note 362); Viscusi and O'Connor, 74 Am Econ Rev 942 (cited in
note 362).
'7' 42 USC §§ 9601 et seq (1988 & Supp 1992).
' United States General Accounting Office, Report to the Congress: Toxic Chemicals:
EPA's Toxic Release Inventory is Useful but Can Be Improved 2-4 (US GPO, 1991).
373 Id at 24-25.
' Food Safety and Inspection Service, Nutritional Labeling of Meat and Poultry
Products, 56 Fed Reg 60, 302 (1991). The final regulatory impact analysis can be found at
58 Fed Reg 2927 (cited in note 249).
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finalized in 1993,"7' FDA seeks (a) to compel nutritional label-
ling on nearly all processed foods, including information relating
to cholesterol, saturated fat, calories from fat, and fiber; (b) to re-
quire compliance with government-specified serving sizes; (c) to
compel companies to conform to government definitions of stan-
dardized terms, including "reduced," "fresh," "free," and "low";
and (d) to allow health claims only if they (1) are supported by
scientific evidence and (2) communicate clear and complete infor-
mation about such matters as fat and heart disease, fat and
cancer, sodium and high blood pressure, and calcium and osteo-
porosis.
These initiatives are only a beginning. As Executive Order
12866 suggests, broader and more ambitious programs, coordi-
nating the general communication of social risks, are very much
in order. It has been urged that government might eventually
develop a "national warnings system" containing a systematized
terminology for warnings."' Such a system could apply to all
contexts and risks, and give a uniform sense of risk levels. The
existence of a uniform language would make it possible to assess
risks across a wide range of social spheres.
4. More effective communication of risk information.
Requiring disclosure of risk information is not enough. Mech-
anisms must be devised to ensure that the information is accu-
rate and not a product of interest-group pressures, which will
predictably be brought to bear on informational effects. Even
accurate information may be poorly processed; it may be ignored;
it may produce "overload."77 The form and content of the infor-
mation disclosed must be such that citizens find it understand-
able and trustworthy. Even good-faith efforts to facilitate truly
informed individual choices turn out, we now know, to fail for
lack of understanding of the dynamics of effective risk communi-
cation. This problem is not specifically addressed in Executive
35 58 Fed Reg 44030 (1993), codified at 21 CFR §§ 101 et seq (1994).
3' W. Kip Viscusi, Product-Risk Labeling: A Federal Responsibility 72-74 (AEI, 1993).
See Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle at 56 (cited in note 6). A careful and de-
tailed study is Peter Menell, Ecoinformation (forthcoming 1995). Menell shows a range of
problems with informational strategies, including interest-group pressures on the infor-
mation that is compiled, and concludes that economic incentives are preferable since they
carry better information via the price signal. We think that this conclusion is too simple,
in part because use of the price mechanism as a true cost-internalizing device requires
government itself to compile and use information.
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Order 12866. In implementing the Order's emphasis on risk com-
munication, much work needs to be done on the topic.
Systematic study of risk-communication strategies only be-
gan in the mid-1980s 78 These studies have shown that much
conventional wisdom, upon which prior regulatory strategies
were based, is wrong. The reasons reveal another manifestation
of the conflict between expert and lay approaches to risk evalua-
tion. Information becomes relevant to people through their
specific background assumptions, knowledge, and systems of
value. Precisely because experts and laypeople often differ, the
kind of information each requires often differs as well. On
efficiency grounds, risk-communication strategies should be tai-
lored to lay needs, in order to ensure better decisions. On demo-
cratic grounds, the right kind of information should be disclosed
so that participation builds on actual valuations and promotes
trust in both the process and outcome.
A first problem with many government-sponsored risk com-
munications is that they take the form of highly generalized and
often inscrutable recommendations, rather than providing infor-
mation that enables citizens to evaluate the recommendations. A
second and more important problem is that regulators should
understand that people filter and process information through
their existing frameworks of belief. Effective information disclo-
sure requires knowledge of the beliefs on which citizens are likely
to draw. If these background frameworks are incomplete or error
filled, new information, even if factually accurate, may well be
ignored or misunderstood. More information might even make
people less informed. Thus, disclosure of the information that an
expert decision analyst would use-the exposure-effect relation-
ship of a risk, the cost and efficiency of alternative remediation
approaches-may not promote informed choice at all.
Risk-communication experts have developed a general ap-
proach to discovering the most effective forms of information
disclosure. We first outline that approach, then describe empiri-
cal results from its application in a recent, concrete regulatory
setting.3 7
9
The appropriate approach can be broken down into three
steps. First, policymakers should elicit the background beliefs
that average citizens will actually bring to the relevant risk is-
376 Slovic, 13 Risk Analysis at 675 (cited in note 143).
"' The discussion that follows is based on M. Granger Morgan, et al, Communicating
Risks to the Public, 26 Envir Sci Tech 2048 (1992).
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sue. Perhaps those background beliefs are already understood. If
they are not, interviews can be helpful, but structured question-
naires might be used where the former are not feasible. The
process of eliciting views should be at least somewhat open end-
ed; investigators should not force the process into predetermined
channels. The process might start with questions like "tell me
about radon" and seek elaboration of the responses. Studies of
different risk problems suggest that after twelve interviews or so,
few new concepts emerge in the answers."o
Second, initial material should be designed to provide the
relevant information in a way that responds to those background
beliefs. To the extent that the elicitation process reveals gaps and
errors in these beliefs, the material should address them. In
addition, rather than providing bare information, the material
should provide it in a form directed to taking action. Third, the
initial material should be tested empirically with potential users.
Iterations of this process yield the most effective forms of infor-
mation disclosure.
Applying this approach in 1987, experts were able to gener-
ate a highly effective brochure for addressing the radon problem,
a brochure that was far more effective than the widely distribut-
ed EPA brochure on that topic. The elicitation process revealed
that, in addition to holding many accurate beliefs about radon
exposure, people also held many inaccurate beliefs: that radon
contamination of surfaces is permanent (39 percent); that radon
affects plants (58 percent); that it contaminates blood (38 per-
cent); and that it causes breast cancer (29 percent).38' Few peo-
ple understood that radon decays quickly (13 percent).382 The
combination of some of these beliefs would make the radon prob-
lem seem severe and unsolvable; consider the lack of knowledge
of the fact that radon decays quickly.
On the basis of this information, brochures were designed
that specifically addressed the flaws and gaps in people's back-
ground beliefs. The unsuccessful EPA brochure had been pre-
pared through traditional methods; scientific experts were asked
what information was relevant and it was then packaged attrac-
tively. The initial version of EPA's "Citizen's Guide to Radon," for
example, did not discuss whether radon contamination is perma-
Id at 2052.
331 Id. The permanent contamination figure is from written surveys; the other figures
are based on interviews.
3" Id.
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nent. When empirically tested, this EPA brochure performed
significantly worse than the brochures prepared through the
alternative method. When people were asked to recall simple
facts, they did equally well with all the brochures. But when
faced with tasks requiring inference, the new brochures "dramati-
cally outperformed" the EPA material.' For example, when
asked what a homeowner could do to reduce high radon levels in
the house, 43 percent of EPA readers answered "don't know" and
9 percent said "there is no way to fix the problem." In contrast,
100 percent of the readers of the brochure designed on the basis
of risk communication studies, and 96 percent of the readers of
another, answered "hire a contractor to fix the problem."384
This approach stands in sharp contrast to that reflected in
one of the most carefully prepared and broadly circulated manu-
als on risk information and its communication. This manual,
produced for the Chemical Manufacturers Association, sought to
provide advice to plant managers on the most effective means to
make public comparisons between different kinds of risks. The
chemical industry drew on literature concerning effective commu-
nication, but it did not test its manual empirically. When that
was done, it turned out that the advice was flatly wrong. There
was no correlation between actual public assessments of the risks
and those the manual predicted.385
Informational remedies should also respond to various
heuristics and anomalies that can affect how people "hear" warn-
ings and advice. For example, it matters a great deal whether a
health effect is framed as a loss or a gain. People are far more
willing to forego gains than to accept losses; they are persistently
"loss averse,"1 6 and loss aversion affects people's reaction to in-
formation about risk. Thus, real-world experiments show that
pamphlets describing the positive consequences of breast self-
examinations (for example, women who undertake such examina-
tions have a greater chance of finding a tumor at a treatable
stage) are ineffective, whereas there are significant changes in
behavior from pamphlets that stress the negative consequences of
a refusal to undertake self-examinations (women who fail to
Morgan, Scientific Am at 40 (cited in note 196).
Morgan, et al, 26 Envir Sci Tech at 2054 (cited in note 379).
The study is reported in Emilie Roth, et al, What Do We Know About Making Risk
Comparisons?, 10 Risk Analysis 375, 380 (1990).
' See, for example, Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler,
Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J Pol Econ 1325,
1342-46 (1990).
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perform such examinations have a decreased chance of finding a
tumor at a treatable stage)." Similar results were found for
efforts to inform people of the advantages of energy insulation:
an emphasis on the gains from insulation produced far less
change than an emphasis on the losses from noninsulation.'
Vivid and personal information can also be more effective
than statistical evidence. The same study of energy conservation
showed that it was not helpful for auditors to point to the cracks
around homeowners' doors and to recommend weatherstripping.
But striking results followed from a simple statement to the
effect that the cracks, added together, would equal a hole the size
of a basketball, combined with the question: "And if you had a
hole that size in your wall, wouldn't you want to patch it up?
That's what weatherstripping does." 89 So, too, the "availability"
heuristic, discussed above,3" means that certain events that
can be easily recalled will seem more probable than they are in
fact; regulators should respond to and take advantage of this
heuristic in attempting to convey accurate information.
Finally, there is evidence that people sometimes try to re-
duce cognitive dissonance by discounting certain risks.39' When
dissonance is at work, information about risk may be discounted,
and hence information campaigns can fail. In order to convey
information effectively, regulators should attempt to respond to
danger posed by dissonance reduction. Efforts to convey informa-
tion about the risk of AIDS, for example, appear to be adversely
affected by a frequent tendency of people to assume that the risk
does not apply to them.392 In many cases, this appears to be an
irrational form of denial, spurred in part by a perception that
condom use detracts from sexuality.393 It has been suggested
that private and public actors concerned about the spread of
AIDS should attempt to convey information not merely by stating
the facts, but also by doing so in a way that is intentionally tar-
' Beth E. Meyerowitz and Shelly Chaiken, The Effect of Message Framing on Breast
Self-Examination, Attitudes, Intentions, and Behavior, 52 J Personality & Soc Psych 500
(1987).
' Marti Hope Gonzales, Elliot Aronson, and Mark A. Costanzo, Using Social Cogni-
tion and Persuasion to Promote Energy Conservation: A Quasi-Experiment, 18 J Applied
Soc Psych 1049 (1988).
9 Id.
m See text accompanying notes 210-11.
... See Aronson, The Social Animal at 85-92, 175-245 (cited in note 257).
"9 Id at 91-92.
Id. See also Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U Chi L Rev
(forthcoming Summer 1995).
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geted at this negative (and by no means inevitable) image of
condom use.394
Effective regulatory emphasis on information disclosure
should learn from these risk-communication investigations. To
provide meaningful information about risk, regulators should
learn what people already know and assume, as well as what
they need to know. Appropriate information must then be devel-
oped, tested, and refined until empirical investigation demon-
strates that the intended information is, in fact, being con-
veyed. 95 The next step in information- and education-based
regulatory strategies is to incorporate these insights.
C. Economic Incentives
By economic incentives, we mean financial penalties imposed
on harm-producing behavior, and financial rewards attached to
harm-reducing behavior. Such penalties or rewards might supple-
ment and sometimes even displace command-and-control regula-
tion. The Clinton Order firmly and specifically endorses economic
incentives; it favors performance standards over design standards
and specifies "user fees or marketable permits" as remedies of
choice. Economic incentives appear to be playing a role in the
regulatory policy of the Clinton Administration.39
1. Efficiency.
The supporting work behind Executive Order 12866 recogniz-
es that it is often inefficient for government to prescribe the
means for achieving social objectives. 97 Often it would be far
better, on economic grounds, for government (a) to create econom-
ic incentives to engage in socially desirable conduct, and (b) to
permit the market to decide how companies respond to those
incentives. It is especially inefficient for government to dictate
technology. A far better approach is to impose a fee or a tax on
harmful behavior,398 and to let market forces determine the re-
See Aronson, The Social Animal at 237-42 (cited in note 257), for a series of inter-
esting remarks on the relation between background beliefs and regulatory problems.
' Compare the discussion of the confusion induced by California's Proposition 65, in
W. Kip Viscusi, Predicting the Effects of Food Cancer Warnings on Consumers, 43 Food
Drug Cosmetic L J 283 (1988).
' See Lubbers, 43 Duke L J at 1171 (cited in note 136). See also the discussion of the
Clinton Administration's proposals for reforming the Clean Water Act in text accompany-
ing notes 429-36.
'" See Lubbers, 43 Duke L J at 1170 (cited in note 136).
"' See Breyer, Regulation and its Reform at 164-71 (cited in note 284). A Coasian
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sponse to the increased cost. Another good approach is for gov-
ernment to set the total quantity of a pollutant that will be per-
mitted, then grant or sell a fixed number of tradable allowances
or permits to discharge that substance. Government should gen-
erally impose fees on those who put pollutants into the atmo-
sphere-instead of (for example) mandating a particular sub-
stance for use in motor vehicles. Consumption of the harm-pro-
ducing good will decline. Producers will shift to less harmful
methods of production.
More generally, government might adopt a simple, two-step
reform policy in the area of social risks and social harms. 99
First, those who impose harm should be required to pay for
it-by purchasing permission to do so, perhaps through a licens-
ing procedure. Second, those who obtain the resulting permission
should be able to trade their "licenses" with other people. In the
pollution context, this would mean that people who reduce their
pollution below a specified level could trade their "pollution
rights" for cash. In one move, such a system would create mar-
ket-based disincentives to pollute and market-based incentives
for pollution control. Such a system would also reward rather
than punish technological innovation in pollution control, and do
so with the aid of private markets. Very generally, and quite
outside the environmental area, it makes sense to think about
programs of this sort for regulation of harmful behavior."°°
An idea of this kind might be made part and parcel of a
system of "green taxes." With such a system, government might
impose taxes rather than mandates on people who impose
externalities on others-users of dirty automobiles, smokers,
farmers who employ undesirable pesticides, coal-fired power
plants, and users of other products that contribute to destruction
of the ozone layer or to the greenhouse effect. Tax levies of vari-
ous sorts are used by many nations already, though they have
qualification is necessary here: Sometimes the apparent victim of the harmful conduct is
in the best position to avoid the harm, and in such cases it is possible to say that the
apparent victim should be charged with taking preventive or remedial measures. An
example would be a case in which workers could cheaply prevent the costs of a chemical
in the workplace by wearing masks or clothing that prevent the harm from occurring. Of
course, there may be moral or other grounds for deciding not to place the responsibility to
avoid harm on the cheapest cost avoider.
' Here we generalize from the helpful discussion in Ackerman and Stewart, 13
Colum J Envir L 171 (cited in note 348).
'4 The most controversial application would be civil rights, but some have taken the
proposal seriously even there. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Implementing Quotas, 79 Georgetown
L J 1769 (1991).
1995]
The University of Chicago Law Review
been slow in coming to the United States."' These levies have
had, or are projected to have, good results. Thus a higher tax on
leaded gasoline in Great Britain increased the market share of
unleaded gas from 4 percent to 30 percent within less than a
year.4 2 It is estimated that a tripling of pesticide prices would
cut pesticide use in half.40 3 It is also estimated that a fee of
$110 per ton on carbon would decrease carbon dioxide emissions
by 20 percent from previous 1988 levels by 2005.' An added
advantage of such strategies is that they generate government
revenues, thus reducing public deficits.4 5
Economic incentives could be applied in other areas as well.
Workers' compensation plans, for example, operate to enhance
workplace safety. According to a careful study, "If the safety
incentives of workers' compensation were removed, fatality rates
in the United States economy would increase by almost 30 per-
cent. Over 1,200 more workers would die from job injuries every
year in the absence of the safety incentives provided by workers'
compensation."4 6 This contrasts with a mere 2-4 percent reduc-
tion in injuries from OSHA, an amount that links up well with
the fact that annual workers' compensation premiums are more
than one thousand times as large as total annual OSHA penal-
ties.40 7 The tax system could be used to punish employers who
provide dangerous workplaces.
2. Democracy.
It is well understood that economic incentives have advan-
tages from the standpoint of efficiency, and thus far we have seen
that a shift to incentives would probably be efficient and effec-
tive. What consequences would such a shift have for democratic
government?
The answer is that it could have significant beneficial conse-
quences."° The current system puts public attention in the
41 A study by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development found
over ffty environmental charges among fourteen of its members. See Lester R. Brown,
Christopher Flavin, and Sandra Postel, Saving the Planet: How to Shape an Environmen-
tally Sustainable Global Economy 143 (Norton, 1991).
2 Id.
40 Id at 146.
4 Id at 148.
' The suggested carbon tax would generate an estimated $120 billion. Id at 145.
4' W. Kip Viscusi, Reforming Products Liability 178 (Harvard, 1991).
Id at 178-79.
The point is nicely treated in Ackerman and Stewart, 13 Colum J Envir L 171
(cited in note 348), and we draw on their discussion here.
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wrong places. Imagine, for example, that Congress and the citi-
zenry-following the contemporary model-are focusing on
whether ethanol, or some other gasoline substitute, should be
required in new cars. It is perfectly predictable that in answering
this question, well-organized groups with significant stakes in the
outcome will bring their influence to bear. It is also predictable
that producers of the competing products may seek and actually
obtain regulatory benefits, and for reasons bearing little or no
relationship to environmental protection.
At the same time, the underlying substantive ques-
tion-whether ethanol is actually an environmentally superior
product-will have to be resolved on the basis of technological
complexities not easily addressed by the public or its representa-
tives. If this is the issue on which the political process focuses,
there is likely to be a series of laws that represent not public-
spirited deliberation with a measure of broad accountability, but
instead trade-offs among well-organized private groups, or, in
Madisonian terms, government by faction. By directing attention
to means, this system creates strong incentives for interest
groups to ensure that they are favored in the legislature or the
bureaucracy.
Compare a system of economic incentives. Here the issue is
not one of means, but the amount of sulfur dioxide that will be
allowed into the atmosphere-an issue to be resolved in the pro-
cess of deciding how many licenses to be given out, and for how
much pollution. An advantage of this shift is that it would ensure
that citizens and representatives would be focusing on how much
pollution reduction there should be, and at what cost. The right
question would be put squarely before the electorate. No longer
would it be possible to pretend that environmental protection is
costless. No longer would the central issue be displaced by the
largely incidental question of means.
Moreover, a system of financial penalties or rewards allows
less room for interest-group maneuvering. The large ques-
tion-how much environmental protection at what cost-does not
permit legislators to favor a well-organized, narrow group, such
as the agricultural lobby or the coal lobby. Special favors cannot
be provided so readily through a system of economic incentives.
The very generality of the question will work against narrow
favoritism. To be sure, the ultimate question of pollution reduc-
tion may be answered in a way that reflects sustained political
pressure rather than democratic deliberation. But the risks are
reduced, certainly as compared with the existing system.
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There are other democratic advantages as well. Economic
incentives should simultaneously promote coordination and ratio-
nality in regulation by giving government an incentive to attend
closely, and for the first time, to how other risks are treated. This
should bring a salutary measure of structure and sense to risk
regulation in general. As an important by-product, the new sys-
tem should create a powerful incentive to obtain information
about the actual effects of pollution and pollution control. If
members of Congress are deciding on the level of risk reduction,
they will not want to do so in a vacuum, especially in light of the
significant costs of large reductions. Affected groups will there-
fore be encouraged to engage in research about real-world conse-
quences.
As we have seen, information about consequences frequently
remains in its most preliminary stages. The new premium placed
on information should be a particularly important gain. There is
every reason to design a regulatory strategy that puts a premium
on greater research, so that when we act, we know what we are
getting, and at what price.
All these considerations suggest that economic incen-
tives-favored so firmly on economic grounds-have as one of
their principal justifications a series of democracy-reinforcing,
faction-limiting characteristics. 9
3. Pre-Clinton initiatives.
The movement toward economic incentives is preliminary but
real. Thus far, it has occurred mostly in the environmental area.
An important series of administrative initiatives have brought
about "emissions trading," especially under the Clean Air Act.41
Under EPA's policy, a firm that reduces its emissions below legal
requirements may obtain "credits" that can be used against high-
er emissions elsewhere. Through the "offset" policy, which is
formally codified in the Clean Air Act,41' a company may locate
in an area not in compliance with national air quality standards
if and only if it can offset the new emissions by reducing existing
emissions, either from its own sources or from other firms.
4r But see Heinzerling, 62 U Chi L Rev at 471-72 (cited in note 190), for cautionary
notes.
410 See Environmental Protection Agency, Emissions Trading Policy Statement;
General Principles for Creation, Banking and Use of Emission Reduction Credits, 51 Fed
Reg 43814 (1986).
411 42 USC § 7503(c) (1988 & Supp 1992).
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Through the "banking" policy, firms are permitted to store emis-
sion credits for their own future use.412 Companies may also en-
gage in "netting," by which a firm modifies a source, but avoids
otherwise-applicable emissions limits by reducing emissions from
another source within the same plant. Existing sources may also
place an imaginary "bubble" over their plants, allowing increased
emissions levels for some emitting devices, so long as the total
emissions level meets the aggregate requirements.
We now have a good deal of evidence about the emissions
trading program. For various reasons, the program's use has
been quite limited.41 A 1989 study showed forty-two federal
bubbles, ninety state bubbles, two thousand federal offsets, be-
tween five thousand and twelve thousand acts of netting, and one
hundred acts of banking.414 Despite this limited activity, there
is considerable evidence that this policy has been successful.
Overall, the program has produced savings of between $525 mil-
lion and $12 billion.415 By any measure, this is a large gain. On
balance, moreover, the environmental consequences have been
neutral or better. Offsets must, by definition, produce environ-
mental gains. The preliminary evidence shows favorable effects
from bubbles as well.4"6 There may be modest beneficial effects
from banking and modest adverse effects from netting.41 ' The
overall environmental effect is therefore neutral or even good,
cost entirely to one side. Consider the following table by way of
summary:
See outline of emissions trading program in Tietenberg, Emissions Trading at 7-9
(cited in note 338).
41 See Daniel J. Dudek and John Palmisano, Emissions Trading: Why is this Thor-
oughbred Hobbled?, 13 Colum J Envir L 217 (1988).
... Robert W. Hahn and Gordon L. Hester, Marketable Permits: Lessons for Theory
and Practice, 16 Ecol L Q 361, 374 table 2 (1989).
45 Id at 374 & table 2.
41 Id at 375.
417 Id at 374 table 2.
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TABLE 7. Emissions Trading Activity
418
Activity
Netting
Offsets
Federally
approved
bubbles
State-
approved
bubbles
Banking
Estimated
number of*
internal
transactions
5,000 to
12,000
1,800
40
<100
Estimated
number of Estimated
external cost savings
transactions (millions)
None $25 to $300
in permitting
costs; $500
to $12,000 in
emissions
control costs
Probably
large, but
not easily
measured
2 $300
0 $135
Small
Environmental
quality impact
Insignificant
in individual
cases; probably
insignificant
in aggregate
Probably
Insignificant
Insignificant
Insignificant
Insignificant
EPA has also permitted emissions trading for lead. Under
this policy, a refinery that produced gasoline with lower-than-
required lead levels could earn credits. These could be traded
with other refineries or banked for future use.419 Until the
program's termination in 1987, when the phasedown of lead end-
ed, emissions credits for lead were widely traded. EPA concluded
that there had been cost savings of about 20 percent over alter-
native systems, making total savings in the hundreds of millions
418 Robert W. Hahn and Gordon L. Hester, Where Did All the Markets Go? An Analysis
of EPA's Emissions Trading Program, 6 Yale J Reg 109, 138 (1989). © 1989 by the Yale
Journal on Regulation, P.O. Box 208215, New Haven, CT 06520-8215. Reprinted from
Volume 6:1 by permission. All rights reserved.
419 See 40 CFR § 80.20 (1993).
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of dollars.42 There have been initial administrative efforts as
well with respect to water pollution and ozone depletion.42'
The most dramatic program of economic incentives can be
found in the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act. The Act now
explicitly creates an emissions trading system for the control of
sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions, major contributors to
acid deposition. In these amendments, Congress has made an
explicit decision about the aggregate emissions level for a pollut-
ant.' The goal is to reduce sulfur dioxide emissions by ten mil-
lion tons each year, with initial standards going into place in
1995 and much tighter standards coming into effect by 2000.'
Whether the particular decision about the size of the reduction is
the correct one may well be disputed. But there are large demo-
cratic benefits from ensuring that public attention is focused on
that issue.
The acid deposition provisions have other beneficial features.
Congress has said that polluters may obtain allowances for emis-
sions avoided through energy conservation and renewable energy.
In this way, conservation strategies are made privately profit-
able.424 This provision creates an incentive to shift to conserva-
tion and renewable sources, without providing further environ-
mental degradation.
Moreover, polluters are explicitly permitted to trade their
allowances; this is a first in national legislative policy.' In this
way, entities that are able to reduce their pollution below the
specified level receive economic benefits. An especially intriguing
provision allows spot and advance sales of sulfur dioxide allow-
ances, to be purchased at $1,500 per ton.426 Through this route,
polluters must-for the first time-pay a fee for their pollution.
"' Environmental Protection Agency, Costs and Benefits of Reducing Lead in Gasoline,
Final Regulatory Impact Analysis viii-31 (1985). See also Hahn and Hester, 16 Ecol L Q at
387-88 (cited in note 414).
421 On ozone depletion, see Environmental Protection Agency, Protection of Strato-
spheric Ozone, 53 Fed Reg 30566 (1988); on water pollution, see Robert W. Hahn and
Robert N. Stavins, Ineentive-Based Environmental Regulation: A New Era from an Old
Idea?, 18 Ecol L Q 1, 18-19 (1991). See also text accompanying notes 429-36.
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 § 406, Pub L No 101-549, 104 Stat 2399, 2632-
33, codified at 42 USC § 7651 note (Supp 1993).
" Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 §§ 401(b), 404-05, 104 Stat at 2585, 2592-613,
codified at 42 USC §§ 7651(b), 7651c, 7651d (Supp 1993).
"' Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 § 404(f)(2), 104 Stat at 2602-03, codified at 42
USC § 7651c(f)(2) (Supp 1993).
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 § 403, 104 Stat at 2589, codified at 42 USC §
7651b (Supp 1993).
4 42 USC § 7651b(b).
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Equally intriguing is a provision calling for auction sales of speci-
fied numbers of sulfur dioxide allowances.4"7 Here the market is
permitted to set the price for polluting activity. For example, in
the first auction of these rights, in 1993, the average price for the
right to discharge one ton of sulfur dioxide in 1995 was $156; by
1994, the market price had risen to $159 per ton.428
For the most part, however, the Clean Air Act does not re-
quire polluters to pay for their "licenses." Instead, government is
granting initial marketable pollution allowances to existing
sources for free. This might be a short-term measure to protect
reliance interests underlying existing uses, for political or more
substantive reasons. As further experience with these approaches
develops, perhaps Congress will take the next step of requiring
dischargers to pay for their emissions by requiring polluters to
purchase their allowances in the first place. Executive Order
12866 holds out promise that future legislative and administra-
tive initiatives will pursue regulation through incentive-altering
structures more fully.
4. Initial Clinton initiatives.
Executive Order 12866 is already having significant effects
on the development of alternative regulatory strategies. The
Clean Water Act is up for reauthorization this year, and the
Clinton Administration, through EPA, has put forward a compre-
hensive set of proposals for revamping administration of the Act
(the Clean Water Initiative, or "CWI"). These proposals include
measures to deal with toxic discharges; nonpoint sources of pollu-
tion; watersheds; and the funding, monitoring, and enforcement
aspects of water pollution control.
The Clinton CWI reflects the Executive Order's influence at
every turn and, more generally, the prevalent techniques by
which regulatory policy is now made. To begin with, the CWI is
accompanied by an extensive analysis of the benefits and costs of
the proposed new regulatory approaches.2 9 Moreover, where
commensurating benefits and costs would involve controversial
value judgments, the analysis does not attempt to force a single
metric on the problem and obscure important qualitative distinc-
4 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 § 416(d), 104 Stat at 2629, codified at 42 USC §
7651o(d) (Supp 1993).
' Utilities gobble up air-pollution credits, Chi Trib § 3 at 3 (Mar 30, 1994).
41 President Clinton's Clean Water Initiative: Analysis of Benefits and Costs, Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency 800-R-94-002 (Mar 1994).
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tions. For example, the analysis carefully documents the physical
water-quality benefits to be expected without attempting to mon-
etize these in order to "weigh" them against costs.' ° In one ar-
ea where some basis for attaching dollar values to the relevant
benefits plausibly exists (the value to urban households of clean
water for various purposes), the analysis attempts to do so."
But the analysis does not hide the uncertainty behind these esti-
mates, and it consistently makes its underlying assumptions
clear. A strong emphasis is placed throughout on more flexible
regulatory strategies that pursue the most cost-effective approach
to producing a given level of benefits.
Thus, rather than requiring all municipalities (as current
law does) to meet the same standards for combined sewer over-
flows and storm water discharges, the CWI proposes different
regulatory regimes for large and small cities." Similarly, the
CWI proposes building on the recent Clean Air Act approach by
using market mechanisms, such as tradable permits, to improve
water quality in the most efficient way. The basic concept here is
that all sources discharging into the same body of water in a
similar manner should be permitted to negotiate among them-
selves (through trading discharge permits) as to how to achieve a
federal water-quality standard for that body. EPA estimates that
about 940 bodies of water would benefit from trades between
certain point sources and nonpoint sources, and 210 bodies of
water would be able to benefit from trades between point
sources. 3 In addition, EPA has identified numerous public
treatment plants that would be able to reduce pollution more
cheaply by negotiating reductions in inputs from the relevant
sources. All told, EPA estimates that permitting trades of these
sorts would achieve the same level of water-quality improvement
at savings of between $658 million to $7.5 billion per year.4 '
"' Thus, EPA projects that its proposals for nonpoint source controls will produce
measurable water-quality improvements in 7.1 million lake acres and 156,200 river miles;
or that these proposals have a "high or medium" likelihood of producing measurable
improvement in 52 percent of impaired or threatened rivers and 63 percent of lakes. Id at
ES-7. Similarly, the proposals for addressing combined sewer overflows are estimated to
reduce the average number of overflows from fifty to eighty events per year to approxi-
mately three to four; this would reduce the number of water-quality violations for each
system from one hundred to two hundred days per year to ten to twenty, and reduce by
35 to 65 percent the annual discharges of various chemicals and toxic substances. Id at
23-24.
=' Id at ES-9 to ES-10, 48-58.
Id at viii.
4" Id at 46.
4 Id at 47.
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This attention to more flexible, cost-effective regulatory strat-
egies is evidenced in the Initiative's bottom-line summary of its
cost consequences. The analysis projects that if the CWI were
adopted as proposed, it would lead to additional incremental
expenditures of $5 to $9.6 billion per year." But the analysis
also claims that this is vastly less-amounting to savings of $29
to $33.8 billion-than would be generated under the regulatory
approaches required by current law. 8 The important point is
not that these numbers are to be believed (although even if dis-
counted substantially, they still suggest roughly the magnitude of
expected savings from more flexible regulatory strategies). More
significantly, Executive Order 12866 is already bringing about
systematic analysis of major new regulatory initiatives by encour-
aging new means to environmental ends.
5. Qualifications.
In some areas, economic incentives are inappropriate. If
government seeks to ban a substance entirely, a prohibition
makes sense, rather than a high fee for marketing or use. At
least if the benefits of the substance do not outweigh the danger,
and if less dangerous substitutes are available, a ban is the pre-
ferred course.
In addition, where economic incentives are warranted, it is
sometimes best to regulate quantity rather than price. Market-
able permits that regulate the quantity discharged, rather than
emission fees, may well be the better approach to market strate-
gies for pollution reduction. Setting emission fees at the right
level to achieve the desired reduction requires detailed (marginal
cost and benefit) information, which is usually unavailable, with
respect to an industry's demand curve for emissions. In contrast,
once the acceptable total level of emissions is determined, it is
much easier to determine the appropriate quantity different
producers should be permitted to discharge. That is what quanti-
ty-based marketable permits or allowances do. When these per-
mits are traded, the market will then set their price. Although
emissions fees are typically the way theorists analyze incentive
approaches to pollution regulation, these approaches are often
more appropriately pursued through quantity-based permits or
43 Id at ES-1.
' Id. The document refers to the larger figure that current law would require as
being based on a "stringent interpretation" of current law. Id.
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allowances." Auctions are also a promising approach, with the
benefit of market rather than governmental setting of initial
prices for the allowances."
On the other hand, fees or taxes may sometimes be prefera-
ble. An advantage of taxes as a response to (say) pollution prob-
lems is that the government need not even calculate the socially
optimal level of pollution, a complex question to be sure. Rather
than compute the tax at a level designed to achieve a predeter-
mined quantity (a difficult task, for reasons described above),
government could simply tax polluters at a level equal to the
harm done to others from the pollution generated. On a standard
view, this would generally equal the lower of either the cleanup
costs, or the amount of money society is willing to accept in ex-
change for living with the pollution. Under this approach, the
polluters would internalize the social cost of polluting, and would
have every incentive to pollute at the socially optimal level. Com-
puting the social harm done from a given unit of pollution may
well be easier in many contexts than computing the total socially
optimal quantity. Moreover, this approach allows the market to
respond to fluctuations in the socially optimal quantity, which
may frequently arise from changes in technology, market substi-
tutes, increased demand, and so forth.
The main difficulty with this approach stems from the prob-
lem of calculating the amount of the fee or tax. Cleanup costs are
often incalculable, and there are problems with relying on aggre-
gated willingness to pay, even if it is calculable."9 Nonetheless,
there are undoubtedly circumstances in which pollution taxes are
better than quantity limits, because taxes are a better response
to government's informational limits. Which approach is best
cannot be decided in the abstract.
As we have noted, sometimes economic incentives are unde-
sirable for what we have described as expressive reasons. Per-
haps a curbside tax is a more efficient response to the problem of
solid waste disposal than mandatory recycling, at least in the
short term (though this could encourage people to dispose of their
wastes in more covert, and environmentally harmful, ways)."0
See James E. Krier, Marketable Pollution Allowances, 25 U Toledo L Rev 449, 452-
53 (1994).
' For a discussion of recent FCC experiences, see John McMillan, Selling Spectrum
Rights, J Econ Perspectives 145 (Summer 1994).
See text accompanying notes 257-65.
See generally Peter S. Menell, Beyond the Throwaway Society: An Incentive Ap-
proach to Regulating Municipal Solid Waste, 17 Ecol L Q 655, 687-90 (1990).
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But mandatory recycling might affect social norms with respect
to consumption, waste disposal, and environmental protection, in
a way that has better long-term consequences, and that in any
case responds better to the public's understanding of how best to
conceive of social obligations in the area of solid waste disposal.
The choice between curbside taxes and mandatory recycling can-
not be resolved in the abstract. But insofar as economic incen-
tives treat a public bad as a commodity, they might be objection-
able on expressive grounds. It is rarely urged, for example, that
the emissions trading model makes sense in the antidiscrimina-
tion area; a "discrimination license" would be inconsistent with
the general effort to delegitimate racial prejudice."'
A final problem is that a system of economic incentives can
bring about distortions that must be addressed through govern-
mental action. In the environmental area, emissions trading
programs can lead to "hot spots," which occur when trades lead
sources to concentrate pollution in some local area."2 There are
important equitable issues here, connected to those treated
above: the "hot spots" may have unfortunate distributional ef-
fects, burdening identifiable social groups."3 This is less of a
problem to the extent that the pollutant has no local effects and
is troubling only when mixed in a larger environment (which
might be true, to a significant degree, of sulfur dioxide).'" But
where local concentration effects are a problem, controls on
trades or location of sources will have to be reintroduced. Indeed,
the regulatory approach to trades in nitrogen oxides already
manifests such an approach. Unlike with sulfur dioxides, trades
in nitrogen oxides (which cause smog) must be approved by envi-
ronmental officials in the states where the extra pollutants will
be admitted; in addition, such trades are supposed to be "direc-
tionally correct," in that sellers must be upwind of buyers."5
41 But see Mashaw, 79 Georgetown L J 1769 (cited in note 400); the idea is proposed
by way of satire in Derrick Bell, And We Are Not Saved. The Elusive Quest for Racial
Justice 88-89 (Basic Books, 1987).
See Krier, 25 U Toledo L Rev at 454 (cited in note 437).
See Hornstein, 92 Colum L Rev at 592-98 (cited in note 286); Carol M. Rose,
Environmental Lessons, 27 Loyola L Rev 1023, 1030 (1994).
Krier, 25 U Toledo L Rev at 454 (cited in note 437).
See Matthew L. Wald, Eastern Utilities in Unusual Pact: A Smog Tradeoff, NY
Times Al, B2 (Mar 16, 1994). For more information on initial experiments with trading
permits to discharge nitrogen oxide, see Northeast Utilities Propose NOx Trade in First
Test of Interstate Swap Scheme, 24 Envir Rep (BNA) 1998 (Mar 25, 1994); New Initiative
Will Allow Companies to Trade NOx Emission Credits, EPA Says, 24 Envir Rep (BNA)
282-83 (June 11, 1993).
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The right solution varies from context to context, but it seems
likely that appropriate structures and policies can be developed
to address these concerns.'
CONCLUSION
This Article has emphasized three principal points. The first
involves regulatory institutions. The second involves regulatory
ends. The third involves regulatory means.
We have suggested that an institution in OMB to oversee
and coordinate regulatory policy is, at least potentially, highly
salutary. Staffed by appropriate employees, such an entity could
help coordinate solutions to similar problems that arise across
different agencies. Moreover, by introducing a more comprehen-
sive perspective on risk regulation, such a body could encourage
sensible priority setting. Executive Order 12866 takes coordina-
tion a step further than the Reagan-Bush approaches. It does so,
most importantly, by attempting to promote early intrabranch
discussion of regulatory proposals and to ensure more continuous
consultation about regulatory goals. This reform is part of a con-
spicuous effort to reduce agency-OIRA antagonism by encourag-
ing cooperation at all stages of rule making. The Order also takes
the important step of including the independent agencies, if only
in a modest, procedurally oriented way.
Executive Order 12866 begins as well to address the conflict
between centralization and participation. The Order requires
disclosure of contacts with private groups. It also opens up the
process of discussion between OMB and the agencies-a step that
might be legally unnecessary, but is nonetheless desirable. Final-
ly, the Order is plainly designed to take advantage of information
from affected persons at early stages of agency action. 7 These
measures reflect appreciation not only of the need for relevant
information, but also of the central role that public trust plays in
risk perception, evaluation, and remediation.
With respect to the current institutional framework, our
principal suggestion is that in its implementation, Executive
Order 12866 should be used to create better priority setting. This
' See Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of
Uniform Standards and "Fine-Tuning" Regulatory Reforms, 37 Stan L Rev 1267, 1331-32
(1985).
"' See Exec Order No 12866 §§ 1(b)(9), 4(e), 3 CFR at 640, 643-44 (cited in note 18).
See also the remarks of Sally Katzen, Administrator of the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs, in Colloquium, 8 Admin L J Am U at 53 (cited in note 18).
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idea is only incipient in Executive Order 12866. Toward this end,
OIRA (perhaps bolstered by the addition of employees trained in
relevant fields in addition to economics and policy analysis)
should generate recommendations about which risk priorities
ought to be viewed as most pressing." As we have emphasized,
the judgment about which risks are most pressing, and about
which problems are most severe, does not depend solely on quan-
tity or on numbers of lives saved. It depends a great deal on the
context in which risks are imposed and on such factors as wheth-
er relevant risks are catastrophic, irreversible, involuntarily
imposed, faced by future generations, or inequitably distributed.
Precisely how these recommendations might be turned into
policy commitments requires further thought about the best mix
of democratic and technocratic influences. Certainly, OIRA's
efforts are unlikely to be productive without a firm commitment
to better risk management at the presidential or vice presidential
level. Under the right circumstances, OIRA might be given some
substantive power to define risk priorities, or perhaps Congress
would act on OIRA's recommendations. For now, OIRA could at
least move the reform process forward by providing information
and recommendations about risk priorities. As we have said, this
view of OIRA's role is, at most, incipient in Executive Order
12866, but we think such a role would contribute significantly to
improving regulation.
In order to monitor OIRA activity, new mechanisms should
be created to allow something in the way of official and private
"performance review," through studies showing which regulations
have been issued by the Administration, with particular atten-
tion to their anticipated and actual real-world consequences.
Such a step would create good incentives for OIRA and also en-
able the public to see what, as a matter of substance, has been
done in the regulatory arena. Thus far OIRA's attention appears
to have been focused mostly on procedural matters,"9 and in-
sufficiently on the hard (and far more important) substantive
issues involved in improving regulation.
On the question of regulatory ends, Executive Order 12866
is, perhaps understandably, a bit uncertain. The Order does not
embody a clear conception of what it means for regulation to be
rational. The Order qualifies the Reagan-Bush conception of cost-
benefit analysis, but it does not reject the technique entirely.
See Colloquium, 8 Admin L J Am U at 53 (cited in note 18).
See Report on Executive Order No 12866, 59 Fed Reg at 24290 (cited in note 28).
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Instead, it requires a modified form of cost-benefit analysis, one
that calls on agencies to incorporate ambiguous concerns for
"equity" and "distributive impacts" into CBA. There is evident
doubt about the prior use of cost-benefit techniques; attenuated
endorsement of the basic method; and vague modifications that
leave the final outcome, in terms of actual effects on agency poli-
cy, quite unpredictable.
The best way to progress beyond this ambivalence is to rec-
ognize its causes. We have focused on three such causes: legiti-
mate conflicts between expert and lay value systems and concep-
tions of rationality; the incommensurability of some benefits and
costs that can only be compared qualitatively; and the relevance
of expressive concerns in choosing regulatory policies. We do not
urge a general abandonment of analytic approaches to regulatory
policy, nor do we deny the importance of CBA or comparative
risk assessment, especially in a period in which regulation is far
too costly a means of achieving its own goals. We have, however,
argued for qualifying conventional CBA, and for embodying in
CRA an understanding of qualitative differences among risks.
Perhaps the qualification could take place through formal analy-
sis that incorporates unconventional variables. But if we attempt
to incorporate all relevant concerns into policy analysis at the
same time, we risk undermining the genuine benefits that more
analytic approaches can provide.
Instead, we might split the process of CBA into two stages.
In the first, the focus should be on a quantitative cost-benefit as-
sessment of those dimensions that can properly be subject to this
approach. To deal with incommensurability problems, the analy-
sis should disaggregate benefits and costs so as to indicate how
they are distributed over various groups and interests. In the
second stage, agencies should take into account differences be-
tween expert and lay value frameworks, concerns for equity, the
expressive dimensions of the choice, and other relevant values
not subject to the cost-benefit approach. Perhaps mechanisms
could be created to promote citizen evaluation of regulatory al-
ternatives, though any efforts in this direction must necessarily
be tentative and experimental. CRA might proceed similarly,
with attention to the sorts of factors that we have emphasized
here.
With respect to regulatory means, Executive Order 12866 is
also a step in the right direction. A pervasive problem with na-
tional regulatory law is the use of rigid, highly bureaucratized
command-and-control regulation, which dictates, at the national
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level, risk control strategies for hundreds, thousands, or millions
of companies in an exceptionally diverse nation. Such regulation
is highly inefficient. Even more fundamentally, such strategies
are deficient from the standpoint of a well-functioning democratic
process. Often they ensure that citizens and representatives will
be devoting their attention not to general questions of val-
ue-what levels of risk reduction and cost trade-offs are appropri-
ate-but instead to the largely incidental and publicly inaccessi-
ble question of what technologies are now available. They focus
on the question of regulatory "means," a focus that increases the
power of well-organized private groups by allowing them to press
the law in the service of their own parochial ends.
In this light, it is no wonder that some observers think that
our current system is a kind of Madisonian nightmare, in which
James Madison's vision of deliberative democracy has been trans-
formed into a system of government as a series of interest-group
deals.450 Executive Order 12866 holds out much promise on this
front. It adopts a kind of presumption against command-and-
control regulation. It presages a greater shift to economic incen-
tives, to informational remedies, and to performance rather than
design standards. All of these are desirable suggestions. But we
have cautioned that some of these new strategies are not likely to
be effective unless they deal with the ways in which ordinary
people process and conceive of risks.
The solution to this problem lies in strategies that respond to
people's background assumptions and to their diverse valuations
of diverse risks. Indeed, a principle of this kind-that risk evalu-
ation should take into account informed public valua-
tions-should be placed at the center of modern efforts to rein-
vent the regulatory state. We have suggested that such efforts
could promote economic goals, by reducing the billions of dollars
unnecessarily spent on regulation and by ensuring that resources
are devoted to the many serious problems that remain inade-
quately addressed. Such efforts could promote democratic goals
as well, by reducing interest-group power, poor priority setting
unreflective of public judgments, and the role of sensationalist
anecdotes in regulatory policy. A reinvented government could
simultaneously increase efficiency and improve the democratic
character of the regulatory state. This task has technocratic di-
mensions, but it is far from only technocratic. It also requires
government to respond to public understandings and valuations
4- See Stewart, 57 U Chi L Rev 335 (cited in note 346).
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of risk, and to make a large place for those valuations to the
extent that they reflect a distinct, and legitimate, conception of
rational choice.

